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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Martin Joseph MacNeill ("Dr. MacNeill") appeals from the final order 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, Utah, the Honorable Derek P. Pullan 
~ presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-
103(2)0). 
ARGUMENT 
The State's untimely and verbose brief offers an abundance of information but is 
lacking in legal and logical arguments. The State fails to provide any direct evidence that 
supports a murder conviction but rather relies on the frailest of circumstantial evidence. 
The State also concedes that the key witness, Inmate One ("Michael Buchanan"), 
received a benefit for his testimony which the State failed to disclose to defense counsel. 
Finally, the State fails to provide any reasonable response to Dr. MacNeill's numerous 
examples of prosecutorial misconduct which deprived Dr. MacNeill of a fair trial. 
I. THE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY REMAINS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GUILT. 
Despite the State's efforts to construe the evidence presented in this case as 
adequate to compel a reasonable jury to find Dr. MacNeill guilty, the evidence remains 
insufficient to demonstrate the elements required to convict anyone of the offense of 
murder. While it is true that the Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the jury verdict, 1 there simply was no evidence presented by the State, absent the 
''testimony" of a jailhouse informant, that could have justified a finding of guilt by the 
1 
jury. The trial judge is the best unbiased source that could provide a trustworthy account 
of what transpired during this trial. In the case at bar, the trial judge wrote a thorough 
order parsing out the evidence that was considered by the jury in reaching their verdict. 2 
That order demonstrates that the jury could have only considered a limited number of 
very weak circumstantial pieces of evidence, and the only direct evidence supporting the 
conviction arose from the false testimony of the jailhouse informant. 
The State has limited its characterization of this offense to a knowing and 
intentional murder. The State argues that the testimony of Jason Poirier3 would be enough 
for tQ.e Court to find there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. The record 
reveals Poirier testified that the purported confession of Dr. MacNeill, admitting that he 
killed his wife was given in public, but conveniently, only Poirier heard the alleged 
confession. Additionally, the trial court gave specific trial instructions to the jury relating 
to weighing the credibility of jailhouse informants.4 Poirier's testimony was, in all 
respects, unbelievable. Poirier testified that he received immunity for many of his 
charges in exchange for his testimony. The jury also heard Poirier had lied to the police, 
defrauded his landlord, discussed making false police reports with his wife, along with 
other false statements that Poirier made when it was convenient. R.6028: 1886, 1902, 
1923-1924, 1933. The most damning evidence lies in the trial judge's order wp.ere he laid 
1. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997). 
2. See, Exhibit B in Brief of Appellant, filed June 19, 2015. 
3. Jason Poirier was in Utah County's custody and was to receive probation in exchange 
for his testimony. Poirier' s name was released to the press and he was filmed during his 
testimony. 
2 
out all of the evidence he felt the jury had used to convict Dr. MacNeill.5 Poirier's name 
does not appear even once in the order because the trial judge, nor the jury, found him 
sufficiently credible to give any weight to his testimony whatsoever. Poirier's testimony 
on the alleged confession was beyond credulity, and even the trial judge refused to 
acknowledge the testimony while reviewing the evidence in a post-trial motion. 
Accordingly, the State simply cannot rely on such testimony in order to contend that the 
evidence against Dr. MacNeill was sufficient to find him guilty of murder. 
A great deal of the evidence presented against Dr. MacNeill consisted of the 
testimony of Dr. MacNeill's daughter, Ms. Somers. Somers was an angry woman who 
hated her father for having an affair and allowing his paramour to stay at the house 
shortly following the death of her mother.6 Additionally, Somers had gone through a 
vehement custody battle with Dr. MacNeill regarding her younger siblings. The trial 
judge observed that Somers and her siblings' testimony was contaminated with bias. 
Somers was exceedingly enraged and so bitter at her father that she accused him of sexual 
assault, harangued investigators to look into her mother's death a year later, and 
contaminated her younger sister's (A.M.) testimony to the extent that A.M. was 
prohibited from testifying. 
Somers was the sole source of the details relating to the purported relationship 
between Dr. and Mrs. MacNeill. The allegation that Mrs. MacNeill knew about the 
4. See, footnote 2, supra. 
5. See, footnote 2, supra 
6. Id. 
3 
affair, the allegation that Dr. MacNeill pushed his wife into a surgery she did not want, 
the allegation that Dr. MacNeill got out his medical books prior to the surgery, the 
allegation that Dr. MacNeill had attempted to overdose his wife after the surgery, and the 
allegation of how Mrs. MacNeill was feeling the morning of her unfortunate death were 
provided solely by Somers. 
In contrast, Dr. Thompson claimed that he felt Mrs. MacNeill was nervous, but 
excited for the surgery and ready to proceed as scheduled. R.6017:63, 124-125. The State 
has offered its version of circumstantial and hearsay evidence throughout the trial, and on 
this appeal, but there is no evidence corroborating Somers' testimony. For example, there 
was no evidence that Mrs. MacNeill was planning on filing for divorce; there was no 
evidence that Mrs. MacNeill or Somers were preoccupied enough to make a police report; 
nor was there any need for Somers to remain in Utah in order to protect her mother from 
Dr. MacNeill. IfMrs. MacNeill overdosed the morning after her surgery, there is still no 
evidence that Somers took her mother to the hospital. Finally, contrary to the contention 
of the State, there is no evidence verifying that Dr. MacNeill left his office prior to 
picking up his minor child on the morning of Mrs. MacNeill's death. 
The State attempts to interpret the allegation that Dr. MacNeill pretended to be 
terminally ill, as some sort of premeditation to commit murder. The Court should see this 
as a red herring as the State has no evidence to support this speculation. 
The State further offers the bizarre premise, that the grief shown by Dr. MacNeill 
was not "consistent" or ''typical" of a grieving husband. What constitutes ''typical 
4 
evidence of grief," if such a model exists, has not been established anywhere, much less 
in this case, where the facts demonstrate the atypical circumstances of a husband 
discovering his wife dead in the bathroom. 7 
The deficiency in the State's case is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that 
there is no agreement among the State's medical experts as to the manner or mechanism 
of death. The State called four medical professionals and not one supported another's 
theory. The original Medical Examiner, Maureen Frikke, M.D. ("Dr. Frikke") the only 
doctor that physically examined Mrs. MacNeill, opined that the manner of death was 
natural. Following the death of Dr. Frikke, the chief Medical Examiner, Todd Grey, M.E. 
("Dr. Grey") modified his :finding regarding the manner of Mrs. MacNeill's death as a 
result of the State asking him to look into the case since they were attempting to build a 
prosecution against Dr. MacNeill. Dr. Grey testified that he would not reach an opinion 
of homicide, but changed the manner of death to undetermined. The other "expert 
witnesses" were brought in from other states and offered their inconsistent proffers 
which, at best, only marginally supported the State's theory of the case. The trial judge 
concurred that the evidence offered in the toxicology report was only suspect at best. 8 The 
remaining doctors provided a different opinion on the manner and mechanism of death 
that so differed from each other, and from those offered by both Dr. Frikke and Dr. Grey, 
7. The State, in regard to a secondary offense, alleges that the fact Dr. MacNeill had the 
pills destroyed after Mrs. MacNeill's death is an example how he was trying to cover up 
his crime. However, the police had released the scene and Dr. MacNeill, as a medical 
professional, knew that prescription pills had to be destroyed. 
8. See, footnote 2, supra. 
5 
that such inconsistent testimony is entirely unpersuasive. The jury heard from many 
doctors, but not a single one was able to give a medical opinion to any degree of medical 
certainty that would allow a jury to find that a homicide occurred beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If five medical experts are unwilling to agree on a simple manner or mechanism 
of death, and the State's medical examiner refused to opine that Mrs. MacNeill was 
murdered, then a reasonable jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. 
MacNeill murdered his wife. 
The only other evidence the jury heard suggesting that Dr. MacNeill had some 
involvement in his wife's death was the testimony of the jailhouse informants.9 The 
testimony of jailhouse informants is known to be unreliable and has a long history of 
leading to wrongful convictions.10 Appellant will expand upon his allegations of 
misconduct committed by the State in Arguments II and ill below. Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that the jailhouse informants' testimony in this case also supports the 
argument of the insufficiency of the evidence necessary to convict Dr. MacNeill. The 
federal informants were brought to Utah just shortly before providing their testimony in 
October and November 2013. However, the pervasive media attention given to this case 
began long before charges were brought against Dr. MacNeill. Dr. MacNeill's impending 
9. Unlike Poirier, the federal inmates, Inmates One through Five, were still in federal 
custody and were receiving threats. The trial judge allowed their names to be kept 
confidential and ordered the media not to film the inmates while they testified. 
10. See, Russell D. Covey, Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 1375 (2014) attached as Exhibit A in the Addendum filed herein; See also, 
Alexandra Natapoff, Comment: Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to 
Wrongful Convictions, Sept. 17, 2006 attached as Exhibit B in the Addendum filed 
herein. 
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trial became a classic high profile case. Prior to their alleged conversations and 
confrontations with Dr. MacNeill, the informants had long seen him depicted in the news 
regarding an investigation into the death of his wife. 
Inmate One watched the news before the alleged confession and continued to 
watch the news for an entire year before Jeff Robinson, the investigator, approached him 
about testifying against Dr. MacNeill. R.6012:9-10. Inmate One continued to watch the 
news, most prominently reports by Nancy Grace, even while the exclusionary order was 
in place. The other inmates, although their testimonies were not confessions, they had 
conversations with Dr. MacNeill. However, the content of those conversations can only 
be attributed to the inescapable media influence. Even without daily and extensive media 
coverage of a murder trial based upon weak circumstantial evidence, jailhouse informants 
lack credibility. No reasonable jury would allow a man to be convicted of murder based 
solely upon the testimony of a jailhouse informant who had received a promise of an 
extraordinary benefit for his testimony. Moreover, this error is compounded where the 
jury does not know of the benefit due to prosecutorial misconduct. 
II. PREJUDICE HAS OBJECTIVELY BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE 
BRADY/GIGLIO VIOLATIONS OF THE STATE. 
The State does not dispute Dr. MacNeill's allegations that it failed to disclose 
Brady material regarding its jailhouse informants. Inmate One and Inmate Three 
("Johnny Vaughn") received benefits for their testimony that the State chose not disclose 
to the defense counsel. The nondisclosure regarding the benefits promised to Inmate 
Three demonstrates a consistent pattern of misconduct by the State. R.6027: 1768. 
7 
However, it was the testimony of Inmate One that provided the questionable, yet 
detrimental, evidence against Dr. MacNeill relied upon by the State. Under a Brady11 
analysis as applied to these facts, Gigilo holds that a new trial is required "irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"12 Giglio continues to hold that, "When the 
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, non-
disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady]."13 The courts have held 
that a Brady/Giglio violation is prejudicial when a State's witness gives false testimony 
about the benefits he/she has received and has held that, "a new trial is required if, the 
false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the 
jury."14 
The State concedes that there was false testimony. Therefore, Dr. MacNeill need 
only show this Court that there was a "reasonable likelihood that the testimony affected 
the judgment of the jury." The State incorrectly argues that its Brady violation was cured 
by defense counsel cross-examining the informant. Any value in cross-examining the 
informant was destroyed by the informant's continued perjury. 
According to Inmate One's testimony, he was expecting to be released in January 
of 2016. R.6012:5. However, because of the benefit conferred on Inmate One by Jeff 
Robinson, the State's investigator, Inmate One was actually released December 15, 2013, 
11. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
12. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972). 
13. Id. at 154. 
14. Id. (emphasis supplied) 
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one month following his testimony.15 The jury was never informed that Inmate One 
would be receiving a two-year reduction of his sentence in exchange for his testifying for 
the State. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury to determine the credibility of the 
jailhouse informant by what his/her would be receiving in exchange for his testimony. 16 
Inmate One told the jury he was not receiving any benefit for his testimony but instead 
was testifying because he just had ''to do the right thing." R.6013:102. 
Inmate One then falsely testified that he had not been given any consideration for 
his testimony. He lied further, telling the jury that his 18:1 motion before the federal 
court was still pending and it was uncertain whether he would receive a reduction in his 
sentence.17 The jury was deprived of any knowledge or facts revealing Inmate One's 
release that would occur a month later, based upon the recommendation of Jeff Robinson 
that he had already promised. 
The impeachment value of the cross-examination was also undermined when the 
prosecutor stated in his closing arguments: 
"The defense challenged him about getting something in return 
for his testimony. There's nothing that State investigators, 
State prosecutors can give this individual. I think it's clear 
from the record that was established that he was looking to get 
something for his testimony. Who wouldn't, quite frankly. But 
he testified it didn't look like anything was going to work out. 
That he wasn't going to get something in exchange for his 
testimony, because it's a State case and not a Federal case ... 
15. See, Exhibit E in Brief of Appellant, filed June 19, 2015. 
16. See, footnote 2, supra. 
17. On September 1, 2013, Inmate One wrote to Robinson, "looks like the release thing 
is dead in the water." Inmate One knew his 18:1 motion was not going to get him early 
release. See, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment or for a New Trial, 
attached as Exhibit C in the Addendum filed herewith. 
9 
Not only was he - - is not getting anything for his testimony, 
ladies and gentlemen, he's suffering a significant detriment to 
come forward and tell the truth, to make the right decision. 
Inmate No. 1 talked about how he's got another couple of 
years on his sentence. He thinks it's part of his rehabilitation. 
Do the right thing and come forward." R.6018:2193-2194 
While closing arguments are not evidence, the jury nevertheless was given the false 
impression that Inmate One was testifying without having been promised anything. The 
State bolstered its representation that Inmate One's testimony was believable because 
Inmate One testified that he was providing his story in spite of the fact that he was facing 
danger upon his return to prison. The prosecution spent a great deal of effort arguing that 
the inmates were trustworthy because they had no jurisdiction over them and they 
themselves could not provide any benefit to federal inmates. The jury was falsely led to 
believe the informant was a credible witness because he was testifying out of the 
goodness of his heart. 
The State refers to the false testimony provided by hunate One regarding the fact 
that he had previously requested a recommendation letter which Robinson had agreed to 
write as a "minimal addition to the impeachment."18 There is nothing minimal about the 
State failing to give a defendant exculpatory evidence, especially when the case against 
him is comprised solely of weak circumstantial evidence. The fault in failing to give Dr. 
MacNeill and his counsel the impeachment evidence of the entire benefit provided to 
Inmate One and Inmate Three lies solely with the State. It is inexcusable after the filing 
of eight discovery requests resulting in an explicit order from the trial court to fail to 
18. See, Brief of Appellant, p. 86, filed June 19, 2015. 
10 
::;) 
reveal such information. This is even more foul when the informant provided damning 
testimony yet failed to disclose the benefits they would receive from the State. Without 
the testimony of an informant, there was little, if any, evidence of a homicide, much less a 
believable argument that Dr. MacNeill had committed the offense. The failure to provide 
candid and complete impeachment evidence, regarding the informants was a critical 
matter that deprived Dr. MacNeill of a fair trial. A reasonable jury, with full and 
complete knowledge of incentives being provided to the inmates, would have given 
substantially different weight to their testimonies and rendered a different verdict. 
III. THE STATE PERFORMED INNUMERABLE ACTS OF PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT DEPRIVING DR. MACNEILL OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
Dr. MacNeill was deprived of a fair trial as he was required to wade through the 
minefield of prosecutorial misconduct from the very beginning of the investigation. Such 
misconduct began with the investigative agency and was exacerbated when the 
prosecution team became a party to the offense by refusing to remedy law enforcement's 
transgressions and misrepresentations. 
In its brief, the State argues that Dr. MacNeill failed to properly brief his issues on 
appeal and cite legal authority establishing his claims. The Utah Supreme Court has 
indicated that the "adequate briefing requirement is not a hard-and-fast default notion" 
and that by relying so heavily on the briefing requirement the State is in jeopardy of 
themselves being in default. 19 That being said, Dr. MacNeill's brief has been and 
continues to be adequately presented to the Court. The State has rested its argument on 
11 
its hope that this Court will find that Dr. MacNeill has inadequately briefed his 
arguments. However, such a ruling is within the Court's discretion. Rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires Appellant's brief be adequately briefed in 
order to avoid shifting the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court. 20 Dr. 
MacNeill has used legal logic and appropriately citations, when applicable, to brief his 
argument and in doing so has followed Rule 24(a)(9). Dr. MacNeill's brief should now 
be considered on its merits. 
A. Robinson's Improper Influence over Somers Prejudiced not only A.M.'s 
Testimony, but also Her CJC Interview. 
The State's investigator, JeffRobinson, committed several acts of misconduct in his 
capacity as an agent for the State in the course of his pursuit to build a case against Dr. 
MacNeill.21 Robinson became inappropriately familiar with Somers, even going so far as 
to writing a letter to a judge on her behalf during the pending probate case lodged against 
Dr. MacNeill. Somers, as pointed out hereinabove, was hostile toward her father and 
worked tirelessly with Robinson to find a way to bring murder charges against Dr. 
MacNeill. At Robinson's direction, Somers relentlessly coached the minor child, A.M., 
into misrepresenting the facts surrounding the discovery of Mrs. MacNeill's body. The 
trial court found that both Somers and Robinson influenced the testimony of A.M. to the 
19. State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2015). 
20. State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, 41 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 
(Utah 1998)). 
19. Robinson was also responsible for concealing from the defense the promised benefits 
the federal inmates would receive in exchange for their testimony. 
12 
extent that she became an unreliable witness regarding the events of April 11, 2007. In 
spite of this finding, the trial court allowed a CJC interview taking place over a year after 
the death of Mrs. MacNeill to be received into evidence. This was plain error because the 
same pervasive coaching and clandestine influence exerted by Somers and Robinson had 
contaminated the CJC interview to the same extend than the proffered in-court testimony 
of A.M. which was rightly suppressed. 
Somers was the guardian of A.M. in October 2007, after she accused her father of 
sexually assaulting her shortly after her mother's death.22 The CJC interview took place 
over a year after Mrs. MacNeill's death. Somers' constant coaching prejudiced A.M.'s 
interview to the point where it cannot be considered reliable. This interview should have 
been suppressed along with A.M.'s testimony. 
Somers and her siblings were responsible for opening the investigation into Mrs. 
MacNeill's death. Absent the constant pressure and harassment of the prosecutor's 
office, it is unlikely that charges would have ever been filed. As a result, the State choose 
to proceed with a case that was deficient in all evidentiary aspects and resorted to tactics 
barred, by law, to prosecutors. 
B. The State Failed to Disclose Exculpatory Matters to the Defense: an Individual 
who Voiced his Motive to Kill Someone. 
The State failed to include in its discovecy the findings that Damian MacNeill, Dr. 
22. Emails between Somers and Robinson clearly establish these individuals were in 
contact a month prior to the CJC interview. See, Exhibit F in Brief of Appellant, filed 
June 19, 2015. 
13 
and Mrs. MacNeill's son, had homicidal ideations. The State had the presence of mind to 
warn Damian's law school that he might be a danger to those around him but somehow 
failed to extend the same consideration to its disclosures to defense counsel contrary to 
the State's assertion. The State refused to even investigate Damian's potential 
involvement in the death of his mother. Damian had access, ability, and was predisposed 
to commit a homicide but the State ignored him in favor of a pre-determined target. Dr. 
MacNeill's counsel only discovered the evidence via expert witness disclosures contained 
in a flash drive. The flash drive contained several documents that were not included in the 
discovery sent to defense counsel. 23 The State believed it was justified because they had 
an "open file" policy. Open files do not affirmatively disclose Brady and Giglio materials 
because by the nature of our criminal justice system defense attorneys do not screen and 
prepare cases for prosecutions. Prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose potential 
evidence which could either exculpate the defendant or impeach a potential witness for 
the State. 24 In this situation, the State had clear evidence of an alternate suspect which it 
made an informed and knowing choice to withhold. The Court must now hold the State 
responsible for the many instances of misconduct in this case, this being just one of many. 
To do otherwise would desecrate the holdings in Brady and Giglio and give a prosecutor 
carte blanche coverage to withhold evidence by stating they have an "open file policy." 
23. See, Memorandwn in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment or for a New Trial, 
attached as Exhibit D in the Addendum filed herewith. 
24. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 153 (1972). 
14 
C. The State Violated the Exclusionary Rule and the Order Prohibiting any 
Witness from Watching Trial Testimony and Media. 
The State argues that no prejudice occurred as a result of the State's failure to 
inform the federal inmates that they could not watch any media reports of the trial. The 
argument is illogical and unsound. The trial court excluded witnesses under Rule 615 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence and ordered all fact witnesses not to watch any media 
coverage of the trial or watch any part of the trial.25 The purpose of the exclusionary rule, 
"is directed toward preventing witnesses from changing their testimony based on other 
evidence adduced at trial."26 Inmate One, the State's key witness, watched extensive 
media coverage, including actual trial testimony of other witnesses, prior to giving his 
testimony. It allowed Inmate One to mold his testimony and sculpt it to the other witness 
testimony he had previously viewed. 
The trial court directly ordered the State to inform all of its witnesses that they 
were prohibited from watching any other testimony or media reports concerning that 
testimony. 27 The State directly violated that order which resulted in the contamination of 
informant's testimony that was at best, extremely unreliable. During the re-direct 
examination of Inmate One, again committed perjury. During the case, when the State 
inquired as to whether Inmate One had made an effort to stay away from the media 
25. See, Trial Witness Exclusion Order, attached as Exhibit I in Brief of Appellant, filed 
June 19, 2015. 
26. State v. Billsie, 131 P.3d 239,241 (Utah 2006). 
27. See, footnote 23, supra. 
15 
regarding this case, he answered in the affirmative. However, this testimony was also 
proven to be false. Following the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel discovered 
jailhouse conversations between Inmate One and his family.28 These conversations 
revealed that Inmate One intentionally viewed not only media coverage of the trial but the 
actual trial proceedings of this case. The perjured testimony of Inmate One is yet another 
clear example of how informant testimony given in exchange for a benefit from the 
government will provide, at best, unreliable testimony. 
D. The State Failed to Provide Discovery and Deprived Dr. MacNeill from 
Presenting a Full Defense. 
The State incorrectly asserts that Dr. MacNeill has failed to adequately brief his 
argument that the State failed to provide discovery to defense counsel. However, Dr. 
MacNeill has already pointed out several instances where the State failed to provide 
discovery. This included exculpatory evidence, impeachment evidence and other 
evidence required by Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. These failures to 
disclose discovery, deprived Dr. MacNeill of a fair trial. 
Dr. MacNeill was prevented from presenting a thorough and competent defense 
because the discovery when disclosed at all, was untimely. Dr. MacNeill was often left to 
discover exculpatory evidence through his own defense counsel investigation. In the vast 
majority of cases where his independent efforts to obtain matters that should have been 
disclosed by the State, the exculpatory evidence was located only after the trial had 
28. See, footnote 2, supra; see also, Document Entitled Michael Buchanan- Utah County 




concluded and that evidence was no longer useful. Moreover, the prosecution challenged 
each and every discovery request made by the defense. 29 The discovery of matters that 
should have been disclosed regardless of whether the law required that a request be made, 
were only made known or discovered after a conviction was secured by the State. Due to 
the intentional failure of the State to disclose discovery to the defense, including key 
exculpatory evidence, Dr. MacNeill is entitled to a new trial. 
The State, through countless acts of misconduct and deceit has deprived Dr. 
MacNeill of a fair trial. Compounding its error, the State circumvented due process that 
must be afforded to defendants under both the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
Although, any single violation of those authorities would be sufficient to require that a 
conviction be overturned, in this case, the errors are so numerous that awarding a new 
trial is required. Dr. MacNeill respectfully requests this Court to hold the State 
responsible for its failures and errors and grant Dr. MacNeill a new trial.30 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Dr. MacNeill respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the jury's verdicts on November 9, 2013, and the Court grant him a new trial. 
DATED this /6J!lday of February, 2016. 
29. Dr. MacNeill filed eight discovery requests. 
30. In Brief of Appellant, filed June 16, 2015, citations in support of this argument were 
previously provided regarding cumulative error. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is arguably the single most unreliable type of evidence currently used in criminal trials. Snitches 
are deeply unreliable witnesses. Many are con artists, congenital liars, and practiced fraudsters. AB compensated witnesses, all 
snitches have deep conflicts of interest. What is worse, jailhouse snitch testimony as a class is not only the least credible type 
of evidence, but it is also among the most persuasive to jurors because jailhouse informants typically allege to have personally 
heard defendants confess their guilt to the crimes charged. Introduction of a defendant's confession, from any source, radically 
changes the complexion of a case, particularly one lacking other evidence that directly implicates the defendant in the crime. 
Research studies demonstrate that jurors are simply ill equipped to evaluate the credibility of jailhouse informant testimony 
and consistently give such testimony far more weight than is due even if they are aware of the incentives jailhouse snitches 
receive or expect in exchange for their testimony. The prejudicial effect of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony is magnified 
by the context in which the evidence is presented to the jury. Jailhouse snitches are States' witnesses, and the credibility of their 
testimony is likely substantially bolstered as a result. Prosecutors bolster jailhouse snitch testimony simply by putting them on 
the witness stand as State's witnesses, signaling to the jury that the prosecutor believes their testimony is trustworthy. Even 
in cases in which bolstering crosses the line into the territory of the unethical or improper, and it often does, prosecutors are 
rarely called out for their misconduct, much less face sanctions. As a result ofboth implicit and explicit prosecutorial bolstering, 
jailhouse snitch testimony tends to have an even greater, and potentially more prejudicial, effect on reliable fact-finding. 
Jailhouse snitch testimony, in fact, is so likely to make a material difference to the outcome of close cases, and so likely to be 
*1376 false, that permitting such witnesses to testify, absent direct corroboration through electronic recording or some other 
similarly reliable method, should be flatly banned. Numerous commentators have proposed modest fixes to the jailhouse snitch 
problem. Some have urged the conduct of pretrial reliability hearings. Others have argued for enhanced disclosure obligations 
regarding informant background and testimony. Still other fixes have been proposed. But given the depth to which jailhouse 
testimony is compromised, these modest proposals are simply inadequate. Anything less than total abolition of jailhouse snitch 
testimony is fundamentally insufficient to address what is perhaps the most outrageous and destructive prosecutorial practice 
currently tolerated by law. 
This Article lays out that argument. Following this introduction, Part I demonstrates that jailhouse informant testimony is 
inherently biased and that the temptations faced by inmates to commit perjury are overwhelming. Part II explains why jailhouse 
snitch testimony is so persuasive to jurors, and why it is responsible for a disproportionate number of wrongful convictions. 
Part ill examines the present devices relied upon to filter out unreliable informant testimony--cross-examination and post-
conviction review--and finds them wanting. Neither device has a successful track record of providing relief to wrongfully 
convicted defendants nor offers any realistic mechanism to screen out unreliable snitch testimony. Part IV considers several 
remedies proposed by commentators and enacted in a few jurisdictions. These remedies, if adopted, might marginally improve 
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the situation in some cases, but all of these remedies ultimately fail to address the fundamental problems of unreliability and 
unaccountability that are inherent to this class of evidence. Part V then advances the main thesis of the Article, urging adoption 
of a total ban on jailhouse informant testimony, subject only to a possible exception for testimony corroborated with electronic 
recording of any alleged confession or admission made by a criminal defendant. It assesses the grounds for such a ban by 
examining other categorical evidentiary exclusions enforced through judicial, legislative, or executive action. 
I. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS FUNDAMENTALLY AND PERVASIVELY UNRELIABLE 
Exoneration studies have identified a set of recurrent causes of wrongful convictions, including false confessions, mistaken 
eyewitness testimony, and faulty forensic evidence. 1 However, no *1377 evidence is more intrinsically untrustworthy than 
the allegations of a jailhouse snitch. :: According to some wrongful conviction scholars, jailhouse snitch testimony is the single 
greatest cause of wrongful convictions. 3 This should not be swprising. It is hard to imagine more facially untrustworthy 
evidence. One federal court characterized the practice of using jailhouse snitches as "one of the most abused aspects of the 
criminal justice system," 4 another as a "fertile field□ from which truth-bending or even perjwy could grow," :'i and a third 
called jailhouse snitch testimony "inherently unreliable." 6 In an address intended as advice for prosecutors, federal judge 
Stephen Trott warned prosecutors not to trust criminal informants: 
*1378 Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get what they want, especially when what they 
want is to get out of trouble with the law. This willingness to do anything includes not only truthfully spilling 
the beans on friends and relatives, but also lying, committing perjury, manufacturing evidence, soliciting 
others to corroborate their lies with more lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come into 
contact, including-and especially-the prosecutor. A drug addict can sell out his mother to get a deal, and 
burglars, robbers, murderers[,] and thieves are not far behind Criminals are remarkably manipulative and 
skillfully devious. Many are outright conscienceless sociopaths to whom "truth" is a wholly meaningless 
concept. To some, "conning" people is a way of life. Others are just basically unstable people. A ''reliable 
informer" one day may turn into a consummate prevaricator the next. ; 
Judge Trott warned that, among informants, jailhouse snitches are indisputably the worst of the bunch: 
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims another prisoner has confessed to 
him. The snitch now stands ready to testify in return for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes 
these snitches tell the truth, but more often they invent testimony and stray details out of the air. ~ 
The practice of usingjailhouse snitches in serious criminal cases is both pervasive and, as a direct result, a major cause of error 
in the criminal justice system. 9 Although it had long been apparent that jailhouse snitch testimony was sometimes extremely 
unreliable, the strong link between jailhouse snitches and wrongful convictions has only become clear recently thanks to the 
still-breaking wave ofDNA exonerations. 10 Analysis of the causes of wrongful convictions in these cases reveals thatjailhouse 
snitches have been involved in a surprisingly large percentage ofknown wrongful convictions-twenty-one percent--according 
to Innocence Project founders Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer. 1 1 The Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer study looked at 
exonerations resulting from DNA testing, a sample that included a disproportionately large percentage of sexual assault cases. 1 ~ 
*1379 Jailhouse informants play an even more pernicious role in capital cases. 13 One criminal defense attorney testified 
before a Los Angeles County grand jury that she had conducted a study of all cases in which a California defendant received 
2 
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the death penalty and concluded that jailhouse informant testimony was used in approximately one-third of those cases. I-! 
According to the Northwestern University Law School's Center on Wrongful Convictions, 45.9 percent of documented wrongful 
convictions in capital cases involved testimony by jailhouse informants or by "killers with incentives to cast suspicion away 
from themselves," making "snitches the leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases." 15 The Commission on 
Capital Punishment convened by former Illinois Governor George Ryan concluded that testimony from jailhouse informants 
appeared to be a major cause of wrongful convictions in the cases it looked at involving persons sentenced to death in lliinois. 16 
A. Jailhouse Informants Face Overwhelming Temptations to Commit Perjury 
Jailhouse snitches testify not out of the goodness of their hearts but to obtain one or more of a variety of incentives typically 
offered to them. These incentives range from almost trivial benefits, like cigarettes, to improved jail conditions and cash 
payments, 1 7 up to the gold standard of "cooperation benefits" -release or reduction of *1380 jail sentences. 18 Indeed, 
testifying against fellow inmates may often constitute a prisoner's only hope of escaping a substantial prison term. 1 <J The 
unscrupulous inmate thus faces powerful temptations to serve as a jailhouse snitch. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, "It is 
difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence." 20 Another court noted that it 
was "obvious" that cooperation premised on promises of leniency or immunity ''provide[s] a strong inducement to falsify" 
testimony. 21 Even in cases where leniency or immunity is not at stake, the prospect of receiving some tangible reward for 
false testimony can be irresistible. As one attorney commented, "When you dangle extra rewards, furloughs, money, their own 
clothes, stereos, in front of people in overcrowded jails, then you have an unacceptable temptation to commit perjury." 22 
Not only are the temptations to manufacture false snitch testimony powerful, the difficulty of doing so is minimal. As a Canadian 
commission created to investigate the causes of one wrongful conviction observed, "In-custody confessions are often easy 
to allege and difficult, if not impossible, to disprove." 23 To generate a credible confession, a snitch need only learn some 
basic details about a fellow inmate's case. 24 A lying jailhouse snitch might gather information about a high profile case 
simply by reading newspaper stories or watching television broadcasts about the case. 2 5 Snitches can also obtain details about 
fellow prisoners' cases by speaking with complicit friends and relatives who can monitor preliminary hearings and other case 
proceedings and feed details to the aspiring snitch.:,, In some cases, informants share knowledge about case *1381 facts with 
~., 
each other, permitting multiple informants to corroborate each other's testimony. - ' Investigators have documented cases in 
which prison inmates purchased information from others outside of prison in an attempt to trade it for reduced sentences. :x 
And now there is the Internet As one commentator has observed, "The combination of the increasing availability of information 
over the internet and inmate internet access makes fabricating confessions even easier than ever before." :,1 
The ease with whichjailhouse informants can fabricate credible confessions was demonstrated by one particularly industrious 
snitch, Leslie Vernon White, a "convicted kidnapper, robber[,] and car thief." -'0 In 1990, the CBS news program 60 Minutes 
aired a segment featuring White, a self-proclaimed jailhouse snitch. 3 1 Two years earlier, White demonstrated for jailers how 
simple it was to concoct a confession and convince prosecutors it was genuine. 3 2 He repeated the performance while on camera 
for the CBS news program. _,J White's methods were shocking in their audacity. To get information, he simply picked up the 
telephone and asked for it _--1 To get government officials to talk, White posed as a law enforcement official or a government 
worker, and in that guise, contacted various government agencies, including the sheriff's information bureau, the county coroner, 
and the district attorney handling the case, from whom he obtained details about the facts and evidence of the case. -'' Then he 
,::; 
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arranged to be transported to or from the courthouse with the defendant who supposedly made the confession so that he could 
plausibly establish an opportunity for the defendant's alleged confession to have been made to him. 36 
Having gathered the basic case information and established a context in which the supposed confession occurred, it was easy 
for *1382 White to approach a homicide detective or a prosecutor with a deal. -'7 ''The key thing is they want to win," White 
. u: 
explamed. -
So if I come forward with the information as detailed as that they're gonna use it Because the jury not knowing the system or 
how it works, is going to believe when I get up there with all these details and facts, that this guy sat in the jail cell, or he sat 
on the bus, or he sat in the holding tank somewhere, or told me through a door or something, they're gonna believe me. ·'9 
Over the course of several years, White appeared as a government witness in numerous cases and offered to appear in even 
more. -1o In return, he received various rewards for doing so, including a letter recommending parole from a high-ranking 
official in a district attorney's office. -l I These benefits did not always work out well for the citizens of California. On White's 
last furlough, he used the opportunity to beat his wife, snatch a purse, and assault his landlady with a knife. -l 2 
As a result of the furor caused by White's confession and his startling demonstration of the ease with which he could manufacture 
false jailhouse confessions, Los Angeles County convened a grand jury investigation. 4 J The Los Angeles County Grand Jury 
commenced a year-long examination of the jailhouse informant problem in the county. 44 What it found was even more shocking 
than White's demonstration. Based on extensive documentary and witness testimony, the Grand Jury learned of the existence ofa 
complex and pervasive "informant system" at work in Los Angeles County, one that was driven by ''the unwritten understanding 
between prosecutors and informants as to the benefits to be derived from their testimony." 4~ In its report, the Grand Jury 
described a system set up to manufacture false jailhouse informant testimony. 46 At the county jail, known informants were 
segregated and housed in a special unit-known as the "K-9 unit"-li Police officers and prosecutors in need of additional 
evidence could request that an inmate be housed in the K-9 unit, and those requests were routinely granted. 48 The delivery 
of fresh meat to the *1383 K-9 unit typically set off a feeding frenzy among the seasoned snitches housed there, and it was 
not unusual for several K-9 inmates to contact officials with reports of alleged confessions only hours after the unsuspecting 
prisoner's arrival. -19 Attempts to obtain information from the unwitting inmate might begin in minutes. 50 
The Grand Jury found evidence that not only did clever informants like Leslie Vernon White find ways to gather facts needed 
to fool police and prosecutors into believing that they had heard a defendant confess to a crime, but in some cases police and 
prosecutors actively colluded with jailhouse informants to manufacture false evidence. 51 These officials, some informants 
testified, provided them with copies of arrest reports, trial transcripts, and case files; took the informants to crime scenes; and 
sometimes simply fed them the facts of the crime in order to help the informants develop convincing testimony. 52 
Snitches, moreover, risk little by fabricating false testimony. Perjury prosecutions of lying jailhouse informants are almost 
nonexistent 5~ As a case in point, following the I,.os Angeles County Grand Jury's investigation of the jailhouse informant 
problem, and despite discovery of large-scale and pervasive deception by jailhouse informants, the only two individuals 
prosecuted for providing perjured testimony in any court or case were the grand jury witnesses who had helped to expose 
the problems in the jailhouse snitch system. 5-1 In contrast, snitches who helped convict other innocent defendants were never 
prosecuted. 55 The message is *1384 clear- lying snitches have little to lose and everything to gain by falsely reporting to 
police and testifying to juries that fellow inmates have confessed to crimes. 
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Witnesses suspected of lying to benefit criminal defendants, on the other hand, do not fare nearly so well. When a witness 
is thought to have lied on behalf of a criminal defendant, the witness is far more likely to be prosecuted for perjury. In one 
prominent Illinois case involving the killing of a Chicago police officer, six witnesses initially gave statements to police 
implicating Jonathan Tolliver as a suspect. 56 Those same witnesses later recanted their statements. 57 According to the 
witnesses, the original statements had been coerced from them by police. 58 The witnesses, however, paid dearly for the 
recantations. Five of the witnesses were charged with perjury and ultimately pled guilty to avoid even more serious sanctions. 59 
Prosecutors then trumpeted the convictions as proof that the allegations that the witnesses' testimony had been coerced by police 
were false. hO 
Inmates thus fmd it easy to fabricate incriminating evidence against fellow defendants and costly to retract incriminating 
statements once made. Where the rewards for providing incriminating evidence are great, and where the costs of providing 
false testimony on behalf of the State are negligible, the "frequency offabrication by witnesses who have made 'deals' with the 
government," as one commentator has observed, ''while impossible to ascertain with accuracy, is potentially staggering." 61 
The easy availability of such powerful but unreliable evidence inevitably tempts both incautious and unethical prosecutors and 
law enforcement officials. The temptation to use snitch testimony is so great, and the costs so low, that prosecutors frequently 
put on such testimony despite multiple "red flags." Confirmation bias and tunnel vision are likely significant explanations 
for the frequency with which jailhouse snitch testimony that was later proved false is accepted and used by prosecutors. 62 
Confirmation bias descn"bes the tendency, well documented by cognitive researchers, for individuals to seek out evidence that 
confirms their preexisting beliefs and *1385 minimize or ignore evidence that contradicts those beliefs. 63 Tunnel vision, 
similarly, refers to the tendency of persons to ignore or downplay facts or evidence inconsistent with an individual's preexisting 
beliefs. r,-1 It is a product of the "'compendium of common heuristics and logical fallacies,' to which we are all susceptible, 
that lead[s] actors in the criminal justice system to 'focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will "build a case" 
for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt"' 65 Prosecutorial tunnel vision has been 
identified as a major cause of wrongful convictions. 66 Confirmation bias and tunnel vision help explain why prosecutors often 
continue to defend the credibility of jailhouse snitch testimony even after it has been confirmed in exoneration proceedings 
to have been false. 6 7 
The ease with which false jailhouse snitch testimony can be manufactured also plays into the hands of corrupt police officers 
and prosecutors who are seeking shortcuts to conviction or are engaged in corrupt conduct. Research on wrongful convictions, 
for example, demonstrates that police are likely to set up innocent people, when they do, by using evidence that is easy 
to manufacture and hard to disprove. 6R Jailhouse snitch testimony fits that description. As the *1386 first-hand accounts 
provided by seasoned snitches prove, it is almost laughably simple to conjure up a plausible, albeit false, claim that a criminal 
defendant made a jailhouse confession. Once such allegations have been made by an informant, the informant has much to gain 
by sticking to his story, and even more to lose by retracting it 1'9 
B. Compensated Witnesses Are Inherently Biased 
A jailhouse informant is the quintessential self-interested witness. Anglo-American law has long recognized the potentially 
distorting effects of self-interest on the accuracy and reliability of legal proceedings. ~0 Indeed, "[s]elf-interested witnesses 
were barred from testifying under early common law," - i and informers in particular were viewed as incompetent witnesses 
5 
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if they stood to directly gain some material benefit from their testimony. ~2 Although the common law bar on self-interested 
witnesses has generally been abandoned, awareness of the effect of self-interest on decision making continues to grow. 73 
Cognitive researchers have documented the powerful biasing effect of self-interest on objectivity. 74 Human judgment is almost 
inevitably influenced, *1387 consciously or unconsciously, by perceived self-interest. 75 Where persons must decide which 
of two positions to adopt or accept as true, those who stand to benefit from talcing one position rather than another tend to 
favor the position that furthers their own self-interest. 7 (, Recognition of the biasing effect of self-interest provides a basis for a 
wide variety oflegal rules. Self-interest bars some witnesses from testifying in probate proceedings, 77 for instance, and "self-
serving bias" has been recognized in some contexts as grounds for regulating the types of compensation that a witness might 
be provided for testifying. 
For example, normally ''payments to witnesses in return for testimony are considered unethical and illegal." .,8 Lawyers who 
provide such incentives to witnesses are subject to professional sanctions. 79 There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Expert 
witnesses, who are retained by parties and paid significant sums to testify on the party's behalf in court, are an obvious 
example. 80 Ethical rules attempt to constrain the degree to which compensated expert witnesses have a stake in the outcome of 
the cases in which they testify. 81 Almost every jurisdiction forbids expert witnesses from being paid on a contingent fee basis 
in recognition that such a fee arrangement would unduly bias the expert's testimony and be *1388 likely to induce the witness 
to tailor her testimony to favor the party on whose behalf she is testifying. 82 Ethics experts have continued to express concern 
about even non-contingent fee arrangements with expert witnesses. 83 The mere act of soliciting an initial opinion in a case 
provides expert witnesses with incentives to provide a favorable assessment because doing so greatly enhances the likelihood 
that they will be retained and paid for future testimony. l\.t 
In criminal law, aside from experts and the parties themselves, the most common type of compensated or incentivized witness is 
the informant. 85 Informants come in many shapes and sizes. There are informants on the street who are paid to feed information 
to police. x6 There are accomplices, codefendants, and coconspirators who seek cooperation deals with prosecutors in order 
to reduce or avoid their criminal exposure. f-7 The use of informants pervades the criminal justice system. According to one 
account, approximately one in eight federal prisoners had his or her sentence reduced as a result of providing information to 
federal prosecutors. xx All such witnesses are prone to self-serving bias, as are the police and prosecutors who benefit from their 
testimony. iN One might argue, therefore, that all informant testimony, and perhaps all incentivized testimony more generally, 
is compromised as a result of self-serving bias. 90 
Jailhouse snitches, however, pose more of a problem than paid expert witnesses or even other types of snitches. The impact of a 
biased expert witness can be muted in many cases by the proffer of competing expert testimony. In a classic ''battle of experts," 
each side can call out an opposing expert whose opinion strays too far from the facts or mainstream science, or at least make 
clear to the *1389 jury that the opposing expert's interpretation is subject to debate. In addition, most credible expert witnesses 
face reputational constraints that limit the expert's willingness to proffer lrnowingly false or misleading testimony. 91 The same 
cannot be said for jailhouse snitches whose reputations are already marginal. Nor is it realistic to think that criminal defendants 
can combat jailhouse snitch testimony, or even the testimony of cooperating accomplice witnesses, street snitches, and the 
like, by calling comparable witnesses of their own. A criminal defendant lacks the ability to commandeer helpful testimony 
from such witnesses because, unlike the prosecutor, he lacks any power to reward such witnesses with leniency or immunity 
from prosecution. 92 And whereas prosecutors routinely reward street informants for information and testimony, a criminal 
defendant who paid a street informant to testify on his behalf would likely be charged with tampering or bribing witnesses. 9~ 
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Nonetheless, it is not implausible to assume that in many cases some types of cooperating accomplices and street snitches do 
have a credible basis for their testimony. Testimony provided by a codefendant who admits to being present at the crime scene, 
for example, can be tested against the known facts and evidence in the case, including the defendant's own account where the 
defendant chooses to testify. 
In contrast, a criminal defendant is typically helpless to counter testimony provided by a lyingjailhouse informant Unlike with 
experts, defendants cannot usually put on their own "jailhouse snitch," so criminal defendants lack any opportunity to fight 
back on an even playing field In criminal trials there is no ''battle of snitches" that might balance competing versions of events. 
The criminal defendant can try, as many have, to call other inmates to testify that the defendant did not make any jailhouse 
confession. 9-'I But such testimony is, on its face, usually irrelevant, and courts will often bar it as such. 95 Even when allowed, 
however, it is not likely to be effective. After all, such witnesses cannot prove the negative- that an alleged confession did 
not actually occur-if the jailhouse informant testifies, as an untruthfuljailhouse informant invariably will, that the confession 
was made out of earshot of other prisoners. Finally, whereas ethical rules bar contingent fee agreements with experts out of 
fear that such arrangements will bias witness *1390 testimony ,jailhouse informants--and indeed all informants-testify almost 
exclusively under arrangements that create de facto contingent payment arrangements. Because ''payment" in terms ofleniency 
almost always is granted by the prosecutor after the informant testifies, the informant readily understands that the informant's 
chances of getting rewarded are contingent on his delivery of credible incriminating evidence against the defendant. 
II. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS IDGHL Y PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is problematic for another reason. There is, by and large, only one thing to which a jailhouse snitch 
can testify: that a fellow inmate confessed, and confession evidence is widely acknowledged to possess unique potency. 96 
The Supreme has Court observed that confessions are ''probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be 
admitted." 97 One prominent evidence scholar asserted that "introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial 
in court superfluous." 9~ Research confirms that evidence that the defendant has confessed greatly increases the odds of 
conviction. 99 In a study conducted by Kassin and Neumann, researchers presented mock jurors with a variety of evidence of 
guilt and found that jurors were far more likely to convict suspects when the evidence included a confession than when other 
types of traditional evidence, such as eyewitness identifications or physical evidence, were presented 1 00 They thus concluded 
that "confession evidence has a greater impact on jurors-and is seen as having a greater impact by jurors- than other potent 
types of evidence." 101 
Secondary confessions-that is, confessions made to witnesses ( other than police officers )-are likely not as persuasive to jurors 
as direct confessions. 1 o::: Jurors do, as a general matter, discount secondary confession evidence to some extent, and jurors 
may often be unwilling to convict based on secondary confession evidence alone. 103 However, secondary confession evidence 
remains extremely potent. "Since few species of evidence are as powerful as an acknowledgement of guilt from the mouth of 
the accused, *1391 jailhouse informant testimony can be highly persuasive." lO-i Secondary confession evidence is likely to 
be particularly critical in "close cases." 10~ That is, jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most influential where the State 
has some other evidence of guilt, but that other evidence is weak. 1 or, And these cases are precisely the ones in which jailhouse 
snitches are most likely to be used. 1 o~ After all, the State must pay a price to induce the jailhouse snitch to testify, and it can be 
expected to avoid doing so unless prosecutors believe that the testimony is needed. 1 o;c: Accordingly,jailhouse snitch testimony 
will typically only be introduced when the prosecutor is concerned about the sufficiency of her case, and the testimony will 
tend to have the greatest impact in precisely those cases. 111'1 
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The prevailing assumption by courts, and the justification for admitting jailhouse snitch testimony absent any significant 
reliability review or assessment, is that jurors are capable of discounting unreliable snitch testimony as the facts and 
circumstances warrant. 1 10 This assumption is almost certainly incorrect. Research on fundamental attnbution error 
demonstrates that jurors cannot properly discount snitch testimony, even when they know that snitches have incentives to lie. 1 1 1 
In a recent study, a team of researchers set out to test the claim that jurors are able to effectively discount secondary confession 
evidence provided by a cooperating witness with incentives to fabricate evidence. 1 12 Their findings undercut the assertion that 
jurors are able to properly take into account the degree to which witness incentives undermine reliability. 1 13 In the study, the 
researchers recruited 345 college students and persons from the community to act as mock jurors. 1 l .t All of the mock jurors 
were given an abbreviated trial transcript drawn from a real criminal case. 1 15 The transcript set forth the testimony of two 
State's witnesses, one who provided fiber evidence and another who *1392 presented knife evidence, and included opening 
and closing statements. 1 16 The control group received this transcript only. 1 17 Other groups received the same transcript, plus 
the testimony of an additional witness who claimed to have heard the defendant confess to the crime. 1 1 H In some cases, mock 
jurors were told that the witness had inadvertently learned of the crime and came forward as an act of civic duty. 1 1 q In other 
cases, they were told that the witness was testifying pursuant to a cooperation deal in which the witness would directly benefit 
from his testimony. I2u The researchers then asked all of the mock jurors to assess the guilt of the defendant. 12 1 Consistent 
with prior research, researchers found that mock jurors who were given the confession evidence convicted the defendant at 
significantly higher rates than those who were not presented the confession evidence. 122 
More disturbing, however, the researchers found that the mock jurors who were presented with the confession evidence 
convicted at the same rate regardless of the source of the evidence. 123 Conviction rates, their data indicated, "were unaffected 
by the explicit provision of information indicating that the witness received an incentive to testify." 124 Although the mock 
jurors' questionnaire responses demonstrated that they understood that the "civic duty" witness was more interested in serving 
justice than the "incentivized" witness, the mock jurors failed to discount the reliability of the incentivized witness. 125 
The most plausible explanation for these results, as the researchers suggest, is that the mock jurors were committing 
"fundamental attribution error." 126 As they explain, "According to the fundamental attribution hypothesis, perceivers will 
ignore the contextual and situational factors in favor of a dispositional attribution. In application to a jury situation,jurors should 
perceive a witness' behavior as influenced by personal factors rather than situational demands." 127 
The vast majority of participants in the experiment seemed to make just this mistake, dismissing the possibility that important 
contextual factors like incentives for incriminating another suspect might influence the witness's motives to provide truthful 
*1393 testimony. 1~8 The mock jurors instead simply accepted the witness's testimony at face value. 129 
Prior studies similarly have concluded that "attributors attach insufficient weight to situational causes and accept behavior at 
'face value."' 130 To be sure, some of these studies have found evidence that subjects were able to engage in some critical 
assessment of certain types of confession evidence. 131 For instance, where subjects were told that a confession was coerced 
through threats or violence, they tended to more heavily discount the credibility of the confession. 1 ·' 2 After conducting one 
such study in which investigators provided subjects with trial transcripts from a mock case presenting a variety of evidence to 
the subjects, the investigators found that the subjects consistently gave some types of evidence more weight than others. 1 ·'3 
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Although subjects continued to be more likely to convict in confession cases than nonconfession cases, subjects generally 
viewed confessions made in exchange for positive rewards as more credible than confessions made in response to threats. 13-l 
When the coercive influence was operationally defmed as a threat of harm or punishment, subjects clearly discounted the 
confession evidence-they viewed the confession as involuntary and manifested a relatively low rate of conviction. However, 
when coercion took the form of an offer or a promise of leniency, subjects were unable or unwilling to dismiss the prior 
confession. i.:;s 
Although this research demonstrates that jurors have the capacity to overcome fundamental attribution bias and discount certain 
·types of confession evidence, it does nothing to increase confidence in jurors' capacity to properly assess jailhouse snitch 
testimony induced through positive incentives. Rather, these findings cast further doubt on jurors' ability to adequately discount 
the reliability of jailhouse snitch testimony that has been induced through positive incentives. 
Juror insensitivity to the increased unreliability of incentivized witness testimony is magnified by two additional factors. First, 
as discussed above, typical jurors almost certainly do not understand how easy it is for jailhouse snitches to manufacture detailed 
false *1394 confessions. If jailhouse snitches testify about details that seem like they could only have been learned if the 
perpetrator had actually confessed to the snitch, but were actually gathered through the variety of approaches that snitches like 
Sidney Storch have admitted to using. thenjailhouse snitch testimony will often be viewed as more credible than it should be. 
Second, many jurors might perceive jailhouse snitch testimony as worthy of enhanced credence because of implicit or explicit 
prosecutorial bolstering of the witness's credibility. The mere fact that a prosecutor calls a jailhouse informant to serve as 
a State's witness suggests that the prosecutor has already determined the witness to be credible and truthful. Although the 
amount of presumptive credit the jury extends to State's witnesses will vary depending on both the local community's and the 
individual juror's views regarding prosecutorial honesty and integrity, in many jurisdictions the State begins with the benefit 
of the doubt 13'' 
Moreover, even though it constitutes improper practice, it is not uncommon for prosecutors to affirmatively vouch for, or bolster, 
the credibility of the jailhouse snitches they put on the witness stand I J 7 Take the controversial case of Troy Davis, who was 
executed in 2011. 1 ,x Davis was tried for the 1989 murder of Savannah police officer Mark McPhail. 139 At Davis's trial in 
1991, the State called ajailhouse snitch named Kevin McQueen to testify about an alleged confession made by Davis while 
the two men were on the prison basketball court. i .in The snitch's testimony was suspect. Not only had McQueen served as an 
informant for the State in other cases, 14 1 but his testimony was also seemingly implausible on its face. Numerous witnesses 
testified at Davis's trial that the persons who *1395 were involved with the police officer shooting had been playing pool at 
a local pool hall, that a man named Sylvester ''Red" Coles had gotten into an argument with a homeless man outside the pool 
hall, and that Troy Davis and a friend-who had both also been playing pool at the hall at the time-had followed Coles and 
his victim up the street to a Burger King parking lot where the police officer-who was responding to the fight between Coles 
and the homeless man-was shot l-l~ 
When the State called jailhouse snitch McQueen to testify at trial, however, McQueen claimed that Troy Davis had "confessed" 
to him a very different set of facts. 14., According to McQueen, Davis told him that he had gone to a party in Cloverdale, 144 a 
Savannah suburb, and that after the party, he had gone to his girlfriend's house, that they had decided to get breakfast at Burger 
King, and that he ran into someone who owed Davis money that was loaned to buy "dope." 145 According to McQueen, Davis 
told him that "they got into some beef there, and then a whole bunch of commotion started, and a dude came in what turned 
out to be Officer McPhail, and there were some shots fired" J-l<, On cross-examination, McQueen admitted that he had seen a 
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story about the shooting on the news but denied "hoping to gain any advantage by testifying on behalf of the State, claiming 
that he had already been sentenced for his crimes." 14 7 
The supposed confession recounted by McQueen failed to match up in almost any way with the other evidence in the case. 
McQueen's version of the confession put Davis in the wrong place, at the wrong time, for the wrong reasons, in light of the 
evidence *1396 presented at trial and the State's own theory of the case. l-lS In fact, McQueen's account of this supposed 
confession was deemed, by the federal district court judge who years later conducted a three-day habeas hearing on Troy Davis's 
contention of actual innocence, to be patently false because it "totally contradict[ ed) the events of the night as described by 
numerous other State witnesses." 149 Indeed, the judge found that McQueen's trial testimony ''was so clearly fabricated" that 
the Court could not understand "why the State persist[ed] in trying to support its veracity." 150 
But the State's position at trial and beyond was that McQueen's testimony was solid and credible. 151 In his closing argument to 
the jury, Savannah District Attorney Spencer Lawton beseeched the jury to credit McQueen's testimony. 15~ As he told the jury: 
You heard from Kevin McQueen. Kevin McQueen was, in Mr. Barker's terms, the jailbird. Weli if you're 
going to talk to Troy Anthony Davis about what he did, you've got to be where Troy Anthony Davis is, 
and Kevin McQueen told you that he was told by Troy Anthony Davis that ... Davis had shot Officer 
McPhail. There's not a reason on earth to doubt his word. There was nothing, no reason why he had to be 
here, except that we subpoenaed him when we learned what he had to say. 1 53 
Notwithstanding that the jailhouse snitch's testimony was later dismissed as "clearly fabricated," jurors were assured by the 
District Attorney that "there's not a reason on earth to doubt his word." 154 It is difficult, in retrospect, to ascertain the weight that 
the jury ultimately gave to McQueen's testimony, but the attempt by prosecutors to bolster McQueen's testimony and convince 
the jury that the jailhouse snitch was a reliable witness certainly could have contributed to the jury's decision to convict. 
m. STATUS QUO SAFEGUARDS ARE INEFFECTIVE 
Despite the virtual avalanche of evidence that jailhouse snitch testimony is inherently biased, unreliable, and frequently the 
cause of wrongful convictions, few jurisdictions have taken any meaningful steps to limit its use, and none bar it completely. 15 5 
Defenders of the status quo contend that the traditional tools of litigation-vigorous *1397 cross-examination and post-
conviction review-adequately enable criminal defendants to discredit lying jailhouse snitches or, where jailhouse testimony 
was only later revealed to have been perjured, to obtain post-conviction relief. 156 For reasons discussed below, neither of these 
supposedly reliable litigation tools provides innocent defendants with meaningful protections from being wrongfully convicted 
because of false jailhouse snitch testimony. 
A. Cross-Examination Constitutes an Inadequate Means to Check False or Unreliable Jailhouse Snitch Testimony 
In Kansas v. Ventris, 15- the U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to adopt sweeping limitations on the use of jailhouse 
informant testimony. 15x Defendant Ray Ventris had been convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery after he 
and an accomplice named Rhonda Theel shot and killed a man in his home and drove away with approximately $300 and 
the victim's cell phone. 1 " 9 Theel pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and agreed to testify against Ventris. 1 <,ri In exchange, 
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prosecutors agreed not to prosecute Theel for murder. l(,I At trial, Theel testified that Ventris was the main instigator, while 
Ventris testified that Theel was primarily responsible for the robbery and shooting. 162 
The State then called a jailhouse informant who had been planted in V entris's holding cell for the specific purpose of 
gathering "incriminating statements" from Ventris. 163 Although the State conceded that use of the jailhouse informant to elicit 
incriminating statements from Ventris likely violated the Sixth Amendment, the trial court permitted the informant's testimony 
regarding Ventris's statements to come in for impeachment purposes. 164 The informant then testified that Ventris confessed to 
him that '"[h]e'd shot this man in his head and in his chest' and taken 'his keys, his wallet, about $350.00, and ... a vehicle."' 165 
The jury acquitted Ventris on the murder count, but convicted him of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. 166 The 
Kansas *1398 Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the admission ofVentris's purported confession obtained 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment for impeachment purposes was erroneous. 167 When the case reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Ventris and amici on his behalf argued, inter alia, that "jailhouse snitches are so inherently unreliable" that the Court 
should "craft a broader exclusionary rule for uncorroborated statements obtained by that means." 16~ The Court rejected that 
argument. 1 r,9 
As the Court explained, "Our legal system .•. is built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of 
competing witnesses, and we have long purported to avoid 'establish[ing] this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation 
of state rules of criminal procedure." 170 The Court concluded that statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
may be used for impeachment purposes, and that the credibility of the jailhouse informant's testimony regarding Ventris' alleged 
jailhouse confession was a matter for the jury to determine. 171 The Court thus declined to impose more stringent regulation 
of jailhouse informant testimony. Reasoning similarly, numerous state courts have also rejected calls for greater regulation of 
jailhouse informant testimony. 172 
The Court's holding in Ventris followed the conventional notion that credibility and reliability determinations should normally 
be left to the fact finder. 17·' As the Court noted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., I 7-l "Vigorous cross 
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate 
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." 1 '~ 
The assumption, however, that vigorous cross-examination provides an effective means of exposing or defeating unreliable 
*1399 evidence is increasingly being questioned with respect to certain types of evidence. The Oregon State Supreme Court 
recently decided that in cases involving eyewitness identifications obtained through suggestive police procedures, "'traditional' 
methods of testing reliability--like cross-examination-can be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or inaccurate eyewitness 
identification evidence." 1 ~(, As the Oregon court noted, research studies have demonstrated that mock jurors are surprisingly 
bad at distinguishing accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications. 1 7 7 Prominent academic commentators have also 
concluded that judges and jurors often fail to properly discount all sorts of direct and factual evidence, including eyewitness 
testimony, because they are "often not aware of the factors that decrease the reliability of eyewitness perception and memory," 
and not nearly as competent at evaluating the veracity of witnesses testifying in court as commonly thought. I is 
For these same reasons, the Court's assumption in Ventris that impeachment of unreliable or untruthful witnesses is sufficient 
to protect criminal defendants from wrongful convictions is wrong in the case of jailhouse snitches. As noted above, confession 
evidence is a uniquely potent form of evidence in criminal trials. Jurors are almost certain to give extraordinary weight to 
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evidence that a defendant has confessed. Where confession evidence has been obtained through the use of coercion, the courts 
have long recognized that such evidence is inadmissible, and that the conventional means of impeaching unreliable evidence-
cross-examination-provides insufficient protection against undue prejudice. 179 As Justice White observed in Arizona v. 
Fulminante: ; xo 
A defendant's confession is "probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," so damaging 
that a jury should not be expected to ignore it even if told to do so. Moreover, it is impossible to know what credit and weight 
• --"- • 181 a Juror gave to a cowess10n. 
*1400 Strict exclusion is sometimes the only appropriate remedy where extremely damaging but unreliable evidence threatens 
to "distort the truth-seeking function of the trial." 1 :(: 
Second, because jurors are likely to proceed under the biasing influence of fundamental attribution error, the traditional stuff of 
impeachment-the demonstration that a jailhouse snitch has a poor character for honesty and self-interested motives to testify-
will often have little or no impact on jury decision making. Once the jury has heard the evidence that the defendant has confessed 
to the crime, the damage has already been done. 
Third, unlike most other types of evidence frequently used in criminal cases, jailhouse snitch testimony is often uniquely 
insulated from effective impeachment. This insulation exists in part because the incentives that jailhouse informants receive in 
exchange for cooperation are typically hidden. 1 R., Prosecutors rarely negotiate explicit deals with jailhouse snitches prior to 
their testimony. 184 Rather, prosecutors and snitches operate with a shared understanding that a snitch's positive performance 
will eventually be rewarded with tangible benefits. 185 The lack of any record of benefits promised to the informant impedes 
effective impeachment by defense counsel, just as it was designed to do. I ,% The usual practice of refusing to enter into any 
formal deal before the snitch testifies in court was documented in one Florida case, where the prosecutor's notes memorializing 
his conversation with the snitch were later discovered and became the subject of a Brady dispute. 18 7 Here is how the prosecutor 
summarized his conversation: "Spoke with Fred Landt [Freeman's defense counsel] regarding Dennis Freeman. Told him I 
would make no firm offer prior to [Ponticelli's] trial but assured him his cooperation would be remembered with favor before 
mitigating judge/Sturgis. Will make no formal deal on the record prior to trial." 1 Xls 
At an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim, the prosecutor denied that the note indicated that she had made any undisclosed 
*1401 deal with the informant. 189 Regardless of whether that claim was technically correct, the note evidences what is already 
acknowledged to be standard practice: prosecutors avoid making any formal deals prior to trial, but provide sufficient post-
trial rewards to snitches to ensure a steady future supply. 1 qo That practice was also apparent in the notorious case of Cameron 
Todd Willingham. 191 Willingham was accused in Texas of murdering his three young daughters by arson. 192 At his capital 
trial, Texas prosecutors calledjailhouse snitch Johnny Webb, who was serving a fifteen-year sentence for aggravated robbery, 
to testify about a confession Willingham supposedly made. 1 9 3 After testifying improbably that Willingham, who hardly knew 
Webb, confessed to him through a hole in a steel door in Willingham's cell, Webb denied that prosecutors had offered him any 
inducementto testify. 194 Nonetheless, "(f]ive years later the prosecutor asked the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant 
Webb parole." 195 Webb later recanted his trial testimony, but then recanted his recantation. I% Willingham, who is widely 
believed to be innocent, was executed by Texas in 2004. 197 
·,:;;J 
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Jailhouse snitch testimony is also difficult to impeach effectively because it is invariably of the ''he said-she said" variety. 
As long as the snitch can plausibly testify that he had an opportunity-no matter how fleeting-to speak with the defendant, 
the snitch's claim that the defendant confessed to him is practically unverifiable. Defense counsel can impugn the credibility 
of the snitch, but many criminal defendants-especially defendants with a criminal *1402 history-go into a jury trial with 
their own credibility highly suspect and will often be unlikely to come out on top in any swearing contest. Whether or not the 
jailhouse snitch is perceived to be believable may ultimately turn simply on the comparative rhetorical skills of the prosecutor 
and defense counsel. l 'i:,; Defense attorneys equipped with superior cross-examination skills may successfully blunt the force 
of ajailhouse snitch's testimony, but the vast majority of criminal defendants saddled with average or inferior counsel will have 
no such luck. It is not unusual, moreover, for trial courts to affirmatively prevent the defense from even questioning the snitch 
about the snitch's criminal history or the charges pending against him. 199 
Apart from simply impeaching the character of the snitch or the circumstances or plausibility of the snitch's claim, there is very 
little that defense counsel can do to counter snitch testimony. For a variety of reasons, defense lawyers can rarely call witnesses 
of their own to prove that the defendant did not confess to the snitch. 200 In most cases, a lying snitch will simply testify that the 
defendant confessed in private, when there were no other witnesses to overhear the alleged confession. 201 And in some cases, 
inmates work together to corroborate each other's false testimony. 2<c The Los Angeles County Grand Jury investigation on the 
County's use of jailhouse informants discovered several instances in which multiple inmates coordinated their trial testimony 
to make their false claims more credible. 203 Not only is it difficult to find jailhouse witnesses who can effectively counter 
snitch testimony, in some cases it is positively hazardous to even try. 20..i One attorney told the Los Angeles Grand Jury that 
jailhouse informants were so uniformly untrustworthy that he was afraid to even interview them because he feared they might 
fabricate some criminal activity that the attorney *1403 was engaged in, such as suborning perjury. 205 Whereas under current 
law prosecutors are permitted to reward informants and cooperating witnesses with substantial benefits in exchange for their 
helpful testimony, defense lawyers have no comparable authority. 206 Indeed, defense lawyers who offer rewards to defense 
witnesses might be prosecuted for witness tampering. 207 
In sum, the dynamics of jailhouse snitch testimony make cross-examination uniquely ill suited to produce reliable results. While 
suffering many similar defects, other forms of incentivized testimony, such as that provided by cooperating accomplices, co-
defendants, and street snitches, at least provide defense counsel with some objective factual context that might be used to assess 
the credibility of the witness. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACOL'') argued to the Supreme 
Court in Ventris, accomplice testimony retains at least some indicia of reliability because ''the accomplice inculpates herself in 
the process." 20!'( In contrast, "snitch testimony lacks even this form of corroboration." 209 
For all these reasons, cross-examination cannot be relied upon to ensure that false snitch testimony is not believed or that 
unreliable evidence is not given undue weight by jurors. 
B. Post-Conviction Review of False Jailhouse Snitch Testimony Is Also Insufficient 
If cross-examination often proves wholly ineffective in countering false jailhouse snitch testimony, the other traditional 
remedy-post-conviction review--is even more dysfunctional. First, the same structural difficulties that plague efforts to impeach 
snitches through cross-examination are present in a post-conviction challenge of snitch testimony. Rarely will evidence be 
available, post-conviction, to prove that a jailhouse snitch lied at trial. 2 1 ° Credibility determinations are largely in the province 
of the fact finder and are ahnost never disturbed on review.: 11 Second, even when reviewing courts do determine that a 
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In one puzzling case, for example, a defendant had been convicted and sentenced to life in prison for allegedly participating 
*1404 in the rape and murder ofa young woman. 213 The State's evidence against the defendant was weak. DNA evidence 
implicated another man but not the defendant. 21 -1 The only physical evidence against the defendant was a single pubic hair 
that had been recovered among sixteen others from the crime scene. 215 The hair was described as a nonexclusive match to 
the defendant's hair type. 2 16 The State conceded by stipulation that the defendant was excluded as a contributor of any of the 
other fifteen hairs. 217 One of these possibly matched another suspect in the case. 2 18 The State's case against the defendant 
was built on this one hair and the testimony of three witnesses. 219 The first witness was a fourteen-year-old boy, described 
in a psychological evaluation as having a penchant for lying, who gave inconsistent statements to police, only one of which 
implicated the defendant, and who testified at trial that the defendant was not involved in the attack. 220 The other two witnesses 
were jailhouse informants. 221 The first jailhouse informant, a man named Hopkins, testified that the defendant had confessed 
to participating in the attack. 222 Hopkins's credibility was dubious; according to the appellate court: 
Hopkins admitted to hearingjail guards talking about the case, but claimed he heard their conversations after 
he first talked to the police. He said that everyone in jail was talking about what happened in defendant's 
case. Hopkins also revealed that he had provided testimony in two other special circumstance murder cases. 
In exchange for his testimony, Hopkins had three felony counts dismissed. His sentence of four years ten 
months on the remaining counts he pled guilty to was stayed and he was released from jail. Furthermore, 
Hopkins's statement that he talked with defendant while they worked mornings together at the same job in 
the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as defendant never had a morning job. 213 
A second jailhouse informant named Cooper also testified that defendant had admitted to participating in the rape and 
murder. 22-1 *1405 But as the appellate court pointed out, this informant also had both a record of prior cooperation and 
apparently strong incentives to testify. 215 
Cooper was in the San Joaquin County Jail on warrants for charges of possession of precursors with intentto manufacture drugs 
,,c, 
and receiving stolen property, plus prior conviction enhancements. "'- ' Cooper stated he was afraid that ifhe went to prison he 
would be killed. 227 Cooper also had a lengthy record of felony and misdemeanor convictions dating to the 1970s and was on 
probation at the time of his testimony. 228 In exchange for his testimony, Cooper was allowed to serve his time in Humboldt 
County, where he was placed in an alternative work program. 229 After two days in that program, Cooper left. :i:,.o He remained 
at large until just before the trial, when he was arrested on a probation violation and sentenced to thirty days in jail. 131 When 
arrested, Cooper gave several fake names and birth dates, apparently to avoid arrest on three outstanding felony warrants. 2;,2 
Cooper also admitted he had provided information to the police to benefit himself a couple of times in the past. 23 3 
Notwithstanding the obvious flimsiness of the State's case-consisting entirely of one nonexclusively matching hair, an 
inconsistent statement from an untrustworthy child, and the testimony of two jailhouse snitches, one of whom was caught in 
a flat lie and the other who had obvious incentives to help the State-the jury convicted and the appellate court affirmed. 23-1 
The appellate court reasoned that although there were serious problems with each of the witnesses who testified, the witnesses 
corroborated each other. 235 The police statement given by the fourteen-year-old with a propensity to lie was corroborated by 
the self-serving and clearly perjurious testimony of the jailhouse snitch. and vice versa. 2·1" The appellate court seems to have 
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thought that while a small amount of untrustworthy evidence might provide an insufficient basis for conviction, problems with 
the reliability of the State's evidence could be overcome by piling on more untrustworthy evidence. 
*1406 Sometimes appellate judges simply do not know what to think but affirm anyway. In one Georgia case, a habeas court 
denied relief to a defendant who had been convicted of mwder and armed robbery almost entirely on the testimony of a jailhouse 
informant named Donald Bates. 23 7 At trial, Bates testified that the defendant Johnny Ashley had made a jailhouse confession to 
him. 238 Defense counsel for Ashley adduced substantial impeachment evidence on cross-examination, but the jury convicted 
Ashley nonetheless. 2·i9 After conducting extensive post-conviction hearings, Ashley's lawyers put on extensive evidence that 
Bates was mentally ill and had fabricated his trial testimony. 240 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the matter, the judge summed up his thoughts on the matter: 
At the trial I thought Donald Bates was lying. Now I think Donald Bates is lying on the trial, but I do not 
think that affects the verdict in the case . . . I just don't believe prisoners who testify against prisoners to 
get out of jail. And I don't think juries do either. I didn't believe it then; I don't believe it now. I don't think 
that you've proved anything about what the truth is, either. I don't think it was what Mr. Bates swore it was 
and I don't think we know. 241 
Despite conceding that one of the main witnesses at Ashley's trial was an untrustworthy witness and a blatant liar, the trial court 
denied Ashley's motion for a new trial, based entirely, it appears, on the judge's conviction that the snitch's testimony was so 
obviously perjured that members of the jury must have realized it. 242 In so ruling, the judge failed to take into account several 
factors that might have led a jury to give such testimony credence at trial, including that Mr. Bates was the State's witness whose 
credibility *1407 was defended by the prosecutor, that the judge himself had permitted the witness to testify in the first place, 
and that the jury's verdict itselfbelied his conclusion. In any event, the court's ruling was affirmed on appeal. 243 Ashley served 
twenty years in a Georgia prison, and was released on parole on January 31, 2012. 244 
What is worse, even in cases where jailhouse snitches come forward and admit that they lied at trial, courts rarely grant 
defendants post-conviction relief. 245 This happened, for instance, in the Troy Davis case. 246 Five years after jailhouse snitch 
Kevin McQueen testified that Davis confessed to shooting police officer Mark McPhail, McQueen executed an affidavit 
recanting his trial testimony. 247 In the affidavit, McQueen explained that he had heard details of the Davis case on television 
and from other inmates, and he had then contacted the detective in charge of the investigation. 24;,; He falsely told the detective 
that Davis had confessed to him and repeated the stocy at trial. :-19 He also admitted that the charges against him had been 
dropped or reduced as a reward for his testimony, a fact that he also lied about at trial. ~50 
McQueen's recantation was presented to numerous courts during the approximately twenty years that Davis sought to prove 
that he was actually innocent of the murder of the Savannah police officer. 2=- 1 Because Davis was deemed to have procedurally 
defaulted most of his legal claims, few courts even addressed the significance of McQueen's recantation. ;;;;2 When a judge 
finally did consider the significance of the recantation in a habeas hearing conducted to evaluate Davis's actual innocence claim, 
the judge rejected it as insignificant. ::: 53 According to the judge, McQueen's trial testimony was so patently false that the jury 
must have been aware of the fact *1408 at trial. 254 Therefore, the judge concluded, McQueen's recantation was both plainly 
true and inconsequential. 255 Davis's habeas petition was denied, and Davis was subsequently executed. ~56 
·15 
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Although it took twenty years, a better result was obtained by Bobby Joe Maxwell. Maxwell had been convicted in 1992-
Iargely on the testimony of infamous jailhouse snitch Sidney Storch-of committing several murders attributed to the "Skid 
Row Stabber." 257 Based on extensive evidence, including the testimony given by Storch to the Los Angeles County Grand 
Jury, that Storch was a serial perjurer who had made a living concocting false jaiJhouse confessions, the Ninth Circuit granted 
Maxwell's habeas petition in 2012. 258 Even then, however, the Ninth Circuit was forced to expressly overrule factual findings 
made by the California Superior Court, which had concluded. notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of Storch's "pattern of 
perjury," that there was no basis in the Maxwell case itself to find that Storch's testimony was false. 159 
California sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied over the dissents of Justices Scalia and 
Alito. 160 Justice Scalia complained that, at best, "the evidence relied on by the Ninth Circuit might permit, but by no means 
compels, the conclusion that Storch fabricated Maxwell's admission." 161 This, Scalia argued. was an insufficient basis upon 
which to grant habeas relief. 2 61 Writing in support of the Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Sotomayor responded: 
The dissent labels all of this evidence "circumstantial." It insists that it is possible that Storch 
repeatedly falsely implicated other defendants, and fabricated other material facts at Maxwell's trial, but 
uncharacteristically told the truth about Maxwell's supposed confession. Of course, that is possible. But it is 
not reasonable, given the voluminous evidence that Storch was a habitual liar who even the State concedes 
told other material lies at Maxwell's trial. 263 
Maxwell's case does demonstrate that post-conviction relief for some victims of false jailhouse testimony is possible, but it is 
the exception that proves the rule. The evidence ofStorch's misconduct was overwhelming, and Maxwell's victory seemingly 
grudging. *1409 Plainly, post-conviction relief for defendants convicted on the basis of unreliable or false snitch testimony is 
technically available but practically attainable only in extreme cases, and even then only over spirited opposition. As the state 
court rulings in Maxwell's case illustrate, busy and jaded state appellate courts typically look the other way in the presence 
of even blatant evidence that jailhouse snitches lied at a criminal defendant's trial, and sentiment in favor of upholding those 
determinations exists in some quarters all the way up the judicial chain of command 264 
This anecdotal evidence is supported by more systematic research. Professor Brandon Garrett conducted a study of the first 
two hundred DNA exonerations. 265 In those cases, Garrett found that jailhouse informant testimony had been a factor in I 1.5 
percent of the cases. ~66 Jailhouse informants provided testimony in forty-three percent of the capital cases that ultimately ended 
in exoneration. 2('7 Strikingly, not one of those wrongly convicted defendants attempted to challenge their convictions based 
on a claim that the jailhouse informant had fabricated testimony, likely, as Garrett surmises, ''because they could not locate 
any evidence to prove that the informants testified falsely." 268 Reviewing the record ofreliefgranted in cases involving false 
jaiJhouse snitch testimony, it is abundantly clear that wrongly convicted defendants cannot rely on post-conviction processes 
for relief. As Anne Bowen Poulin has argued, ''When false testimony is given at trial the truth finding process is fundamentally 
corrupted." 269 The courts' routine failure to grant relief to defendants who establish that jailhouse snitches presented false 
testimony at trial deserves prompt and effective relief, but such relief, sadly, for most has simply not been forthcoming. 
IV. REGULATION OF JAil,HOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY 
SHORT OF ABOLmON IS CERTAIN TO BE INEFFECTIVE 
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A wide variety of commentators have condemnedjailhouse snitch testimony for many of the reasons noted here. ::~o They have 
*1410 proposed a variety of reforms, including enhanced disclosure requirements to ensure vigorous cross-examination of 
jailhouse informants, pretrial reliability hearings, special jury instructions, using experts to educate the jury about the effect 
of incentives on the reliability of testimony, and heightened corroboration requirements. 271 Few, however, have vigorously 
called for an outright ban on use of electronically uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony. 27~ As I argue here, however, 
nothing less than a total ban on such testimony v:ill be effective. 
A. Pretrial Reliability Hearings Are Unlikely to Adequately Screen Out Lying Jailhouse Snitches 
Some commentators have proposed conducting pretrial reliability hearings to screen out unreliable jailhouse snitch 
testimony. ::73 Leading snitch expert Alexandra Natapoff, for example, urges courts to conduct pretrial reliability hearings 
for all informant witnesses, including jailhouse snitches that the government intends to present at trial. 274 In such hearings, 
the government would have the burden to demonstrate "the reliability of any informant witness, or statements made by that 
informant." 2 75 Moreover, as she points out, at least three states have already established pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse 
snitches. 276 Proponents argue that such hearings fall well within the comfort zone of trial courts, which regularly are asked to 
screen other types *1411 of evidence, such as scientific evidence and expert witness testimony, for reliability. 2 77 
Professor George Harris has also proposed that courts undertake extensive pretrial reliability hearings of any compensated 
witness, including jailhouse snitches. 2~s Harris suggests that evidence at such hearings would include anything relevant to 
the witness's credibility, including the ''nature of compensation that the witness has received or may receive," the witness's 
history of cooperation in other cases, and physical or other evidence ''unknown to the witness at the time ofher initial proffer of 
testimony, that is consistent with or contradicts the cooperator's testimony" in specific and unanticipated ways. ~79 "Changed 
testimony, a history of repeated cooperation for compensation, compensation out of proportion to the government's legitimate 
interest in the prosecution of the defendant, or overtly contingent compensation should create a presumption of insufficient 
reliability that the moving party would have to overcome." 280 
Although adoption of a pretrial reliability screening requirement would not be a bad thing, and might even be moderately 
helpful, the proposed pretrial reliability screenings would certainly not be a panacea. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that 
trial courts have the ability or inclination to screen out false jailhouse snitch testimony in the mine run of cases. 
For starters, judges are unlikely to be any better than jurors at distinguishing lying witnesses from honest ones. 2~ 1 Numerous 
studies have examined the extent to which training and expertise improves one's ability to assess whether others are telling the 
truth. :ic Police officers in particular have been the focus of many of these studies because they regularly interview suspects 
and evaluate the credibility of the stories they are told. :s., Without exception, those studies have found that "people are 
poor intuitive judges of truth and deception, and that police investigators and *1412 other so-called experts who routinely 
make such judgments are also highly prone to error.":::s..i Indeed, some studies indicate that specialized training might make 
interviewers more likely to misinterpret the truthfulness of the interviewee and to increase the interviewer's confidence in 
those misjudgments. :s~ If police investigators--who often receive special training in interrogation skills and lie detection--
have not demonstrated any measurable advantage in detecting deception, there is little reason to believe judges--who deal with 
individuals at far greater remove--have developed any better abilities. 
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Like police officers, judges actually might be more poorly equipped than jurors to fairly evaluate the credibility of a jailhouse 
snitch's incriminating testimony, and confirmation bias again may be the culprit. Research on judge and juror perceptions of guilt 
indicates that judges are more likely to view criminal defendants as guilty than jurors. 2 Sh In Kalven and Zeisel's classic study 
of jury behavior, for example, the researchers found that judges were consistently more likely than juries to vote to convict. 287 
Other researchers have found "similar patterns of trial judges unduly leaning in the prosecution's favor when appraising the 
evidence." 2 88 Due to the volume of apparently guilty criminal defendants that judges sec regularly in their courtrooms, judges 
may similarly be more strongly disinclined to question the accuracy of the jailhouse snitch's testimony, which confirms what 
the judge likely assumes anyway: that the defendant is guilty. 
Pro-prosecution bias by judges has been frequently noted in other contexts as well. For instance, judicial tolerance of police 
perjury is widely acknowledged. ~89 Courts know that police frequently lie but tend to look the other way. 290 A variety of 
scholars have concluded that trial judges "habitually accept□ the policeman's word" and may even ignore police lies "to prevent 
the suppression of evidence and assure conviction." 291 At least one research study *1413 lends empirical credence to that 
hypothesis. 292 One commentator summarized the most frequently advanced explanations for why judges so frequently fail to 
crack down on police perjury: 
1) it is impossible to determine if a witness is lying; 2) judges dislike the possibility of suppressing evidence 
due to police perjury; 3) many judges believe that most defendants in the system are guilty; 4) judges are 
more likely to believe an officer's testimony rather than the defendant's; and 5) judges do not enjoy accusing 
other government officials oflying. ~93 
The reasons judges are reluctant to make credibility determinations against police are also applicable to jailhouse snitches in 
that adverse credibility findings might also impugn the motives or integrity of the prosecutors who put the snitches on the 
witness stand. In many cases there will be little external basis on which to assess the credibility of a jailhouse snitch's testimony. 
Because of pro-prosecution bias, judges may be more inclined to permit prosecutors to put on potentially unreliable evidence, 
particularly because such evidence confirms the possible judicial assumption that most defendants are, in fact, guilty. While 
judges are unlikely to be inclined to specially credit an inmate's testimony under most circumstances, they may be more willing 
to credit such testimony where it has been previously vetted-or at least apparently vetted-by law enforcement officials. Finally, 
just as judges are often reluctant to accuse police officers oflying, they probably are also reluctant to make an adverse credibility 
determination against a witness for whom the prosecutor has-expressly or implicitly-personally vouched. After all, a judicial 
determination that such a witness is lying at minimum suggests that the prosecutor who put that witness on the .stand was 
negligent in proffering the evidence, and could even imply that the prosecutor knowingly attempted to use false testimony. 
That judges tend, for whatever reason, to be biased when assessing the admissibility of evidence is further supported by 
the judicial track record in screening scientific evidence. As Professor Suzanne Rozelle has argued, a study of evidentiary 
challenges in criminal cases reveals a clear pattern of pro-prosecution admissibility rulings. 2 94 Courts readily admit all sorts 
of questionable forensic "match" evidence proffered by prosecutors, *1414 including tool mark, bite mark, footprint, and 
handwriting comparisons, that lack any scientific foundation regarding the reliability of the method or the proficiency of the 
analyst. ~ 9 ~ At the same time, those same courts routinely deny defendants' requests to put on expert witnesses to testify about 
the known unreliability of that evidence, even where such testimony is grounded in empirical research. 2% This pro-prosecution 
bias strongly suggests that judges will conduct pretrial reliability screenings of jailhouse snitch testimony in the same one-
sided manner. 
-----------------·----------------------------------------
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In sum, most judges' laissez-faire attitudes about State's witnesses provides little reason to expect that if given the opportunity 
to conduct pretrial hearings, judges will suddenly crack down on unreliable jailhouse snitches. 
B. Disclosure of Impeachment Material 
A small number of states require prosecutors to comply with enhanced disclosure obligations in certain types of cases involving 
jailhouse informants. 2r As a result of recent reforms, for example, Illinois prosecutors must now disclose a substantial 
amount of information about informants, including any benefit promised to the informant in exchange for testimony, the 
circumstances in which the defendant's alleged confession supposedly occurred, names of witnesses present at the time, 
and the informant's prior history of cooperation with the State. 29x Oklahoma and Nebraska also require enhanced pretrial 
disclosure. 299 Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals recently established disclosure rules applicable to jailhouse snitch 
testimony in all cases. ·'00 According to the Oklahoma Court, at least ten days prior to trial the State must disclose the 
informant's criminal history, any deal or promise extended to the informant, the circumstances in which the admission or 
confession was obtained, other cases in which the informant has testified and any benefits received as a result, any statements 
recanting his statement or testimony, and any other information relevant to the informant's credibility. ~O I This impeachment 
evidence is undoubtedly necessary to permit defense counsel to better cross-examine informants. For these reasons, numerous 
commentators *1415 have called for increased disclosure obligations along similar lines. 30~ 
There may, however, be inherent limits on the extent to which disclosure rules can mitigate the likely prejudice resulting from 
admission of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony. First, no matter how scathing the impeachment, jurors all begin with the 
knowledge that jailhouse snitches are convicted criminals. Notwithstanding that knowledge, jurors routinely believe snitch 
testimony anyway. Second, as George Harris has noted, most of the critical details surrounding a jailhouse informant's testimony, 
including how the government "selects, prepares, and evaluates" such witnesses, are "undiscoverable," and "[e]ven that which 
is discoverable often remains resistant to realistic portrayal at trial."-'0-' More likely, however, the critical information will 
simply never be uncovered. "Given the secrecy surrounding the prosecutor's preparation of her witnesses and the inability to 
review the process meaningfully, it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent witnesses have been coached 
by prosecutors and police to give false or misleading testimony." ~o--1 In addition, many types of benefits that prosecutors can 
bestow on jailhouse informants-such as a promise not to bring future charges or to bring lesser charges rather than greater 
charges-are protected under the guise ofprosecutorial discretion and insulated from discovery. -'05 
There are additional reasons why enhanced discovery will not resolve the jailhouse snitch problem. Perhaps most importantly, 
in many cases there simply will be little to disclose. When an inmate comes forward purporting to possess incriminating 
information, the State can truthfully claim that it had nothing to do with initiating contact with the witness. It simply received the 
evidence that the witness reported, found it credible, and proffered it at trial. The fundamental question-whether the informant 
is truthful or lying-will remain for the jury to determine. Because no formal deal will actually have been made in most cases 
prior to the witness's in-court testimony, there also will be nothing to disclose regarding any benefit or inducement offered by 
the State in exchange for the testimony. When questioned about whether the witness has received a benefit, the witness can 
honestly state that he has not. He might add, as witnesses frequently and honestly do, that he hopes the prosecutor or judge will 
look favorably upon him in the future as a result of his testimony, because the prosecutor has never *1416 made any explicit 
promise to reward him, and because the prosecutor has only asked him to testify "truthfully" about what he knows. 
Enhanced disclosure is an inadequate remedy for another, and perhaps even more basic, reason. Precisely in those cases in 
which jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most sought out, prosecutors cannot be trusted to fairly and honestly disclose 
the critical facts that would undennine the snitch's testimony. :;o" If police or prosecutors have affirmatively provided essential 
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details about a case to a jailhouse snitch they know to be untrustworthy, have made secret promises to reward witnesses for their 
testimony in the future, or have recruited the snitch-in violation of the Sixth Amendment-to affirmatively elicit incriminating 
information against a fellow inmate, then no formal disclosure requirement will induce the prosecutor to disclose such damning 
information. 
Finally, even if a disclosure requirement did result in discovery of important impeachment evidence that defense counsel could 
use at trial to impeach the witness, it is not clear that witness impeachment alone is sufficient to blunt the prejudice caused by 
testimony that the defendant has confessed to the crime. As discussed above, research suggests that while jurors have the capacity 
to recognize that some witnesses are more self-interested than others, such information does not necessarily get processed in a 
way that helps defendants. Due to the stickiness of fundamental attnoution error, jurors are still more likely to vote to convict, 
particularly in close cases, after hearing even tainted and objectively unreliable confession evidence. 
Another suggestion made by commentators is to apply heightened corroboration requirements to jailhouse snitch testimony. 307 
Indeed, the American Bar Association passed a resolution "calling on federal, state, and local governments to adopt measures 
so 'no prosecution should occur based solely upon uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony."' Jos These *1417 
recommendations recently have been implemented in a few states, including Texas 309 and California, 310 which have enacted 
legislation to require corroboration of jailhouse informants' testimony. ·11 1 
Jailhouse snitch corroboration requirements are often modeled on similar corroboration requirements for accomplice 
testimony. 312 While these reforms are laudable for what they are worth, they simply are not worth that much. The main 
problem with a corroboration requirement is that, as typically formulated, it is too lax. Under Texas law, for example, "all that 
is required is that there be some evidence-other than the jailhouse informant's testimony-which tends to connect the accused 
to the commission of the offense." 313 California's requirement is somewhat more stringent In California, it is not enough if the 
corroborating evidence merely ''tends to connect" the defendant to the crime. 3 14 Rather, the corroborating evidence must, in 
fact, "connect□ the defendant with the commission of the offense."-' 15 Accomplice testimony, however, can be corroborated by 
jailhouse snitch testimony, and vice versa, substantially weakening the protective value of the corroboration requirement. 3 IC, 
Jailhouse snitches can also presumably be corroborated by other jailhouse snitches. ·11 7 
Other states rely on the "corpus delicti rule" to enforce a more modest corroboration requirement. In Tennessee, for instance, 
''the corpus delicti of a crime may not be established by a confession *1418 alone." ··m: Accordingly, a conviction may not 
be sustained if the only evidence in the case is testimony by a jailhouse informant. The corpus delicti rule, however, provides 
even weaker protection against lying jailhouse snitches. In Tennessee, for example, as long as the prosecutor can prove that 
a crime in fact occurred, the corpus delicti rule will not bar the State from relying solely on jailhouse informant testimony to 
establish that a particular individual was the crime's perpetrator. 3 19 
Even where the corroboration requirement has some teeth, it will rarely make much of a difference. In the vast majority of cases 
in whichjailhouse snitch testimony is sought, there will be at least some other evidence implicating the defendant. 310 In those 
cases, however, prosecutors want to use the jailhouse snitches for precisely the reason that they should not be allowed to do so: 
the other evidence in the case is weak or equivocal, making the jailhouse snitch testimony unduly influential in determining the 
outcome of the case. 3 21 After all, there is no reason to use jailhouse snitch testimony--and to reward convicted criminals for 
20 
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providing it-if the State has sufficient other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only in cases where the 
prosecutor believes there to be a real risk ofacquittal that the prosecutor will be willing to 'i>ay" the price for such testimony. 322 
These corroboration rules do little to prevent wrongful convictions from occurring in the types of cases in which jailhouse 
snitches are typically used. Prosecutors will rarely move forward in *1419 cases where there is no evidence at all connecting 
a defendant to a charged crime, and as long as there is some other evidence, even if it is quite weak, then the corroboration 
requirement will not prevent the snitch's testimony from coming in. 
Perhaps a truly robust corroboration rule would make a difference. For instance, reliability would not be a significant problem 
under a rule that permitted jailhouse snitch testimony to come in only if the alleged confession made to the snitch bad been 
electronically recorded. In that case, the snitch's testimony would be corroborated by the taped recording of the conversation. Of 
course, such a rule would raise other problems-most significantly, Sixth Amendment concerns-that would preclude snitches 
from being used to secretly record confessions by other inmates in most cases . ."\::!> 
Given the substantial concerns, however, that police officers and prosecutors might provide jailhouse informants with crucial 
details about the investigation--inadvertently or otherwise-even a strong corroboration requirement that did not actually require 
electronic recording would fail to provide sufficient protection. First, there is documented evidence that law enforcement 
agents have provided informants with incriminating details in some cases. ·124 More generally, research on false confessions 
demonstrates that even police officers and prosecutors acting entirely in good faith can, and have, inadvertently revealed 
supposedly secret details to interrogated suspects during the course of interrogation. ·'2=' Judges and juries then concluded that 
those confessions were reliable precisely because they included details about which only the perpetrator of the crime supposedly 
could know. 321' Corroboration of the "details" of the suspect's confession, in these cases, actually served to bolster the false 
confessions. ::2- Courts uniformly emphasized that these confessions contained admissions that only the true murderer or rapist 
could have known. 32~ 
While recording the entirety of the interrogation might have revealed the source of contamination, anything less only further 
*1420 cemented its persuasiveness. 32'' The same dynamic almost certainly would be at work in cases involving jailhouse 
snitches. A mandatory requirement that all conversations between a snitch and state agents be recorded, as some commentators 
have urged, -' 30 would address some aspects of the problem, but given the variety of possible sources of information from which 
a jailhouse snitch can potentially draw, only a tape recording of the defendant's actual confession to the snitch would adequately 
ensure that the snitch's testimony was reliable. 
D. Jury Instructions 
Commentators have also called for juries to be instructed about the special reliability concerns presentwhenjailhouse informants 
testify. 3:; 1 A few states have adopted such requirements. :;:; 2 While requiring special jwy instructions is harmless, it is, like 
the other measures discussed above, almost certainly an insufficient remedy. The problems with jwy instructions are well 
documented. A wealth of data suggests that jwy instructions are generally ineffective tools for channeling a juror's assessment 
of evidence presented at trial. :n First, jurors generally are poor at understanding traditional jury instructions or applying 
those instructions in deliberations .. ,.,-1 *1421 Second, studies using mock jurors have consistently shown that instructions to 
disregard relevant evidence do not prevent jurors from incorporating that evidence into deliberations. '·' 5 Studies of the efficacy 
of cautionary instructions are also at best mixed. '·16 There is thus substantial reason to doubt that such instructions will prove 
effective in inoculating jurors after exposure to false jailhouse snitch testimony. Indeed, like with unreliable confession evidence 
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generally, it is far more likely that such instructions "occur too late in the process to undo the damage" once the testimony 
"has entered the stream of evidence at trial." 3 3 7 Where evidence as potentially prejudicial as a reported post-crime confession 
is at issue, cautionary jury instructions--while undoubtedly better than nothing--are simply inadequate to ensure that innocent 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 
There is, in short, no reason to believe that jury instructions are an effective tool to neutralize the impact of highly prejudicial 
false snitch testimony. Relying on jury instructions to redress the harm inflicted from false jailhouse snitch testimony is like 
applying a Band-Aid to a gunshot wound. It merely obscures the problem. 
Indeed, even if all of the above requirements were in place, there would still be no reason for confidence that false jailhouse 
snitch testimony might not be admitted and relied upon by jurors to convict innocent defendants. Observations made by scholars 
writing about a similar problem-the admissibility of unreliable expert forensic witness testimony-apply equally to jailhouse 
snitch testimony: "Experimental research ... reinforces the need for incriminating D evidence to be reliable because the various 
trial *1422 safeguards, along with lay jurors, trial, and appellate judges, have not performed well in response to prosecutions 
and convictions incorporating unreliable [] evidence." -''8 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is fundamentally and pervasively unreliable. Its use poses an irremediable threat of taint in criminal 
cases. 
V. ABOLITION IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
Abolition of jailhouse snitch testimony is perhaps a radical suggestion. After all, courts are extremely reluctant to bar use 
of relevant evidence in general, and even more so to exclude an entire class of potentially material evidence altogether. 
Nonetheless, there is precedent for such a ban. Indeed, several types of evidence are now considered so lacking in reliability 
that they are flatly banned as admissible in-court evidence. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that nothing less than a total ban 
can protect innocent criminal defendants from the substantial risk of wrongful conviction as a result of the use, and abuse, of 
jailhouse snitch testimony. 
A. Constitutional Precedents: Coerced Confessions 
Coerced confessions are the paradigmatic example of a type of evidence that has been barred as a matter of law from use in 
criminal trials .. WI Although there are constitutional considerations at play in the taking as well as the use of coerced confessions, 
the ban on the use of coerced confessions can be traced in substantial measure to the inherent unreliability of such evidence. ·'40 
The voluntary confession requirement is a longstanding common-law evidence rule that ultimately took on constitutional 
significance in the United States. -~""' 1 The rule is premised on the presumption that freely made confessions are strongly reliable, 
but that confessions induced through promises or threats lack such indicia of reliability. -'42 The Arizona v. Fulminante case 
reflects the *1423 Supreme Court's most recent recognition of both the inherent unreliability of coerced confessions and the 
difficulty of repairing the prejudice done to defendants when such evidence is erroneously admitted. -' 4 ·' It is perhaps noteworthy 
that Fulminante, though widely invoked as a coerced confessions case, is also a jailhouse snitch case. '4-1 In Fulminante, the 
defendant was suspected of killing his eleven-year-old stepdaughter. 3-1~ While in jail for an unrelated offense, Fulminante 
allegedly made statements to a fellow inmate implicating him in the killing. 346 After the inmate reported the statements to the 
FBI, the inmate was instructed to "find out more." ~4 7 As a suspected child murderer, Fulminante was being threatened by other 
22 
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prisoners and was deeply concerned for his safety. _,-1~ The inmate "offered to protect Fulminante from his fellow inmates, but 
told him, 'You have to tell me about it,' you know. I mean, in other words, 'For me to give you any help.'" 3-l'J Fulminante 
then allegedly admitted to the inmate that he had driven his stepdaughter ''to the desert on his motorcycle, where be choked 
her, sexually assaulted her, and made her beg for her life, before shooting her twice in the bead." -' 50 
Fulm.inante moved to suppress the confession on grounds that it was the product of coercion. -~ 51 The trial court denied the 
motion, and Fulminante was convicted and sentenced to death. ·' 52 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
trial court erred in finding that the confession was voluntary and that the error was not harmless. 35; The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari *1424 and affirmed. 35 -1 All nine justices agreed that use of coerced confession evidence at trial is per se 
error. J:-i~ 
"Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jwy, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out 
of mind even if told to do so." While some statements by a defendant may concern isolated aspects of the crime or may be 
incriminating only when linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means 
of the crime may tempt the jwy to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision. ·' 56 
The Court was divided, however, as to whether admission of a coerced confession could ever be harmless .. '> 57 A five justice 
majority held that harmless error analysis was appropriate even in cases where a coerced confession had improperly been 
admitted at trial, but that the error in Fulminante's case was not harmless. 35 ~ Four justices dissented from the application of 
harmless error analysis, contending that such evidence was so inherently prejudicial that no trial in which such evidence had 
. . ,.,\/ 
been presented to a Jwy could be fair. · · 
The Court thus emphasized not only that use of coerced confessions was always constitutionally improper, but that any harmless 
error analysis conducted by a court in a case where a coerced confession had erroneously been admitted required "extreme 
caution," since ''the risk that the confession is unreliable" is magnified by the "profound impact" that confession evidence tends 
• • ,/10 
to exert upon Junes. · 
Of course, the constitutional ban on involuntary confessions necessitated by due process considerations is accompanied by 
the Fifth Amendment's ban on compelled self-incriminating testimony. -' 61 That ban is further expanded under Miranda v. 
Arizona 362 to preclude government use of virtually all statements obtained by police during custodial interrogation in a manner 
inconsistent with the procedural safeguards established by the Court. -' 6·' 
*1425 B. Procedurally Unreliable Hearsay Evidence 
A coerced confession is not the only kind of evidence categorically prohibited from use in criminal trials. The Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause similarly precludes the use, at trial, of a particular class of evidence, namely, testimonial 
out-of-court statements that were either made without prior opportunity for cross-examination or by a currently available 
declarant. -'6~ The Court's pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was an express reflection of the constitutional 
importance of evidentiary reliability. _,1,, In Ohio v. Roberts, _,;,1, the Court construed the Confrontation Clause as directed 
toward the exclusion of out-of-court statements made by unavailable witnesses that lack "adequate 'indicia of reliability."' ~6 ~ 
Of course, with Crawford, the Court reconceptualized its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, downplaying mere evidentiary 
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reliability as the touchstone of constitutional admissibility of hearsay evidence. 36x Instead, the Court substituted a procedural 
standard: hearsay evidence was admissible under the Confrontation Clause only if it was either nontestimonial, or if testimonial, 
only if it had previously been subject to cross-examination. 369 Nonetheless, the Court was explicit that the reliability of 
evidence was the primary pwpose of the Confrontation Clause: 
To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than 
a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not 
only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about 
h 1. b·1· b b d . d -no ow re 1a 1 1ty can est e etermme . · 
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause thus represents a longstanding, and well-recognized, constitutional exclusionary 
principle for a class of presumptively unreliable evidence. 
Judges also have the ability, although it is one that is infrequently used, to enforce wholesale exclusions on classes of *1426 
evidence deemed insufficiently reliable. 371 A court might exclude jailhouse informant testimony on grounds that admission 
of such unreliable evidence violates basic due process norms. J7~ 
Alternatively, courts might follow the lead established in Jackson v. Denno·' 7·1 and impose stricter constitutional regulation 
on the use of jailhouse snitch testimony. The defendant in Jackson, Nathan Jackson, alleged that his murder confession was 
the product of coercion. 3 74 Pursuant to New York state procedure, the voluntariness of Jackson's confession was submitted, 
along with all of the other evidence, to the jury, which was accordingly instructed that if it found that Jackson's confession 
had been coerced, it should ignore it. ·175 Jackson complained that submission of a coerced confession to the jury irreparably 
tainted the case. 3 7r, The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, ruling that questions regarding the voluntariness of confessions must be 
adjudicated prior to trial in order, among other things, to ensure that jurors do not rely on unreliable involuntary confessions to 
"serve as makeweights in a compromise verdict," or to prevent jurors from "accepting the confessions to overcome lingering 
doubt of guilt prejudice . .,·' T 
The logic underlying an expansion oftheJackYon rule to jailhouse snitch cases is simple. Like involuntary confessions,jailhouse 
snitch testimony is patently unreliable. Permitting a snitch to testify regarding the substance of an alleged confession is little 
different from permitting a police officer to testify about an allegedly coerced confession. The only difference is the identity of 
the witness--and few would argue that the credibility of inherently self-interested felons is greater than that of police officers. 
Certainly, the logic undergirding the Jackson rule, at minimwn, counsels for mandatory pretrial reliability hearings for contested 
jailhouse snitch testimony, as many commentators have argued and as a few states now require. But because-unlike presumably 
uncoerced confessions made to trained and disinterested law enforcement officers--all jailhouse confessions are inherently 
unreliable, it makes far more sense to treat those alleged confessions like coerced confessions, requiring not merely that they 
*1427 be screened through pretrial reliability hearings, but that they be absolutely precluded. m 
C. Statutory and Administrative Exclusions 
While the federal Constitution bars the use of certain classes of presumptively unreliable evidence, such as compelled 
confessions and statements obtained in violation to the Confrontation Clause, still other classes of evidence are barred by statute, 
evidentiaiy rule, and administrative practice. 3 79 
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One familiar example is polygraph evidence. Because of deep--seated concerns about its reliability, polygraph evidence has been 
banned by statute in many states .. ,xo In virtually every state where it has not been banned by statute, it has been ruled per se 
inadmissible by courts. -' 8 1 Such bans are appropriate, the Supreme Court has held, because of the State's "unquestionably ... 
legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial." 382 Indeed, the evidence 
at issue in the famous Frye v. United States 3s3 case- setting minimum standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence-
was a polygraph test. -'84 Although the test for admissibility established in Frye has been replaced by the Daubert criteria, the 
ban on polygraph evidence in criminal cases remains largely-albeit not entirely-intact. Jxs 
*1428 Other types of evidence have also been deemed sufficiently unreliable in some jurisdictions and therefore categorically 
inadmissible. Visual hair analysis, for example, is "a kind of evidence so inexact that it is restricted or barred in some 
jurisdictions." ·'86 Other examples include hypnotically refreshed testimony -' x 7 and uncorroborated accomplice testimony. -' 88 
(Of course, all of the flaws of uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and then some, exist with respect to uncorroborated 
jailhouse snitch testimony as well.) Some law enforcement agencies have taken it upon themselves to refrain from using or 
sanctioning the use of certain types of unreliable evidence. The FBI, for instance, stopped performing bullet lead analysis 
after the ''National Research Council concluded that available data did not support expert testimony linking crime bullets to 
'8') 
a particular source." ·'' 
Because of the highly unreliable nature of jailhouse snitch testimony, state and federal lawmakers and law enforcement agencies 
can and should, consistent with the treatment of other forms of grossly unreliable evidence, ban the use of jailhouse snitch 
testimony through legislative or administrative fiat. ·'90 
CONCLUSION 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is an inherently unreliable type of evidence. Snitches have powerful incentives to invent incriminating 
*1429 lies about other inmates in often well-founded hopes that such testimony will provide them with material benefits, 
including in many cases substantial reduction of criminal charges or sentences. At the same time, false snitch testimony is 
difficult if not altogether impossible to impeach. Because such testimony usually pits the word of two individuals against one 
another, both of whose credibility is suspect, jurors have little ability to accurately or effectively assess or weigh the evidence. 
Moreover, research suggests that jurors frequently succumb to fundamental attribution error and unwittingly fail to properly 
discount the reliability of evidence supplied by biased and self-interested witnesses. Unreliability concerns are further magnified 
because jailhouse snitch testimony is almost exclusively a species of confession evidence, and ample research demonstrates 
that confession evidence is more persuasive to jurors than any other type of evidence. 
Although some jurisdictions have placed a few modest limits on jailhouse snitch testimony, no jurisdiction has banned such 
testimony outright. It continues to be assumed that the traditional tools of trial procedure- cross-examination and post-
conviction review-are adequate to screen out unreliable evidence and safeguard defendants' rights. These methods, however, 
are plainly insufficient, as mounting evidence of wrongful convictions brought about through the use of false snitch testimony 
attests. Commentators have urged adoption of a variety of additional measures intended to bolster the ability of courts to screen 
such testimony for reliability, but on closer examination, none of these suggestions-while on their own terms marginally 
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The only effective solution is to flatly preclude the use of such testimony. The constitutional infrastructure already exists to 
permit courts to move in this direction. The Supreme Court's longstanding preclusion of coerced confession evidence provides 
a precedent readily applicable to confession evidence from jailhouse snitches. But in all likelihood, if change in this area comes, 
it will be as a result of legislative resolve to take meaningful steps to reduce wrongful convictions. There is a mature body of 
research data that identifies the primary causes of wrongful convictions. Jailhouse snitch testimony is at the top of the list. It 
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Of course, many types of witnesses testify in contexts where it is clear that they have an interest in the outcome. Mothers testify about 
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Trial Transcript at 1228, State v. Davis, No. 089-2467 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Davis Trial Transcript]. 
Id. at 1229. 
Id at 1228. 
Id. at 1230. 
Id. 
Id. at 1230-31. McQueen also claimed that Davis had confessed to shooting someone at the party. According to McQueen, "when he 
was at the party, he got into a beef with some dudes, and a whole bunch of shooting and stuff going on. So after the party-" Id. at 
1230. The D.A. interrupted. "Did he say he did any shooting?" Id. "Yeah," McQueen answered. Id. The D.A. began to ask if"he was 
the one that shot" an individual named Michael Cooper at the party, as Davis had been charged with that shooting in addition to the 
shooting of police officer Mark McPhail. Id. at 1231. However, before the prosecutor could get the name of the shooting victim out, 
defense cotmsel cut him off, asking the judge to counsel the prosecutor not to lead the witness. The judge obliged. Id The prosecutor 
then rephrased bis question: "What did he say about shooting somebody at the party?" Id. McQueen's answer was vague: "Well, 
exchange of gunfire. He didn't know who shot who, you know, I guess it was the wrong guy, you know, got hung up that night Id. 
Id 
Id. at 1231. 
/11 re DaYi,. !\n. C\' -109-130. 2010 WL 33850:-il. at *.W (S.D. (ia. Aug. 2-1.2010); see Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 139, 
at 1239, 1243 (informing the defense attorney that he "was already sentenced" and that ''the Judge was not going to go back and 
review [his] case"). 
/11 r<' D.wi.1. 20 IO WL 33~50l-l. at •-N. 
Id. 
Id. 
Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 139. 
Id. 
Id at 1501 (emphasis added). 
Id. 
See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 143 (explaining several states' limitations onjailhouse snitch testimony). 
Id. at 142 (stating that the Supreme Court relies on traditional litigation tools, like cross-examination, to combat the potential for 
error in snitch testimony). 
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556 U.S. 586 (2008). 
id at 594 n. * (rejecting the suggestion that the Court craft a broader rule to exclude uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony). 
Id. at 588-89. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 589. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id (quoting State v. Ventris. ~o. 94.001. 2006 WL 2661161. at * 3 ( Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 15. 2006 J). 
Id. 
Id (citing State v. Ventris. 176 P.Jd 920. 928 ( Kan. 100X )). 
Id at594n.*. 
Id 
Id. (quoting Spencer v. Texas. 385 U.S. 554. 564 (1967)); see also L:nitcd States v. Sd1cffrr. 523 U.S. 303. 313 (1998) ("A 
fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that 'the jury is the lie detector."' (quoting Unih::d States\'. 13arn.ird, 490 F.:!d 
907. 911 (9th Cir. 1973))). 
1 '<'111/'is. 556 L,:.s. at 594. 
See, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth. 121 S.W.3d 198. 203 (Ky. 2003) (rejectingaclaimthattestimonyofajailhouseinfonnantshould 
have been excluded because it was inherently suspect, and its reliability should have been the subject of a cautionary admonition 
because the rule is that "the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given sworn testimony are matters for the jury to decide"). 
See Pomona v. SQ!vl N. Am. Corp .. 750 FJd I 036. 1049 (9th Cir. '.!014) (stating that "it is the job of the fact finder, not the trial 
court, to determine which source is more credible and reliable"). 
:'-09 L'.S. 579 ( 199] l. 
Id :115%. 
Stat.::\'. Lawson, 191 P.3d 673. 695 (Or.1011). 
Id. at c,9, n.9 (citing R.C.L. Lindsey et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Inaccuracy Within and Across Situations?, 
66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981)). 
Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is bp<'rt L\•ide11ce Reath· Oiflc-n·,11.'. :,.;9 NOTRl: DA\11: L. REV. I. 18-19 120131 
(arguing that the relevancy standard for factual evidence may be too lax). 
See Unit1:d States\'. Karakc. 443 F. Supp. 2d 8. 50 (D.D.C. 2006) ("A long line of Supreme Court precedent makes clear, 'confessions 
which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological,' are inadmissible .... " (quoting Rog~r, \. 
Richmond. 365 L.S. 534. 540-41 ( 1%1 ))). 
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Id. at 191 (quoting Cruz\'. :-.e\\ YNk. -Ii> I l.:.S. l Xh. I '15 ( 1•>~7) (White, J., dissenting)). 
Id. at 193. 
See Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1167 n.215 (noting that "[e]xamples abound of significant inducements to accomplice witnesses 
that were hidden from the defense at trial"); Harvey A. Silverglate, The Decline and Fall of Mens Rea, CHAMPION, Sept-Oct. 
2009, at 14, 18 (noting that "in practice, many types of inducements and threats often are implied, the subject of a knowing wink 
of the eye by the prosecutor to the prospective witness's lawyer"), available at http://www.threefeloniesaday.com/LinkCiick.aspx? 
fileticket=rdMd9mcf5ZA % 3D&tabid=38. 
Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1144 n.80. 
Id. at 1129. 
Id. at 1142. 
Pontics'lli \'. State. 9-1 l So. 2d I 073. I OX5 I Fla. 1006 ,. 
Id. 
Id. 
Cassidy, supra note 6 I, at 1148. 
\Villingham ,·. Cockrell. ~o. 01-101>3.1003 \\'L 110701 I (5th Cir. Feb.17.1001). 
Id. at *l. 
Paul Gianelli, Junk Scil'tu·,· and 1he Ercrntio11 u/,m lmwcmr ,\Ian. 7 :'\. Y.L. J.L. & LIBERTY 211. 13-1 (1013) (explaining that 
lawyers seeking a posthumous exoneration of Willingham have uncovered records indicating that, in fact, prosecutors reduced 
charges against Webb from aggravated robbery to simple robbery and also advocated on his behalf at a clemency hearing, citing his 
participation in the Willingham case as a basis). 
Id. at 13 3-3-1; see Brandi Grissom, Citing New Evidence, Urging a Postlmmous Pardon in 1992 Case, TEX. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2013, at 
Al 9A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27 /us/citing-new-evidence-urging-a-posthumous-pardon-in-l 992-case.html? 
_r=O. 
Gianelli, supra note 193, at 233-34. 
Id. at 234-35 (noting also that Webb later admitted to a reporter from the New Yorker magazine that he might have ''misunderstood" 
Willingham, adding "[t]he statute oflimitations has run out on perjury, hasn't it?"). 
See Cameron Todd Willingham: Wrongfully Convicted and Executed in Texas, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Cameron _Todd_ Willingham_ Wrongfully_ Convicted&uscore;and _ Executed _in_ Texas.php 
(last visited Sept 1, 2014); David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), 
http:// www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07 /090907fa _ fact_grann. 
Stephen Bright made this point more generally in the context of death penalty litigation. See Stephen B. Bright, Co1111scl ti,r the l'unr.· 
The Death Sc111<·11ce .\',,1fi,r the ll'on1 Crim<' !11afi,r th,· lli,nt L,iln-,.,.. I 03 Y . .\Lt::: L .. 1. 1835. 18:1(, I 199-1 l. 
See, e.g., Drrn,by,. H,,bbs. 7(,(, 1- .. <d S09. X2 I-S22 ( :--th Cir. 201-l) (discussing the trial court's enforcement of the motion in limine 
precluding "the defense from mentioning or attempting to elicit testimony from any witness regarding the reason for [the jailhouse 
snitch's] incarceration" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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See, e.g., C. Blaine Elliott, Lifi:'s Uncerrailltics: Jim,· lo Deal 11·i1lr Coopcn11i11g ll'i111cs,,es and .laillmme S11i1d1('s. I(, CAP. DEF . 
.1. I. 10 12003) ("A defense witness whose freedom is at stake is often too scared of retribution to come forward and offer valuable 
exculpatory evidence."). 
See, e.g., id at I (descnbing the story of one man wrongfully convicted of murder because a snitch lied about a confession). 
See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 18, 30. 
See id. 
See id. at 39. 
Id. 
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 186. 
Id. 
Brief of the NACOL, supra note 2, at 3. 
Id. 
See Brandon L. Garrett, .J11d!!i11g fl111ucc11cc. I ox cou.:rv1. L. REV. 55. X6-f'.;7 (200X). 
5 A\I. .ICR. 20 Ap1•ella1c R,·1·ic11· ~ c,41 1201-ll. 
See supra Subpart III.A. 







Id. at *1-2. 
A fourth witness who knew nothing of the case at bar testified about an incident occurring after the attack in which the defendant 
and others allegedly fondled a teenage girl. Id. at *3. 
Id at *2. 
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Id. at "'I. 
Id. at *5. 
--.~---~-.--~---· 
Id at *3 (noting that a jailhouse snitch's "statement that he talked with defendant while they worked mornings together at the same 
job in the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as defendant never had a morning job''). 
Ashley v. Statc. 439 S.E.2d 91-l, l)J.5-lt> (Ga. 199-lt. 
Id. at 916. 
As the court noted on appeal: 
During defense counsel's cross-examination of Bates, the witness admitted that he had previously given police officers false 
information about the case; that he had been convicted six times for forgery; that he had just been released from the mental health unit 
of a state correctional institution; and that he had mental health problems and was being treated with Prozac. Defense counsel sought 
to present testimony from an assistant district attorney that, in another murder case, Bates had given authorities false information 
concerning the identity of the perpetrator in exchange for favorable treatment from the authorities. The trial court refused to allow 
the evidence after sustaining the State's objection that it was irrelevant and collateral. 
Id. 
See Briefof Appellant, Ashlcy v. Stmc. 439 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 199-l) (No. S93Al989), 1993 WL 130.~5276. at *24-25. 
Id. 
Id. 
Ashley. -!~9 S. E.2d at 917. 
Parolee Database, ST. BOARD. PARDONS & PAROLES (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.pap.state.ga.us/ParoleeDatabase/ (search 
"Inmate Number" for "219088''). · 
See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, C0111·icriom Based 1111 Lies: Oe/i11i11g Due Pron·.,.,- l'mtel'lio11. 116 PENN ST. L. RE\". 331 (2011 ). 
D~\·is \. Stal.:. h(,O S.E..~d 3:--l. 35S-59 <(ia. 200:S) (affirming a denial ofa motion for a new trial despite recantations by several 
prosecution witnesses). 
/11 re Davis. No. C\'-!09- DO. 20 IO WL 33850S 1. at *48 (S.D. (ia. Aug. 2-l. 201 OJ. 
Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 36-37, In re D<11·is. < 0.0. O'lC\'00 I 30t. 20 IO WL t--032222. 
Id. at 27-30. 
In re D,11·is. 2010 \\L 3.,~50S I. at *-IX. 
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See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 25, Davis, 660 S.E.2d 354 (No. 08-66), 2008 WL -136(, 181 (presenting McQueen's 
recantations as a reason for the Supreme Court of Georgia to reconsider Davis's conviction) . 
. See, e.g., Da\'is v. Turpin. 539 S.E.2d 129. 134 (Ga. 2001) (holding that Davis had procedurally defaultedonhisconstitutionalclaims 
by failing to raise them on direct appeal). 
Ill re Dads. 2010 WL 33X50Xl. at *54. 
.Id. 
.Id at*60. 
Id. at *61; Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate Executed; Raised Racial Issues in Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at Al. 
Maxwell v. Roe. 628 F.'.ld 486. 49 I (9th Cir. 20!0). 
/d:n513. 
Id. at 50-1-05. 
Cash\· . .'vl:txwell. 132 S. CL 611. 613 (2012!. 
Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
/d.,it615. 
Id. at 612 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
But see, e.g., Cr parte Weinstein. 421 S. \V.Jd 656. 659 (Tex. Crim. App.2014) (denying habeas relief despite false witness testimony 
on the grounds that said testimony was immaterial to the verdict). 
Garrett, supra note 210, at 64. 
Id. at 86. 
Id. at 93. 
Id at 86-87. 
Poulin, supra note 245, at 334. 
See, e.g., 1HE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 15; Alexandra Natapoff, Comment, Bl:i-m1d l.i11rdiahle: Hm,· S11i1clies Co111rih1111: /I! 
lfrongfid Co11.-ictio11s. 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107. 107-29 (2006J;DavidProtess,A TaleofTwoSnitches, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 10, 2013, 5: 12 AM ), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-protess/reynaldo-guevara _ b _3397012.htrnl. 
See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 192-99; Harris, supra note 78, at 49-58. 
The authors of a 2007 PEW Charitable Trust study on jailhouse snitches, for instance, condemned their use but advocated a set 
of reforms, including corroboration, ''pretrial disclosures, reliability hearings, and special jury instructions" instead of a categorical 
ban. 1HE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2. Rory Little has urged a categorical exclusion of six types of unreliable evidence most 
frequently linked to wrongful convictions, includingjailhouse informant testimony, in capital cases. See Rory K. Little, .·!ddressi11g 
1hc b·id,•111h11T Su11rcl.'s of ll'ro11gfiil Co111"ic1iom: Catq;urica/ Erc/11.1iu111:{L,·idc11cc i11 Copit(I/ Stu1111,·s. 37 SW. L'. L. REV. %5. 
%8-69 ( 2008 ). Other occasional calls for a total ban have been made. See, e.g., Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants, 18 A.B.A. 
SEC. CRIM. JUST. 20, 78 (2003) ("The best way to deal with perjured testimony is to exclude it, and in light of the evidence that 
testimony from a jailhouse informant is so often false, it, too, should be subject to exclusion."). 
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See, e.g., DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 157; Harris, supra note 78, at 61-62. 
N ATAPOFF,supranote3,at 194. 
Id. 
Id. at 194-95 (identifying lliinois, Oklahoma, and Nevada as mandating pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse-informant 
testimony);see D"Agt,stinn ,·. State. 823 P.2d 283. 285 t 1'c,·. 19911; Dodd,·. Stat.:. 993 P.2d 778. 7!-.4 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 195; see D,mbcrt,. \kn-ell Do\\' Pham, .. Inc .. 509 U.S. 579. 587-90 ( 1993). 
Harris, supra note 78, at 63-64. 
Id. at 63. 
Id. at 64-65. 
See, e.g., Schauer & Spellman, supra note 178, at 19 (noting the "mistaken belief that judges and juries are competent evaluators of 
the veracity of those who are offering [direct evidence] testimony''). 
Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, "I'm Innocenti": Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation 
Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 501 (1999) (internal citations omitted); see also Gary D. Bond, Deception Dc1ec1io11 
t.\7,ertisc. 32 LAW & 1-!Uivl. BEHA V. 339. 339 ( 200~ I (citing research studies finding that subjects were generally unable to identify 
lies at a rate greater than chance). 
See Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, "He's Guilty!": Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & 
HUM. BEHA V. 469, 471 (2002). 
Kassin & Fong, supra note 282, at 500-0 I; see also Bella M. DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Co"elation in the Detection 
of Deception, l PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346,346 (1997). 
DePaulo et al., supra note 284. 
See HARRY KAL VEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN ruRY 55-59 (Phoenix ed., 1971 ); Martin Guggenheim & Randy 
Hertz, Rt:fh•,·ti,ms 011 .hu{~es . .furies. and .Justict': E11.1·111·i11g the Faimess o/'.f11n·11ilc /)c/i11q11,·11t:1· Trials. 33 WAKE FOREST L 
REV. 553. 562-6J < 1998). 
KAL VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 286; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 286 ( discussing research). 
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 286, at 568. 
Melanie D. Wilson, !111pmh<1hle ( 't111sc: A ( 'ascji,r .l11,l~i11g Police /11· a Mort' .\/aicstic S1<111dard. 15 BERKELEY .I. CRH,!. L. 259. 
267-6~ (20IO). 
Id. at 26 7 (citing studies that conclude judges "knowingly acquiesce in police perjury so that they too avoid letting a guilty defendant 
escape prosecution''). 
Id. at 265. 
Id. at 264-65 (studying judicial resolution of claims of police perjury brought by criminal defendants) . 
See Jennifer E. Koepke, Note, 77,c Failure: 111 Breach 11,,, Blue Ir,,// ,fSilcncc: The Circling 0(1/,(' Wagons 10 Protffl Polin· Pc1:i111:r. 
39 WASH13UR'.',; LI. 211. 222 (2000) (summarizing reasons that judges are reluctantto find police perjury}. 
See Susan D. Rozelle, Dauhi:r1. Stl1111<111hcrt: Criminal llcfi-11d,11111· ,me! the Slum End o(the Science Srick. 43 TULSA L. REV. 597. 
606(20071. 
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Id at 599-600. 
Id. 
GARRETT, supra note l, at 256. 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / l 15-2l(c) (1993). 
NATAPOFF, supra note 3. 
See Dodd, .. State. 993 P.2d 778. 78-1 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
Id. 
See NAT APO FF, supra note 3, at 192; Harris, supra note 78, at 62 ( calling for enhanced discovery requirements in cases of all 
cooperating witnesses, including electronic recording of all ex parte discussions with the cooperator). 
Harris, supra note 78, at 53. 
BennettL. Gershman, Wimcss Coaching hr l'rosecutors. 23 CARDOZO L. REV. i(:9. 833 (2002). 
Hanis, supra note 78, at 53. 
As one commentator noted, "The likelihood of fabrication resulting from bargained-for testimony is simply too great to rely on a 
prosecutor's honor and good faith in meeting his discovery obligations" with respect to incentivized witnesses. Cassidy, supra note 
61, at 1176. 
CJ Christine J. Saverda, Accomplin's in Federal Courr: A Ca.H·ji1r lllcreas<'1//;·l'idemian· S1<11ularil~. I 00 YA LE L.J. 785. 798 t 19901 
(arguing that corroboration requirements should apply for all compensated informants). 
See Peter A. Joy, Comtmcting .~rs1cma1ic S1!1<'g11ard~ Against lllfi,m1a111 Per;111:1·. 7 OHIO ST . .I. CR.11'1. L. 677. 680-81 C0I0) 
( quoting ABA Res. 108(b ), adopted by the House ofDelegates (Feb. 15, 2005)). Defendants have argued for adoption of corroboration 
requirements unsuccessfully in some states. See, e.g., State, .. Walker. 82 A.3d 1,30. 635 (C'onn. App. Ct. 2013); see also ABA 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AClilEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 63 (Paul 
C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) (urging reforms of state rules regardingjailhouse informants). 
TEX. CODE C'Rl:V1. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (\Vcsl 201-ll. 
CAL. PENAL CODE ~ 1111.5 (Deering 2008). 
Id. t'The testimony of an in-custody infonnant shall be corroborated by other evidence that connects the defendant with the 
commission of the offense, the special circumstance, or the evidence offered in aggravation to which the in-custody informant 
testifies."); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. AN!'-J. art. 38.075 ("A defendant may not be convicted ofan offense on the testimony of 
a person ... imprisoned or confined in the same correctional facility as the defendant unless the testimony is corroborated by other 
evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed."). 
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE ~ 1111.5, with CAL PENAL CODE ~ 1111 (Deering 2008). 
Hernandez\. State. "Jo. 03-10-00863-CR. 2013 \\'L 3723203. at *-I (Tex. App. July 11. 20 I 3 ); see also Gill \'. State. 873 S.W.2d 
45. 48 (Tex. Crim. :\pp. 1994). 
CAL. l'Ec'JAL CODI:.~ 111 l. 
Id.; see People-\. D:J\ i,. 217 Cal. App. -Ith 14S-I. 1490 (2013 ). 
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See, e.g., People,·. \Va.,hington. N,,,. A 1183--l<J. Al 2:SOxX. 200•l \VL 71--1512. at "'9 (Cal. Ct. App. :-.br. 19. 2009) (citing People,·. 
Williams. 940 P.2d 710, 772 (Cal. 1997)); Ramiro,. State. 75--1 S.E.2d :-25. 327 (Ga. 2014). 
See, e.g., Whitley,·. Ercole. 725 F. Supp. 2d 3%. 40--11.S.D.'.'--l.Y. 2010) (affirming conviction based on testimony ofjailhouse 
informant where informant's testimony was corroborated by other jailhouse informants). 
State v. Chun:hwell. ;s;o. :\COi l-00950-CCA-IU-CD. 20!3 \VL-DOl 18. at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. h:b. 4. 2013) (citing Ashby v. 
State. 139 S.W. S72 (Tenn. I'll I l). 
See id. (holding that the bodies of shooting victims established that a criminal offense had occurred. and therefore the corpus delicti 
rule was not violated by admission of a jailhouse informant's testimony that the defendant confessed to the crime). Connecticut 
makes corroboration of a jailhouse snitch's testimony a factor in determining whether a failure to instruct the jury about the potential 
unreliability of ajailhouse informant was harmless error. See State,·. Ebron. 975 A.2d I 7. 2{) (Conn. 2009); Stme v. Arroyo. 973 
A.2d 1254. 1262-63 (Conn. 2009). 
RobertP. Mosteller, The Special ThrrnT of11?fim11,1111s 10 1/,e !1111t1cc111 ll"ho Are .\"01 l,111occ11ts: Pmd11ci11g ""Finl Dra/is. ·· Recurdi11g 
/11cc111fres. ,md Taki11g ,1 Fresh Look a1 the El"ide11ce. 6 OHIO ST. .I. CRl\1. L. 519. 551-52 t2009l. 
Id. 
At the same time, cases in which the only evidence against a defendant is jailhouse snitch testimony-though they certainly exist-
are likely to be highly disfavored by prosecutors. After all, even jurors prone to be misled by fundamental attribution error will be 
hard-pressed to convict a defendant where there is absolutely no other evidence of guilt than the uncorroborated say-so of a single 
jailhouse snitch. I say a single snitch here advisedly, because in California, at least, jailhouse snitch testimony provided by two 
different snitches will satisfy the corroboration requirement, as long as the snitches did not have an opportunity to conspire among 
themselves. See CAL. PEi\.-\L CODE~ 1111.5 (Deering 2008). 
The Sixth Amendment bars the State from "deliberately eliciting"- either directly or through its agents-incriminating statements 
from criminal defendants. See Kuhlmann ,. Wilson. --177 U.S. 436. --1:-9 ( l 986!; t:nited States Y. Henry. 4--17 U.S. 264. 270 ( 1980). 
However, the prohibition only applies with respect to crimes as to which the defendant has been charged. See Texas '"· Cobb. 532 
t:.S. 162. 163 (2001 I. 
See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 27-28. 
Brandon L. Garrett, The Suhst,mce ,fF,i/.1·,• Cunf;•ssic111s. 62 STA\.:. L. REV. I 051. 1053 (2010). 
Id at I 11 3 ( examining dozens of exonerations involving false confessions and finding that "[i}n many cases ... police likely disclosed 
[[critical] details during interrogations by telling exonerees how the crime happened"). 




See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 1, at 247. Some jurisdictions already require such procedures. In Los Angeles County, for 
example, "the District Attorney's office ... requires tape-recording of all interviews withjailhouse infonnants and preservation of these 
recordings, as well as any other records of interaction and use of jailhouse informants." Handy, supra note 29, at 760; see also 
Gershman, supra note 304, at 861-62; Mosteller, supra note 320, at 560-61, 560 n.193. 
See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 197. 
California is one such state. See CAL. PE'.\A L CUDI: ~ 1127,H bi (Deering 2008) (requiring courts to instruct thejwy on in-custody 
informant testimony). Other states include Montana and Oklahoma, which require special jury instructions on informant credibility 
when ajailhouse informant testifies. See Stat,:\. (inms:s. 'JX2 P.2d l 03,. l 0--13 ( \t,,111. i•N9); Dodd,·. State. 993 P.2d ::~. 7~-H Ulda. 
----------~~--------
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Crim. App. 2000). Some states require cautionary jury instructions only where ajailhouse infonnant's testimony lacks corroboration. 
See People v. Pctschow. 119 P.3d 495. 50-1 (Colo. App. W04); Stale v. James. No. 96-C A-17. 1998 \VL 518135. at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. \far. 25. 1998 ); Statc v. Spiller. No. 00-2l-97-CR. 200 I \\/ L I 03 52 I 3. at * 5 ( Wis. C1. App. Sept. 11. 200 I ). 
See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence 
Act upon an Accused, 15 CR.IM. L.Q. 88, 91-95 (1972) (finding that mock jurors who learned ofa defendant's prior convictions 
were more likely to convict regardless of whether they received instructions to disregard the prior convictions). But see David Alan 
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payment for relaying "incriminating statements from targeted suspects." Id. On one occasion, Sarivola produced a fake audio tape 
-.,;,; 
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containing purportedly incriminating statements made by another inmate. Id. at 12. He ultimately admitted that the tape was a "phony," 
but the FBI continued to use his services even after learning of the fraud Id. at 6-7. 
F11/mi11a11te. 499 l'.S. .it '.!S::!. 





Id. at 283-84. 
Id. at 284. 
Id. 
Id. at 284-85. 
Id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting). 
Id. at 296 (quoting Bruton v. L'nitcd Slates. 391 L' .S. 123. 139-40 { I %8 l (White, J., dissenting)). 
Id. at 288, 295. 
Id. at 295,297. 
Id at 288-90. 
Id. at 296 . 
L.S. CO;,;ST . .imc•nd. V. 
384 L.S.-Bh I 1%6). 
Id. al 460-61. 
See, e.g., Crawfi.1rd ,·. Washington. 541 U.S. 36. 68 120041 (holding that testimonial evidence is only admissible where cross-
examination is unavailable). 
See, e.g., Oliio v. Roberts. 448 L·.s. 56. 66 I 19S0i. 
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Id. 
Cra\\·fi.ird \-. \\"a,hington. :>-l 1 l .S. 3!,. (,I (.:OOhJ. 
Id at 61. 
See Welsh S. White, Regulating Prison /,!formers Under the Due Process Clause, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 (1991). 
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HOW SNITCHES CONTRIBUTE TO 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
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WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
CONFERENCE, APRIL 2006) 
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF* 
INTRODUCTION 
Thanks to new DNA technologies and the heroic efforts of 
innocence advocates, there is increasing public recognition that 
our criminal justice system often convicts the wrong people. 
Criminal informants, or "snitches,"1 play a prominent role in 
this wrongful conviction phenomenon. According to 
Northwestern University Law School's Center on Wrongful 
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This piece is based in 
part on my earlier article, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 
73 U. CIN. L. REv. 645 (2004), which offers a global analysis of the role of snitches in 
the criminal system and their impact on high crime communities. 
1 By "snitchesn I mean criminals who provide information in exchange for 
lenience for their own crimes or other benefits. The term "informant" therefore does 
not include law-abiding citizens who provide information to the police with no benefit 
to themselves. 
107 
NATAPOFF 9/17/2006 11:05:16 AM 
108 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Convictions, 45.9 percent of documented wrongful capital 
convictions have been traced to false informant testimony, 
making "snitches the leading cause of wrongful convictions in 
U.S. capital cases."2 Horror stories abound of lying jailhouse 
snitches and paid informants who frame innocent people in 
pursuit of cash or lenience for their own crimes. 3 In recognition 
of the dangers of informants who lie, capital reform proposals 
often contain provisions designed to restrain the use of 
informant testimony. 4 
But informants do not generate wrongful convictions 
merely because they lie. After all, lying hardly distinguishes 
informants from other sorts of witnesses. Rather, it is how and 
why they lie, and how the government depends on lying 
informants, that makes snitching a troubling distortion of the 
truth-seeking process. Informants lie primarily in exchange for 
lenience for their own crimes, although sometimes they lie for 
money.5 In order to obtain the benefit of these lies, informants 
must persuade the government that their lies are true. Police 
and prosecutors, in turn, often do not and cannot check these 
lies because the snitch's information may be all the government 
has. Additionally, police and prosecutors are heavily invested 
in using informants to conduct investigations and to make 
their cases. 6 As a result, they often lack the objectivity and the 
information that would permit them to discern when 
informants are lying. 7 This gives rise to a disturbing marriage 
of convenience: both snitches and the government benefit from 
inculpatory information while neither has a strong incentive to 
challenge it. 8 The usual protections against false evidence, 
2 Rob Warden, The Snitch System: Haw Snitch Testimony Sent Randy Steidl 
and Other Innocent Americans ta Death Row, Center on Wrongful Convictions, 
Northwestern University School of Law, 2004, available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions. 
s See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text. 
4 See, e.g. IWNOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 120-22 
(Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter IWNOIS COMMISSION] (recommending enhanced 
documentation and discovery regarding the government's use of informants); see also 
ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21 (2003) (adopting Commission recommendation 
requiring reliability hearings for jailhouse informants). 
6 Alexandra Natapofl: Snitching: The Institutional and Communal 
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 645, 652 (2004). 
6 Id. at 671. 
7 Ellen Y aroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Troth 
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 946 (1999). 
e This scenario presupposes some good faith on the part of the government; the 
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particularly prosecutorial ethics and discovery, may thus be 
unavailing to protect the system from informant falsehoods 
precisely because prosecutors themselves have limited means 
and incentives to ferret out the truth. 9 
This Comment briefly surveys in Part I some of the data on 
snitch-generated wrongful convictions.10 In Part II, it describes 
in more detail the institutional relationships among snitches, 
police, and prosecutors that make snitch falsehoods so 
pervasive and difficult to discern using the traditional tools of 
the adversarial process.11 Part III concludes with a litigation 
suggestion for a judicial check on the use of informant 
witnesses, namely, a Daubert-style12 pre-trial reliability 
hearing.13 The Appendix in Part IV contains a sample motion 
requesting and justifying such a hearing.14 
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTION DATA 
In 2000, the groundbreaking book Actual Innocence 
estimated that twenty-one percent of wrongful capital 
convictions are influenced by snitch testimony.15 Four years 
later, a study by the Center on Wrongful Convictions doubled 
that number.16 Another recent report estimates that twenty 
percent of all California wrongful convictions, capital or 
otherwise, result from false snitch testimony.17 The Illinois 
Commission on Capital Punishment, in reviewing that state's 
wrongfully convicted capital defendants, identified "a number 
of cases where it appeared that the prosecution relied unduly 
on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness with something 
to gain. In some cases, this was an accomplice, while in other 
purposeful use of false evidence is of course more problematic. 
9Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 947. 
10 See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text. 
12 Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring court9 to 
independently evaluate the reliability of expert testimony). 
13 See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text. 
15 JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 156 
(Doubleday 2000). 
16 Warden, supra note 2, at 3. 
17 Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, SAN FRANCISCO MAGAZINE 87-88 (Nov. 2004) 
(estimating the number of California wrongful convictions as being in the hundreds or 
even thousands). 
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cases it was an in-custody informant."18 Professor Samuel 
Gross's study on exonerations likewise reports that nearly fifty 
percent of wrongful murder convictions involved perjury by 
someone such as a "jailhouse snitch or another witness who 
stood to gain from the false testimony."19 
Behind these general statistics lie numerous stories of 
informant crime, deceit, secret deals and government 
duplicity.20 In Texas, in the so-called "sheetrock scandal," a 
group of police officers and informants set up dozens of 
individuals with fake drugs, which were actually gypsum, the 
main, non-narcotic component of sheetrock.21 The suspects 
were typically Mexican workers, and many pleaded guilty or 
were deported before the scandal was uncovered.22 In Los 
Angeles, DEA informant Essam Magid not only avoided jail for 
his many crimes but earned hundreds of thousands of dollars 
by serving as an informant. 28 During this time, he framed 
dozens of innocent people before one person he targeted finally 
refused to plead guilty and revealed the arrangement.24 The 
now-infamous Leslie White, the prototypical jailhouse snitch, 
sent dozens of suspects to prison by fabricating confessions and 
evidence, reducing his own sentences by years.25 
Although such horror stories provoke outcry, little has 
been done to cabin the law enforcement discretion that makes 
such informant operations possible, or to impose greater 
transparency and oversight onto the process in order to curtail 
such abuses. 
18 ILLINOIS COMMISSION, supra not.e 4, at 8. 
19 Samuel R. Gross et al, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 528, 548-44 (2005). 
20 Natapoff, supra not.e 5, at 656-57. 
21 Fake Drugs, real lives: Euolution of a Scandal, DALLASNEWS.COM, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dws/spe/2008/fakedrugs/fakedrugl 108.html (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2006). 
22 Id.; see also Ross Milloy, Fake Drugs Force an End to 24 Cases in Dallas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at AL 
23 John Glionna and Lee Romney, Snagging a Rogue Snitch, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
2005, at Al (chronicling DEA's reliance on Magid). 
24 Id. 
25 ROBERT BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 64-66 (Praeger 2000). 
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Informants have become law enforcement's investigative 
tool of choice, particularly in the ever-expanding world of drug 
enforcement.26 Informants are part of a thriving market for 
information. 27 In this market, snitches trade information with 
police and prosecutors in exchange for lenience, the dismissal 
of charges, reduced sentences, or even the avoidance of arrest. 28 
It is a highly informal, robust market that is rarely scrutinized 
by courts or the public.29 And it is growing.30 While data is 
hard to come by, federal statistics indicate that sixty percent of 
drug defendants cooperate in some fashion. 31 Informants 
permeate all aspects of law enforcement, from investigations to 
plea-bargaining to trial.a2 
The growth in the sheer number of informants reflects the 
increasing dependence of police and prosecutors on 
informants. 83 Professor Ellen Y aroshefsky describes 
prosecutors' own complaints: "These [drug] cases are not very 
well investigated. . . . [O]ur cases are developed through 
cooperators and their recitation of the facts. Often, in DEA, 
you have agents who do little or no follow up so when a 
cooperator comes and begins to give you information outside of 
the particular incident, you have no clue if what he says is 
true."84 Another prosecutor revealed that "the biggest surprise 
is the amount of time you spend with criminals. You spend 
most of your time with cooperators. It's bizarre."35 Another 
26 Natapof( supra note 5, at 655. 
27 See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563 
(1999). 
28[d. 
29 Natapof( supra note 5 (describing the contours of the informant institution). 
so Weinstein, supra note 27, at 563 ("These are boom times for sellers and buyers 
of cooperation in the federal criminal justice system."). 
3l See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS Table 5.34 (2001) (stating that thirty percent of federal drug defendants 
received on-the-record cooperation credit under USSG § 5Kl.l); American College of 
Trial LaWYUS Report and Proposal on Section 5Kl.1 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, 38 AM.. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2001) (citing sentencing commission 
report that "fewer than half of cooperating defendants receive a departure"). 
32 See Natapoff, supra note 5. 
33 See id. 
34 Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 937. 
ss Id. at 937-38. 
NATAPOFF 9/17/2006 11:05:16.AM 
112 GOLDEN GATE UN1VERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
prosecutor describes the phenomenon of "falling in love with 
your rat"86: 
You are not supposed to, of course .... But you spend time 
with this guy, you get to know him and his family. You like 
him. . . . [T}he reality is that the cooperator's information 
often becomes your mind set .... It's a phenomenon and the 
danger is that because you feel all warm and fuzzy about 
your cooperator, you come to believe that you do not have to 
spend much time or energy investigating the case and you 
don't. Once you become chummy with your cooperator, there 
is a real danger that you lose your objectivity. . . . 87 
Because investigations and cases rely so heavily on 
informants, protecting and rewarding informants has become 
an important part of law enforcement. 88 Police and prosecutors 
are well known for protecting their snitches: all too often, when 
defendants or courts seek the identity of informants, cases are 
dismissed or warrant applications are dropped. 39 More 
fundamentally, police and prosecutors become invested in their 
informants' stories, and therefore may lack the objectivity to 
know when their sources are lying.40 
Informants are thus punished for silence and rewarded for 
producing inculpatory information, even when that information 
is inaccurate. The system protects them from the consequences 
of their inaccuracies by guarding their identities and making 
their information the centerpiece of the government's cases. 
The front line officials who handle informants - police and 
prosecutors - are ill equipped to screen that information, and 
once they incorporate it into their cases, they acquire a stake in 
its validity. This phenomenon explains in part why snitch 
testimony generates so many wrongful convictions: it 
permeates the criminal system and there are few safeguards 
against it. 
ss Id. at 944. 
B7Jd. 
38 See Natapoff, supra note 6, at 664-67, 671-74 (documenting the nature and 
extent of law enforcement reliance on informants). 
39 See,.e.g., L. Paul Sutton, GeUing Around the Fourth Amendment, in THINKING 
ABOUT POLICE 441, 443 (Carl B. Klockars & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 2d ed. 1991). 
40 Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 943-44. 
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Ill. LITIGATING SNITCHES: A DAUBERT-INSPIRED APPROACH 
While the impact of informants on the criminal system 
goes far beyond their role as witnesses, an important part of 
the wrongful conviction phenomenon turns on the role of 
snitches at trial. Many wrongful convictions represent 
instances where an innocent defendant refuses to plead guilty 
and goes to trial, but is nonetheless convicted because the jury 
accepts a snitch's testimony as credible and true. When this 
happens, the integrity of the system is at stake. This section 
proposes a limited remedy for this problem in the form of pre-
trial reliability hearings. Illinois has adopted this procedure 
for in-custody informants (so-called "jailhouse snitches"), and 
at least two U.S. jurisdictions as well as Canada have 
contemplated variations of it. 41 
The theory behind pre-trial reliability hearings mirrors the 
reasoning in Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 42 in which the Supreme 
Court established the necessity for reliability hearings for 
expert witnesses. As Professor George Harris points out, there 
are many similarities between snitches and expert witnesses.43 
Like experts, informants are "paid" by one party.44 This makes 
them more one-sided than typical witnesses. 45 Informants' 
testimony is coached and prepared by government lawyers, 
making them challenging to cross-examine.46 Moreover, 
informants' stories are hard to corroborate or contradict in 
cases where their testimony is the central evidence against the 
defendant.47 Finally, like experts, informants may have an air 
of "inside knowledge" about the crime that may sway the jury, 
an air that is not easily dispelled by cautionary instructions.48 
41 See ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21 (2003); Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 
785 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (Strubhar, J., specially concurring); D'Agostino v. State, 
823 P.2d 283, 285 (Nev. 1992) (holding that before "jailhouse incrimination" testimony 
is admissible the "trial judge [must] first determine□ that the details of the admissions 
supply a sufficient indicia of reliability"); ILLINOIS COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 122 
(documenting Canadian experience). 
42Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring courts to 
independently evaluate reliability of expert testimony). 
43 George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and 
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000). 
44 Id. at 3. 
46Jd. at 4. 
46 Id. at 31. 
47 Id. at 71. 
48 See Harris, supra note 43, at 49-58 (describing inadequate procedural controls 
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Indeed, the prevalence of wrongful convictions based on snitch 
testimony demonstrates that juries often believe informants. 49 
For these types of reasons, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that discovery, cross-examination and jury 
instructions - the traditional adversarial protections against 
false testimony - do not guarantee a rigorous jury evaluation of 
expert testimony. 50 The court must act as a preliminary "gate-
keeper'' and evaluate the reliability of experts before the jury 
hears them. 51 For these same reasons, courts should act as 
gatekeepers and evaluate the reliability of informants before 
they can testify at trial. This would permit fuller disclosure of 
the deals that informants make with the government, 52 allow 
more thorough testing of the truthfulness of informants, and 
reduce opportunities for abuse. It would also acknowledge that 
even well-meaning police and prosecutors may need help in 
ascertaining the reliability of their criminal sources. 
Illinois has enacted a statute that provides a potential 
blueprint for the type of reliability inquiry that a trial court 
should conduct in evaluating informant testim.ony.53 This 
statute places the burden on the government to prove 
reliability by a preponderance of the evidence, and requires the 
court to consider the following factors: 
(1) the complete criminal history of the informant; 
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the 
offering party has made or will make in the future to the 
informant; 
(3) the statements made by the accused; 
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place 
of their disclosure to law enforcement officials, and the 
names of all persons who were present when the statements 
were made; 
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that 
testimony or statement and, if so, the time and place of the 
recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names of 
over cooperating witnesses). 
49 Id. at 57-58. 
50 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
51Jd. 
62 See Justin Scheck, Circuit Gets Tough on Secret Deals, THE RECORDER, Feb. 
16, 2006 (describing increasing attention to secret deals between prosecutors and 
informants that are not revealed to defense or the court). 
53 ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-2l(c) (2003). 
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the persons who were present at the recantation; 
(6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided 
that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained 
through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant 
received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for 
or subsequent to that testimony or statement; and 
(7) any other information relevant to the informant's 
credibility.54 
115 
In effect, this model permits the court to examine the 
informant's incentives to lie, his history of escaping 
punishment through snitching, the existence, or lack, of 
corroboration, and the government's efforts to check the 
informant's story.55 Such reliability determinations will be 
more efficient and effective in avoiding wrongful convictions 
because the court can evaluate the informant in the same way 
that it evaluates all preliminary questions of admissibility, 
without the constraints of the rules of evidence or the presence 
of the jury.56 
Although Illinois limits reliability hearings to in-custody 
informants, all informant testimony in which a criminal 
witness receives compensation for inculpating someone else is 
potentially infected by the same unreliability.57 Accordingly, 
reliability hearings should be available in any case, pre-plea as 
well as pre-trial, in which a compensated informant is the 
source of inculpatory evidence.58 Given the prevalence of 
informant falsehoods in wrongful capital convictions, such 
hearings should be mandatory in capital cases, even where the 
defense intends to concede guilt and move directly to the 
sentencing phase. If the government's information is based on 
informant testimony, the defense in turn will rely on such 
testimony in assessing the likelihood of success at trial. Given 
the stakes, such evaluations should not be left to the vagaries 
of informant truthfulness. 
The Appendix to this Comment contains a motion and 
memorandum of law in support of the motion, requesting a 
54Jd. 
55 See id. 
56 FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
67 Harris, supra note 43, at 63. 
58 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-633 (2002) (holding that the 
government is not constitutionally obligated to provide impeachment information to 
defendants pleading guilty). 
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reliability hearing in a capital case in which the main evidence 
against the defendant was supplied by three informant-
accomplices. While the factual scenario is not universal, the 
legal analysis could form a basis for similar requests. 
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IV. APPENDIX: MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PRE-TRIAL SNITCH RELIABIIJTY HEARING59 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
* 





* * * * * * * * * 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE COOPERATING WITNESS 
TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR A RELIABILITY 
HEARING 
117 
John Doe, by and through his attorneys, respectfully 
moves, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 104, 403, and 
701, to exclude the testimony of cooperating witnesses John 
Smith, John Jones and John Johnson, because their testimony 
is unreliable and its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Mr. Doe further 
requests that the Court hold a pre-trial hearing to determine 
the reliability of these witnesses. In support of this motion Mr. 
Doe alleges as follows: 
1. Mr. Doe has been charged by indictment with use of a 
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence that results 
in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924G), carjacking in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, conspiracy in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and related counts. 
59 This motion is available for download at 
http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/natapoff-snitching.html. Although this motion 
was filed in federal district court and is thus a matter of public record. I have changed 
the names and other identifying information. The motion was never ruled on. 
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2. In addition to Mr. Doe, three other men were arrested 
in connection with this case. Those men are John Smith, John 
Jones, and John Johnson. Information provided by the 
government indicates that, shortly after their arrests, these 
three men gave statements to the police. Eventually each man 
exonerated himself and implicated Mr. Doe in the victim's 
murder. The men also portrayed Mr. Doe as the leader in the 
carjacking. All three are now cooperating with the government 
against Mr. Doe. 
3. In exchange for having incriminated Mr. Doe, the 
cooperators have all received compensation from the 
government in the form of charging and sentencing 
consideration. In particular, as a result of their statements 
implicating Mr. Doe, they have been permitted to plead guilty 
in state court to paroleable sentences of forty-five years for 
Smith and Jones, and thirty-five years for Johnson. Family 
members of the men have advised counsel that if Mr. Doe is 
convicted, their sentences may be further reduced. In light of 
the compensation that the cooperating witnesses have received 
(and may expect to receive) in exchange for implicating Mr. 
Doe, their testimony is biased and inherently unreliable. 
4. Their testimony also will be extremely difficult to 
disprove because they are the only witnesses to the crime, and 
the police have recovered very little physical evidence. Cross-
examination may be an insufficient tool to establish the 
veracity of these unverifiable statements. 
5. For these reasons, Mr. Doe moves to exclude the 
testimony of the three cooperating witnesses based on its 
unreliability, its lack of probative value, its prejudicial nature, 
and its imperviousness to cross-examination at trial. 
6. Several courts have held that pre-trial reliability 
hearings are appropriate where unreliable cooperating 
witnesses are propounded as witnesses. The Illinois Governor's 
Commission on Capital Punishment recently has recommended 
that reliability hearings be held whenever an in-custody 
informant is a potential witness in a capital case. In this case, 
a hearing is especially important, because the government's 
entire case for guilt and for the death penalty rests on 
cooperating informant testimony. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Doe requests that the Court hold a 
pre-trial reliability hearing at which the cooperators shall be 
made available for examination by counsel, to permit the Court 
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to decide whether their testimony is sufficiently reliable, and 
therefore sufficiently probative, to be admissible under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403. A separate memorandum of law is 
submitted in support of this motion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
* 






* * * * * * * * * 
MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFDEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE COOPERATING WITNESS 
TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR A 
RELIABILITY HEARING 
SUMMARY 
"It is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than 
the inducement of a reduced sentence .... " United States v. 
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987). In this 
case, the government's case for Mr. Doe's guilt, and potentially 
for the death penalty, will be based primarily on the testimony 
of three compensated, interested, biased witnesses whose 
eventual freedom depends on their ability to obtain Mr. Doe's 
conviction .. Under the circumstances, their reliability is so 
compromised that their testimony lacks probative value, 
thereby failing the test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have called for increased judicial 
scrutiny of compensated informant witnesses, and several 
courts have mandated pre-trial reliability hearings to permit 
courts to evaluate the reliability of compensated witnesses such 
as the cooperators in this case. Mr. Doe thus requests that the 
Court hold a reliability hearing to require the government to 
establish the reliability of its cooperating witnesses, to exclude 
some or all of those witnesses if the Court deems it 
appropriate, and to preserve Mr. Doe's right to a fair trial. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
* * * 
Gii 
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ARGUMENT 
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I. COURTS HA VE DEEMED COMPENSATED WITNESSES 
UNRELIABLE AND SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL 
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
The Fourth Circuit has recently expressed its deep concern 
over the use of compensated informant testimony and its 
reluctance to admit such testimony absent stringent judicial 
controls. United States v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454, 459-62 (4th 
Cir. 2002). Compensated testimony "create[s] fertile fields 
from which truth-bending or even perjury could grow, 
threatening the core of a trial's legitimacy." Id. at 462. Such 
testimony "may be approved only rarely and under the highest 
scrutiny." Id. so 
The Fourth Circuit has prescribed additional procedural 
guarantees that the government must adhere to where the use 
of compensated informant witnesses is contemplated. Before 
such testimony will be permitted: (1) the compensation 
arrangement must be disclosed to the defendant, (2) the 
defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness, and (3) the jury must be instructed to engage in 
heightened scrutiny of the witness. Finally, where the 
compensation is: 
contingent on the content or nature of the testimony given, 
the court must ascertain (I) that the government has 
independent means, such as corroborating evidence, by 
which to measure the truthfulness of the witness's testimony 
and (2) that the contingency is expressly linked to the 
witness testifying truthfully. Moreover, when a witness is 
testifying under such a contingent payment arrangement, 
the government has a duty to inform the court and opposing 
counsel when the witness' testimony is inconsistent with the 
government's expectation. 
Levenite, 277 F.3d at 462-63. 
60 Although Leuenite concerned a witness who was testifying in exchange for 
money, the same concerns arise when the compensation consists of reduced criminal 
sanctions. Indeed, the promise of a reduced sentence or the elimination of the capital 
sentencing option may be far more valuable to a defendant than cash. See Cervantes-
Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 (the same analysis is applied by analogy when lenience is 
provided as compensation for information). 
NATAPOFF 9/17/2006 11:05:16AM 
122 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Similarly the Ninth Circuit has called for increased 
judicial scrutiny of deals between informants and the 
government, holding that "where the prosecution fails to 
disclose evidence such as the existence of a leniency deal or 
promise that would be valuable in impeaching a witness whose 
testimony is central to the prosecution's case, it violates the 
due process rights of the accused and undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial," Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 581 
(9th Cir. 2005), and calling such lack of disclosure 
"unscrupulous." Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
In this case, the three cooperators are being compensated 
specifically for testimony adverse to Mr. Doe. They have 
already received the benefit of reduced charges and have been 
promised low, agreed-upon sentences, and may have their 
sentences further reduced if Mr. Doe is convicted. Their 
testimony is thus compensated, contingent testimony precisely 
of the sort that so troubled the Fourth Circuit in Levenite. The 
Court therefore has an obligation to ascertain whether the 
government can corroborate the cooperators' truthfulness, the 
nature of the contingency arrangement, and the means the 
government intends to use to assure that the cooperators 
testify truthfully. Because of the difficulty ascertaining these 
matters in the heat of trial in the presence of the jury, a pre-
trial reliability hearing is warranted. 
II. COMPENSATED WITNESSES ARE INHERENTLY 
UNRELIABLE 
A growing body of literature documents the inherent 
unreliability of compensated witnesses, cooperating co-
conspirators, "jailhouse snitches," and other types of 
informants. Numerous horror stories of wrongful convictions 
based on perjurious informant testimony have emerged, and 
they have prompted official review of the practice of permitting 
compensated informant testimony. The following list contains 
just a few of the efforts to document and control informant 
unreliability: 
l. The founders of the Innocence Project discovered that 
twenty-one percent of the innocent defendants on death row 
·..J 
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were placed there by false informant testimony.61 
2. The Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital 
Punishment unanimously concluded that "[t]estimony from 
in-custody witnesses has often been shown to have been 
false, and several of the thirteen cases of men released from 
death row involved, at least in part, testimony from an in-
custody informant."62 The Commission recommended the 
holding of reliability hearings to mitigate the chances of 
perjury. 
3. In their comprehensive historical study, Bedau and 
Radelet discovered that one-third of the 350 erroneous 
convictions they studied were due to "perjury by prosecution 
witnesses." This was twice as many as the next leading 
source - erroneous eyewitness identification - and stemmed 
in large part from the prevalence of co-conspirator 
testimony. 63 
123 
Courts likewise have recognized the inherent unreliability 
of compensated informants, going so far as to take judicial 
notice of their tendency to lie. "The use of informants to 
investigate and prosecute persons engaged in clandestine 
criminal activity is fraught with peril. This hazard is a matter 
'capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned' and 
thus of which we can take judicial notice." United States v. 
Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). "Our judicial 
history is speckled with cases where informants falsely pointed 
the finger of guilt at suspects and defendants, creating the risk 
of sending innocent persons to prison." Id. Another court has 
noted that "[n]ever has it been more true that a criminal 
charged with a serious crime understands that a fast and easy 
way out of trouble with the law is . . . to cut a deal at someone 
else's expense and to purchase leniency from the government 
by offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for 
reduced incarceration." Commonwealth of Northern Mariana 
Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, 
long before snitching became a pervasive aspect of the criminal 
61 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JThi DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 126-57 
(Doubleday 2000). 
62 !LLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Chapter 8 (April 
2002). 
68 Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital 
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 173 (1987). 
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justice system, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he use of 
informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the 
other betrayals which are 'dirty business' may raise serious 
questions of credibility." On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 
755 (1952). 
Where the unreliability of a particular type of witness is so 
well-established, it is appropriate for the court to take 
protective steps to guarantee the integrity of the process. Cf. 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595 
(1993) (court to act as "gatekeeper" to ensure reliability of 
scientific evidence). 
Ill. CROSS EXAMINATION IS AN INSUFFICIENT 
GUARANTEE OF RELIABILITY IN THIS CASE 
Despite the recognized unreliability of compensated 
informant witnesses, courts have traditionally permitted them 
to testify on the assumption that cross-examination will 
adequately test an informant's truthfulness. See, e.g., Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293,311 (1966). In Hoffa, the Supreme 
Court upheld the use of a compensated informant, holding that 
his testimony did not violate the defendant's right to due 
process, in large part because of the availability of cross-
examination, reasoning that "[t]he established safeguards of 
, the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a 
witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of 
his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury." 
Id. at 311; see also Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 
(procedural protections of discovery, cross-examination, and 
jury instructions regarding informants satisfy due process). 
The cooperators' testimony in this case, however, will be 
nearly impossible for defense counsel to penetrate on cross-
examination. The cooperators are the only witnesses to the 
crime, and their stories can be neither independently confirmed 
nor disproved. The assertion that Mr. Doe was the shooter-the 
most important single disputed fact in the entire case-rests 
entirely upon the self-serving, unverifiable statements of the 
cooperating witnesses. Their mere ipse dixit, if maintained, 
could suffice to persuade a jury to impose the death penalty on 
Mr. Doe. 
Cross-examination will be further hampered because the 
defense lacks pre-trial access to the cooperators. At this stage 
NATAPOFF 9/17/2006 ll:05:16AM 
2006] SNITCHES & WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 125 
in the proceedings, the defense has not yet seen the 
cooperators' plea agreements. The cooperators, on the other 
hand, have had multiple opportunities to hone their version of 
events in preparation for court, both in the state proceedings 
and in connection with this federal case. This combination of 
one-sided access and government preparation will render these 
witnesses overly prepared and difficult to examine at trial. 
Finally, unlike uncharged lay witnesses, the cooperators 
have compelling incentives to pin responsibility on Mr. Doe. 
Their future literally hangs in the balance, based on their 
ability to maintain a consistent story. For all these reasons, in-
trial cross-examination may be insufficient to determine 
whether the cooperators are being truthful. 
Professor George Harris has analyzed the difficulty of 
cross-examining informants whose compensation depends on 
their usefulness to the prosecutor. As Professor Harris 
explains: 
Paradoxically, the more a witness's fate depends on the 
success of the prosecution, the more resistant the witness 
will be to cross-examination. A witness whose future 
depends on currying the government's favor will formulate a 
consistent and credible story calculated to procure an 
agreement with the government and will ad.here religiously 
at trial to her prior statements.64 
In this case, the motivations of the cooperators are 
precisely those described by Professor Harris. Years of their 
lives literally depend on the success of this prosecution, and 
therefore they will be more resistant to cross-examination than 
the typical witness. 
For these reasons, the. Court should not rely on defense 
counsel's eventual cross-examination of these witnesses to 
establish their truthfulness, but rather should have the 
opportunity, unfettered by the rules of evidence and the 
presence of the jury, to determine for itself whether the 
testimony of these witnesses bears sufficient indicia of 
reliability to permit its presentation at trial. 
64 George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and 
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 54 (2000) (attached as Ex. D). 
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO 
ESTABLISH THE RELIABILITY OF ITS COOPERATING 
WITNESSES 
The government has special obligations when it comes to 
their cooperating informants. Courts have established that a 
"prosecutor who does not appreciate the perils of using 
rewarded criminals as witnesses risks compromising the truth-
seeking mission of our criminal justice system [and courts] 
expect prosecutors and investigators to take all reasonable 
measures to safeguard the system against treachery." 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 236 
F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Levenite, 277 F.3d at 
459-62. This obligation stems from two sources: first, the 
government enlists and controls and rewards its informants 
and is therefore in a unique position to evaluate their 
reliability. The second is that the prosecutor, as the 
representative of the sovereign, has an ethical obligation to 
ensure that the defendant is given a fair trial See Bowie, 236 
F.3d at 1089 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935)). 
Unfortunately, because of the dynamics of this case, the 
government is in a weak position to guarantee the reliability of 
the cooperators' testimony. From the inception of this case, the 
cooperators have been well aware that any hope of lenience 
rested on their ability to provide the government with useful 
information. The government is thus the primary target of the 
cooperators' efforts to escape punishment, and if the 
cooperators are lying, they will presumably be particularly 
careful not to reveal it to the government. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed these issues of reliability and 
government obligations in a case with facts startlingly similar 
to the instant case. In Bowie, three co-conspirators were 
charged with murder and kidnapping. There was some 
evidence that two of the three conspired to pin the murder on 
the third. The government's failure to fully investigate the 
possibility of collaborative perjury caused the Court to reverse 
the conviction. In its decision, the Court noted that when the 
government makes a deal with an informant, "each contract for 
testimony is fraught with the real peril that the proffered 
testimony will not be truthful, but simply factually contrived to 
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'get' a target of sufficient interest to induce concessions from 
the government." Bowie, 236 F.3d at 1095. The Court 
concluded that "rewarded criminals represent a great threat to 
the mission of the criminal justice system." Id. 
Barry Tarlow has likewise documented the significant 
difficulties that prosecutors experience in holding their 
criminal informants accountable.65 Tarlow, a former 
prosecutor, explains how prosecutors may be drawn in by 
informants who have strong motivations to pin responsibility 
on others, and notes the heavy pressures on prosecutors to rely 
on unreliable compensated witnesses when others are 
unavailable. 
Given the inherent "peril" of rewarded testimony and the 
government's heavy reliance on it in this case, the government 
should not be permitted merely to proffer its good faith belief in 
the reliability of its witnesses. Rather, it is appropriate to hold 
a hearing to establish the reliability of the witnesses through 
adversarial questioning and a neutral evaluation by the Court. 
V. A PRETRIAL RELIABILITY HEARING IS REQUIRED TO 
TEST THE INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY OUTSIDE THE 
PRESENCE OF THE JURY 
A. The Court has the Authority and Obligation to 
Conduct a Reliability Hearing Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence 
In this case, the interests of justice and a fair trial require 
a pretrial reliability hearing to permit the Court to ascertain 
the reliability and probative value of the cooperators' 
testimony. The Court has clear authority to hold such a 
hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(c), which 
provides: "Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in 
all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings 
on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the 
interests of justice require . . . . " 
The rules of evidence likewise obligate the Court to scre~n 
out unfairly prejudicial, harmful, confusing or otherwise 
unhelpful evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides 
65 See Barry Tarlow, Perjuring Informants Brought to the Bar, RICO Report, 
CHAMPION, at 33-40 (July 2000). 
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that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." Likewise, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 701, limits lay witness testimony to testimony that 
is "helpful" to the trier of fact. 
At least two courts and one state legislature have 
mandated reliability hearings whenever incarcerated 
informants ("jailhouse snitches") are proposed witnesses. See 
Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Ok. Ct. of Crim. App. Jan. 6, 
2000) (Strubhar, J., concurring) (approving lower court 
imposition of "reliability hearing'' comparable to Daubert 
hearing); D'Agostino v. State, 107 Nev. 1001, 823 P.2d 283 
(Nev. 1992) (holding that before "jailhouse incrimination" 
testimony is admissible the "trial judge [must] first determine□ 
that the details of the admissions supply a sufficient indicia of 
reliability"). Illinois mandates such hearings by law. See ILL. 
COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21(c) (2003). Illinois's statutory 
requirement is based on the recommendations of the 
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, which 
concluded that reliability hearings are necessary whenever 
incarcerated informants are offered as witnesses. 66 Such 
conclusions apply here with equal force. Jailhouse snitches are 
incarcerated defendants who provide information to law 
enforcement in exchange for charging and sentencing benefits. 
The ability of such snitches to fabricate confessions and other 
evidence has become infamous.67 Precisely the same concerns 
are present where, as here, the informant is in custody, subject 
to criminal penalties, and is offering unique, unverifiable 
information in exchange for lenience. 
B. The Principles of Daubert Support the Holding of a 
Reliability Hearing 
The law's treatment of expert witnesses further supports 
the holding of a reliability hearing in this instance. In Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the 
66 See ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at 30, 122. 
67 See id. at 122-123 (detailing the Los Angeles Grand Jury investigation of 
jailhouse snitch testimony). 
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Supreme Court determined the need for a special mechanism 
to evaluate the reliability of expert witnesses because experts 
pose thorny problems of cross-examination and persuasion. 
Experts, for example, rely on specialized information that is 
not directly available to the jury. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
The court held that the concerns underlying Rule 403 are 
preeminent because expert witnesses can have such a potent 
effect on juries: 
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading 
because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this 
risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against 
probative force under Rule 403 □ exercises more control over 
experts than over lay witnesses. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Moreover, as Professor Harris 
has noted, expert witnesses are compensated, violating the 
usual presumption against the use of paid testimony.68 The 
suitability of compensated expert testimony is thus determined 
in part by pre-trial judicial examinations of reliability. 
Informants pose many of the same special concerns that 
expert witnesses do. Unlike typical lay witnesses, they are 
compensated, they have personal interests in the outcome of 
the case, their testimony is difficult to test on cross-
examination, and they are selected and controlled by the 
propounding party.69 Like experts, moreover, informant 
testimony can be "powerful and quite misleading." Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 595. At least one court has expressly extended the 
principles of Daubert to cover informants, imposing a 
"reliability hearing'' requirement whenever the testimony of a 
so-called "jailhouse snitch" is involved. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 
778, 784 (Ok. Ct. of Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2000) (Strubhar, J., 
concurring) (approving lower court imposition of "reliability 
hearing" comparable to Daubert hearing). 
In this case, the cooperators are the sole witnesses to the 
crime and their version of the story will carry heavy weight 
with the jury. In the same way that courts act as "gatekeepers" 
with respect to experts, it is appropriate for this Court to 
ensure that unreliable informant testimony does not taint the 
G8 See Harris, supra note 64, at 1-5. 
69 See id. at 49-59. 
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jury. 
C. A Reliability Hearing is Warranted on the Facts of 
this Case 
In this case, the cooperators' testimony presents a 
substantial danger of "unfair prejudice" because it is the 
government's primary evidence against Mr. Doe, because it is 
highly unreliable, because the cooperators have overwhelming 
motivations to lie, and because their testimony cannot be 
disproved. Their testimony may not be helpful to the trier of 
fact if it is so biased and unverifiable that no trier of fact can 
conclusively determine it is truthful or not. 
It is particularly important that the cooperators' reliability 
be tested prior to trial outside the presence of the jury. The 
cooperators' reliability, their incentives to fabricate, the details 
of the crime, and their relationship to the defendant are 
matters which may only be susceptible to penetration through 
the more informal inquiries permitted under Rule 104, where 
the rules of evidence do not apply. Moreover, the Court is 
better suited to recognize reliability and credibility concerns 
that may elude the jury. The inquiry into such matters also 
could be highly prejudicial if heard by a jury and incurable by 
subsequent jury instruction. 
Finally, as noted above, the procedural requirements set 
forth in Levenite can best be met at a preliminary hearing. At 
such a hearing, the informant will be subject to cross-
examination, and the government can provide to the Court and 
counsel any corroboration it might have and provide 
assurances that the arrangement with the witnesses indeed 
protects against perjurious testimony. 
For all these reasons, Mr. Doe moves to exclude the 
testimony of the cooperators, and for a pretrial reliability 
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A jury convicted Defendant Martin Joseph MacNeill ("MacNeill") of murdering his wife, 
Michelle MacNeill, and obstructing justice. Before imposition of sentence, MacNeill moved 
timely to arrest judgment or (in the alternative) for new trial. 1 
The Court heard oral argument on June 30, 2014. The State of Utah was represented by 
the prosecutor, Mr. Chad E. Grunander. The Defendant appeared in custody and was represented 
by his attorney, Mr. Randall K. Spencer. 
After careful consideration of the arguments and extensive briefing, the Court now enters 
the following: 
1 Defendant's combined motion is timely. URCrP 23 (motion to arrest judgment may be filed "at any time prior to 
the imposition of sentence"); URCrP 24 (motion for new trial "shall be made not later than IO days after entry of the 
sentence). Courts have held that a motion for new trial filed before entry of sentence is premature. However, these 
courts were interpreting the prior version of Rule 24 which required such motions to be filed "within IO days after 










Violation of The Court's Order to Exclude Witnesses 
On October 17, 2013, the parties stipulated to exclude testifying witnesses from the 
courtroom pursuant to Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Tr. 53-54). 
The trial proceedings were being broadcast live by various media outlets. For this reason, 
the parties asked that fact witnesses be ordered not to listen to electronic media coverage 
of the trial while under subpoena. 
The Court granted the request, issuing a Trial Witness Exclusion Order on October 18, 
2013. The Court ordered that:_ "All fact witnesses shall not watch or listen to television, 
radio, or internet news coverage of the trial while under trial subpoena." (Order, dated 
10/18/13). 
The Court ordered the parties to "inform their respective fact witnesses of [the] exclusion 
order." Id 
The State immediately undertook efforts to infonn many of its witnesses of the exclusion 
order. 
However-for reasons that remain unexplained-the State did not inform the federal 
jailhouse informants of the exclusion order for almost a week. (State's Opp. Memo, 
Exhibit K, Jan. 28, 2014 Robinson Affid., ,r 11) ("First Robinson Affid. "). 
7. These witnesses did not receive notice of the exclusion order until October 23 or 24, the 








8. After trial, defense counsel filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons. Defense counsel sought disclosure of Inmate 1 's September 2013 and 
October 2013 email and telephone conversations. 
9. Defense counsel received copies of this infonnation in December 2013. The telephone 
conversations clearly indicate that Inmate I-contrary to his trial testimony-was 
watching television coverage of the trial. 
10. Inmate I appears to have been watching television coverage of the trial on and after 
October 18, 2013, the date the Court's exclusionary order took effect. 
The Court's Order To Disclose Impeachment Evidence 
Related to Jailhouse Informants 
11. Before trial, MacNeill moved to exclude the testimony of the jailhouse informants the 
State intended to call at trial. 
12. The Court denied the motion, ruling that (I) the weaknesses of jailhouse informant 
testimony could be exposed through rigorous ~ross-examination; and (2) the jury would 
be instructed on how to judge the credibility of witnesses, and may be instructed on the 
heightened motive of jailhouse informants to misrepresent. 
13. To guard against the very post-trial motions now pending, the Court issued the following 
order: 
I am of the view that because cross examination provides the mechanism by 
which unfair prejudice is avoided, and due process afforded to the defendant, 
there needs to be complete and full disclosure of any promised benefits to the 
inmates. I know there is disagreement between the State and the defense about 
whether or not this has been done. Prior to the date of trial, I will order that the 
State, in writing, disclose to the defense with respect to each inmate who will 
tesnfy, any and all benefit.s promised, expressed or implied, realized now or to 
be realized in the future, in exchange for testimony in the MacNeill case, 
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together with any documentation of the deaL It is only by full disclosure of any 
and all promised benefits that cross examination can be fully effective, such that 
the due process rights of the defendant will be secured. I know the State would 
say that has already been done. I want it put in writing so that it's a part of the 
record, with respect to each inmate. 
(Court Record, Oct. 8, 2013). [Emphasis added]. 
The State's Notice of Benefits Offered or Provided to Jailhouse Informants 
14. On October 15, 2013, the State filed its Notice of Benefits Offered or Provided to 
Jailhouse Infonnants (''Notice"). As to Inmate I, the Notice read: 
(Notice, p. 5). 
The State of Utah has no authority over federal inmates and had nothing to offer 
Inmate #1 in exchange for his cooperation in the investigation and his testimony 
at trial. There is no agreement to exchange Inmate #I's testimony for 
consideration from the State of Utah. Nothing has been given him, and there are 
no promises outstanding. (If Inmate # 1 were to request a recommendation from 
Robinson or the prosecution, that request would be honored. To date, however, 
he has not made any requests for any consideration.) 
15. This statement was not true. 
16. On September 27, 2013 and at Inmate l's request, Investigator Jeff Robinson 
("Robinson") of the Utah County Attorney's Office called Beth Ford, Inmate l's federal 
public defender. Ford asked Robinson to write a letter in Inmate l's behalf after the trial. 
Robinson agreed "to write a letter on [Inmate l's] behalf for his willingness to come 
forward with evidence in this case and for his cooperation." Robinson contacted Inmate 
1 and explained the agreement (First Robinson Affid., 112, 4). 
17. Inmate 1 wanted the recommendation letter to support a Rule 35 motion to reduce his 
federal sentence. (Ford Affidavit, 15). 
18. On the same day that Robinson spoke to Beth Ford, prosecutors filed the State's 
memorandum opposing MacNeill's motion to exclude jailhouse informant testimony. 
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19. In the memorandum, the State wrote: "[N]one [ of the. jailhouse informants] were offered 
anything other than the promise to put in a 'good word' about their help to the federal 
authorities . . . . [T]hese inmates will receive nothing other than a favorable 
recommendation from the prosecution in exchange for their testimonies." (Opposition 
Memo,p. 7). 
20. More than two weeks later on October 15, 2013, the State filed the Notice which 
expressly disclaimed any consideration being given to Inmate 1 in exchange for bis 
testimony. 
21. Prior to the State filing the Notice, a prosecutor met with Robinson and asked him what 
Inmate 1 had asked for in exchange for his cooperation in [the MacNeill] case. (State's 
Sur-Response, Exhibit C, May 14, 2014 Robinson Affid., ,I7) ("Second Robinson 
Affid."). 
22. Robinson (1) said that Inmate 1 had not asked for anything in return for his assistance; (2) 
did not inform counsel that Inmate 1 's attorney had asked for a letter or recommendation; 
and (3) did not inform counsel that Robinson had agreed to write the letter. (Second 
Robinson Affid., ,r7). 
23. In summary, contrary to the State's express representation in the Notice: (1) Inmate 1 
had-through his attorney-asked for consideration (the recommendation letter) in 
exchange for his testimony; (2) the State did have something to offer Inmate 1 in 
exchange for his testimony; (3) there was an agreement to exchange Inmate 1 's testimony 
for consideration; and (4) there were promises to Inmate 1 that remained outstanding (the 
writing of the recommendation letter). 
24. As to Inmate 3, the State's Notice of Benefits read: 
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The State of Utah has no authority over federal inmates and had nothing 
substantial to offer [Inmate 3] in exchange for his cooperation in the investigation. 
There is no agreement to exchange [Inmate 3 's] testimony for consideration from 
the State of Utah. Nothing has been given him, and there are no promises 
outstanding. (If [Inmate 3] were to request a recommendation from Robinson or 
the prosecution, that request would be honored. To date, however, he has not 
made any requests for consideration.) 
(Notice, p. 4). 
25. As it turns out, some of this statement was not true. 
26. On January 3, 2014, the State disclosed to defense counsel a letter written by Inmate 3 to 
Robinson. The letter was written in October prior to Inmate 3 testifying. In the letter, 
Inmate 3 references having previously "asked [Robinson] to write or call my prosecutor 
and give a recommendation for me." (Exhibit 2, Defendant Sur-Reply Memo). 
27. In summary, contrary to the State's express representation in the Notice, Inmate 3 had 
made a request for consideration related to his testimony. 
Inmate 1 's Trial Testimony 
28. At trial, the State called Inmate 1 as its last witness. 
29. He testified that while incarcerated together with MacNeill in 2011, MacNeill confessed 
to (1) giving his wife "some oxy and some sleeping pills"; (2) getting her into the 
bathtub; (3) "helping her out"---meaning that he held her head under the water for a little 
bit; and (4) doing this because MacNeill's wife was "in the way, that she wanted the 
house and kids." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 13-14). 
30. In response to a question from the prosecutor on direct examination, Inmate 1 testified 
that he expected to be incarcerated in federal prison until 2016 (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, 
p.5). 
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31. On cross examination, defense counsel: 
a Caused Inmate 1 to affirm that the Notice was completely accurate. (Tr. Inmate 1 
Testimony, pp. 22-23). 
b. Caused Inmate 1 to affirm that his only motives for testifying were to (1) protect 
others; and (2) to do the right thing as part of Inmate 1 's rehabilitation. (Tr. 
Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 21-22, 25, 45). 
c. Caused Inmate 1 to affirm that besides ''thinking about" a possible benefit to him 
for testifying, he had done nothing else to pursue it. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 
45-46). 
d. Repeatedly confronted Inmate 1 with evidence that his true motive for testifying 
was to obtain a reduction on his federal sentence. This evidence included: 
1. Inmate 1 's statement to his niece, Raven, that (1) he could "testify [for the 
State in MacNeill' s trial] and tell them what I know and come home"; and 
(2) This [referring to testifying] "might get me home." (Tr. Inmate 1 
Testimony, p. 24). 
ii. An August 9, 2013 phone call with Inmate 1 's mother in which he 
admitted that the State was going to cut him a deal, that he was going to 
talk to his lawyer "and find out the real deal. If so, then I'm going [to 
testify]; ifno, I ain't going to, you know." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 
53-54). 
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iii. In the same phone call, Inmate I described how an SIS Lieutenant at the 
prison told him that he "was an idiot if [he did not testify]" and said, "Man 
you could be home." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 53). 
lV. Inmate 1 's statement to his mother, "Let's just keep praying I get home 
around Christmas." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 54). 
v. An August 10, 2013 phone call in which Inmate 1 tells his mother that he 
is ''putting that date, I'm putting Christmas in my head because the thing 
[ referring to the trial in Utah] is going from October to November." (Tr. 
Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 58). 
vi. Inmate l's statement in the same phone call: "He said that the thing is 
going to be going from October 9th to November 9th•2 So then I'm going to 
have from November 9th up until Christmas to get out." (Tr. Inmate 1 
Testimony, p. 59). In frustration, Inmate 1 then testified "I didn't ask for 
anything ... I still haven't asked for anything." Id In response, defense 
counsel confronted Inmate 1 with the rest of the conversation with his 
mother in which he states he is going to 1 ''talk with Raven and have her 
crack down and see what [Robinson] is going to do ... And make sure he 
do the right thing, you know .... Because if he ain't, then I ain't" (Tr. 
Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 60). 
vu. An August 10, 2013 phone call with Raven in which Inmate I states: 
"Hey, we've got to start working on [Robinson] and my lawyer next week 
too." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 61). 
2 This statement was particularly telling because Inmate I had just testified that he did not know when the trial 


















Inmate l's statement to Raven in which he refers to his testimony for the 
State as "Operation Utah." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 62-63). 
Inmate l's concession that he called his lawyer on August 14, 2013 in 
relation to "Operation Utah." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 64). 
Inmate l's statement to Raven that if"they're through [by November 9th] 
(referring to the MacNeill trial)-ifthey're through on the 9th it should 
only take them a month to get me up out of here, and then I'm going to get 
home." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 64). 
An August 16, 2013 telephone conversation between Inmate 1 and Steve 
(his federal defense investigator), in which Steve outlines the plan for 
Inmate 1 receiving credit for testifying in Utah. Steve tells Inmate 1 that 
his defense team would (1) wait to see if Inmate 1 testified; (2) contact the 
prosecutor in Utah; (3) contact the AUSA (assistant U.S. Attorney) and 
tell him what assistance Inmate 1 provided to the Utah people; and ( 4) file 
a Rule 35 motion to reduce his federal sentence. (Tr. Inmate I Testimony, 
pp. 72-74). 
xii. In the same conversation, Steve tells Inmate 1: "I won't say that [the Rule 
35 motion] would do away with those two-and-a-half years [remaining on 
Inmate l's federal sentence] but it certainly I think would put a big dent in 
it ... Who knows, if it's something-if your testimony is really great and 
kind of puts the nail in the guy's coffin, then you know, you might get the 
two-and-a-half off." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 74). 
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xiii. Inmate I's statement in the same conversation that Robinson had told him 
he was ''willing to help me out in any way that he could." (Tr. Inmate I 
Testimony, p. 74). 
XIV. Another August 16, 2013 email between Inmate 1 and Raven in which 
Inmate 1 states "So I talked with my lawyer and they-they say that after 
it is over, I should be coming home." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 98). 
xv. An August I 7, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and his sister in 
which Inmate I reports that he "is excited;' because he spoke to his lawyer 
who said "full speed ahead; let's do this" referring to "Operation Utah." 
(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 76). 
xvi. An August 17, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and Robinson in 
which Robinson tells Inmate 1: "What I really want is to get you out 
before, and I just wish we could do that somehow, some way .... Your 
[sic] really are one ofmy key, absolute key witnesses. So it's really 
important to us to make sure that you are taken care of, and kept safe, and 
you know, I just want to make sure that your needs are taken care of." 
(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 83). 
xvii. In the same telephone call, Robinson states the he lost the contact 
information for Inmate l's federal public defender and defense 
investigator, but that he will call them. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p.p. 83-
85). 
xviii. In the same telephone call, Robinson's stated desire to communicate with 
Inmate l by phone rather than email to so that MacNeill 's defense team 
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would not learn of these communications. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 
86). 
xix. An August 17, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and his mother in 
which Inmate 1 states: "But he's just told me, and I talked to my lawyer 
the other day, too, and they were like 'You know, it will be contingent on 
how key of a person you are."' (Tr. Inmate I Testimony, p. 87). When 
asked whether "it will be contingent" referred to the amount of 
consideration he could get on his federal sentence, Inmate 1 responded, 
"Possibly." Id. 
xx. In the same conversation, Inmate I's statement that Robinson labeled him 
his "No. I." Inmate 1 then states: "He told me I was his No. 1, and my 
lawyer and them was like 'You know, according to, you know, how much 
you know, how good of a key person I am for him, that would decide how 
much, you know, downstroke I got off .... They were like, you know, 
and then he told me, he said, 'Because of the amount of time I have left ... 
I shouldn't even look back, you know what I mean? He said that's the 
deal, you know." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 89). 
xxi. An August 18, 2013 telephone call between an unidentified woman and 
Inmate 1 in which Inmate 1 states he is coming home for Christmas and 
that "between October the 5th and November the 5th [Robinson] will be 
coming to get me. Then after I get through with [Robinson] it will only be 
a matter of, you know, a couple of weeks, maybe a month." (Tr. Inmate 1 
Testimony, p. 91). 
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xxii. In the same call, Inmate 1 states that "whichever one is first"-referring to 
his 18: I Ratio Motion for a reduction in sentence ~r "Operation Utah"-"I 
don't care. If that one comes first then I ain't going to Utah." (Tr. Inmate 
1 Testimony, p. 93). 
xxm. An August 20, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and Raven in which 
Inmate 1 states that Robinson is ''talking good" and that he said "he would 
do what he could for me, but he really couldn't do anything because this 
was a State case. . . . He's going to do whatever he got to do, but you 
know, it's still up to the United States Prosecutor." {Tr. Inmate I 
Testimony, p. 95). 
xxiv. An August 22, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and his mother in 
which Inmate 1 states that "[Robinson is] open any time I need him open." 
(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 96). 
xxv. An August 30, 2013 email between Robinson and Inmate 1 in which 
Robinson says he has "not heard from the Defender's Office or 
investigator" and that he will "try and contact them on Monday." {Tr. 
Inmate I Testimony, p. 100). 
32. This cross examination caused Inmate 1 to make important concessions. For example, 
Inmate 1 testified: 
a. "Well, if you know, everything works out, [testifying for the State] might work 
out to my benefit." {Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 25). 
b. If he did not get a deal from Robinson, Inmate 1 would not testify. (Tr. Inmate I 







c. By providing testimony in "Operation Utah" it was possible for him to get all the 
rest of his federal sentence reduced. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 74). 
d. Inmate 1 's concession that he asked his federal defense investigator and his 
federal public defender to contact Robinson. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 75-76). 







Obtaining a benefit in exchange for his testimony was "in the back of his mind," 
but that his "bigger motivation" was to do the right thing." (Tr. Inmate 1 
Testimony, p. 103). 
Ifhe were to benefit from giving testimony, he would accept it. (Tr. Inmate 1 
Testimony, p. 103. 
His belief he was getting a deal for his testimony changed because he learned that 
federal prosecutors are only interested in "something that happened in my area 
where I'm from"-in Inmate l's case, Tennessee. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 
103). 
He would not lie to get a deal. Id. 
He was concerned about being physically assaulted or killed by inmates who 
discover he acted as a "snitch." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 104). 
It was still possible that he may receive a benefit in his federal case for testifying 
for the State, but that it was "on the U.S. Attorney." (fr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 
107). 
34. On redirect examination. the prosecutor elicited the following false testimony: 
Q. Have you struck any deal with Robinson for your testimony? 
A. No. 
(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p.106). 
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35. On re-cross, Inmate 1 conceded that even though MacNeill confessed in 2010 to 
murdering his wife, Inmate 1 did nothing to report this to authorities until 2013 when he 
"had a hope that that information would get [him] out of prison.,, (Tr. Inmate I 
Testimony, p. 11 I). 
36. Finally, during his trial testimony, Inmate 1 claimed that his "18:I Ratio Motion" filed in 
federal court was the thing upon which his hopes for early release actually centered, not 
any benefit derived from his testimony in this action. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 54-
56, 91-92, 105-107). 
37. When this explanation proved untenable, Inmate 1 took a different tack. He conceded 
that in August 2013, he believed that his testimony for the prosecution might result in his 
going home by December. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 92, 99). However, he had 
recently received a letter from his attorney explaining that this would probably not 
happen. (Tr. Inmate I Testimony, pp. 99-100, 102). 
Inmate J's Trial Testimony 
38. The State called Inmate 3 in its case in chief. 
39. On direct examination, Inmate 3 testified that: 
a. He was incarcerated with MacNeill at Texarkana Federal Prison sometime in 
2011 or 2012. (Tr. 1737, -39). 
b. He worked out and ran with MacNeill three to four times per week. (Tr. 1739). 
c. He never knew MacNeill to have any physical ailments or problems with his 
body. (Tr. 1741). 
d. He read part of a magazine article about the case. This prompted a conversation 
between Inmate 3 and MacNeill. Inmate 3 said, "Doc, they said you murdered 
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your wife." MacNeill responded, "No, I didn't murder my wife. Ifl did, they 
don't have any evidence of it." When pressed about what the article said, 
MacNeill again denied killing his wife and said that ''they didn't have any 
evidence and couldn't prove anything." (Tr. 1742). 
e. After a hearing in which he was denied entry into a half-way house, MacNeill 
referred to his wife as a bitch. (Tr. 1745). 
f. MacNeill referred to Gypsy Willis as his wife. (Tr. 1745-46). 
g. MacNeill remained healthy prior to his release from prison. (Tr. 1748). 
;40. On cross-examination, Inmate 3 admitted that: 
a He had previously told investigators that MacNeill "acted like ... his shoulder 
was hurting him," was "walking crooked," and had "bad feet." (Tr. 1752). 
b. Other inmates ~atched television coverage of the trial (Tr. 1753). 
c. MacNeill was upset that a television narrator had accused him of not performing 
CPR on the day Michelle MacNeill died .. (Tr. 1754). 
d. Inmate 3 had previously fabricated information about another inmate and reported 
it to the FBI. (Tr. 1754-59). 
e. Inmate 3 understood the possibility of a reduction on his sentence but was not 
promised anything. (Tr. 1760). 
41. On redirect, the prosecutor engaged in the following line of questioning: 
Q: Okay, have you received any special treatment from prosecutors in this case 
for what you're doing today? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Testifying. Have you received anything from Federal authorities? 
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(Tr. 1766). 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Is your sentence being shortened at all? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Are you being paid? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Do you have promises that we'll, I guess, ripen, or do you have--do you 
have-you know, have we made you promises for when you 're done testifying 
that you'll get something? 
A: No, sir. 
42. On recross, Inmate 3 again testified that he was not receiving any consideration from the 
State in this case. (Tr. 1767). 
43. On redirect, the prosecutor raised the issue again: 
Q: If you get something beneficial out of this, would that be-would you refuse 
it? 
A: No, sir, I wouldn't refuse it, but I wouldn't ask for it. 
Q: Okay, and you haven't asked for it? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: To your knowledge, have we offered anything to you for it? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Why are you here? 





Jury Instructions On Judging Witness Credibility 
44. At the close of the evidence, the Court gave two instructions on judging the credibility of 
witnesses. 
45. Instruction 27 told the jury what factors to consider in weighing the credibility of 
witnesses generally. It read: 
Witness Credibility 
In deciding this case you will need to decide how believable each witness was. 
Use your judgment and common sense. Let me suggest a few things to think 
about as you weigh each witness's testimony: 
• How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise observe 
what the witness testified about? 
• Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case? 
• Does the witness have any connection to the people involved in this case? 
• Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the testimony? 
• Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is there a good 
reason for the inconsistency? If the witness was inconsistent, was it about 
something important or unimportant? 
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of other evidence 
presented at trial? 
• How believable was the testimony in light of human experience? 
• Was there anything about the way the witness testified that made the 
testimony more or less believable? 
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may also consider 
anything else you think is important. 
You do not have to believe everything a witness has said. You may believe 
part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand, if you are convinced that a 
witness lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In other words, 
you may believe all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. You may believe 
many witnesses against one or one witness against many. 
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's 
memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest mistake. Honest people may 
remember the same event differently. 
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46. Instruction 29 told the jury what additional factors to consider in judging the credibility 
of in-custody informants. It read: 
In-Custody Informant 
You have heard from witnesses who may be classified as "in-custody 
informants." The law allows the use of such testimony. However, the 
testimony of an informant who provides evidence against a defendant 
must be examined and weighted by you with greater care than the 
testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informant's testimony has 
been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is for you to 
determine. In making that determination, you should consider: 
1. Whether the informant has received anything (including leniency in 
prosecution, personal advantage, or vindication) in exchange for 
testimony. 
2. Other cases, and the number of other cases, in which the informant 
testified or offered statements against another, whether those 
statements are being used, and whether the informant received any 
deal, promise,· inducement, or benefit in exchange for, that testimony or 
statement, or believed he was likely to receive some benefit for his 
cooperation; 
3. Whether the informant has ever changed his or her testimony; 
4. The criminal history of the informant, not just limited to number of 
convections, but also the level of sophistication gained through the 
informant's experience in the criminal justice system; and 
5. Any other evidence related to the informant's credibility. 
In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what credence 
and what weight, if any, you would give to the jailhouse informant. 
You should bear in mind that a witness who has entered into such an 
agreement with the government may have an interest in the case different 
than any ordinary witness. A witness who believes that he may be able to 
obtain his own freedom, or receive a lighter sentence by giving testimony 
favorable to the prosecution, has motive to testify falsely. Therefore, you 
must examine his testimony with caution and weight it with great care. If, 
after scrutinizing his testimony, you decide to accept it, you may give it 
whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves. 
Closing Arguments 





The defense challenged [Inmate I] about getting something in return for his trial 
testimony. There's nothing that State investigators, State prosecutors can give 
this individual. I think it's clear from the record that was established that he was 
looking to get something for his testimony. Who wouldn't, quite frankly? But he 
testified it didn't look like anything was going to work out. That he wasn't going 
to get something in exchange for his testimony, because it's a State case and not a 
Federal case .... 
He talked about the risks of coming forward, being killed or stabbed, beaten up ... 
Not only was he-is he not getting anything for his testimony, ladies and 
gentlemen, he's suffering a significant detriment to come forward and tell the 
truth, to make the right decision. Inmate I talked about how he's got another 
couple of years on his sentence. He thinks it's part of his rehabilitation. Do the 
right thing and come forward .... 
Inmate No. 3 talked about how he was friends with Doc, with the defendant. 
They used to lift weights together, they used to run together. They did pushups, 
dips, bench, curls. He used to run four to five miles per day. When asked about 
the defendant keeping up with him, he said, "I couldn't keep up with the 
defendant." 
Then he testified with respect to Michelle MacNeill's death; that the defendant 
said ''Nab, I didn't murder her. Ifl did, they don't have any evidence." Again, 
just saying, "They don't. have evidence to prove it." Talked about the risk of 
being killed, stabbed, raped, or even burned in prison for coming forward. He's 
getting nothing for his testimony. 
(Trial Tr. 2195-96). 
48. In response, defense counsel portrayed Inmate I as a liar, motivated only be a desire for 
self-benefit. {Tr. 2245-47). 
49. Finally, in rebuttal the prosecutor stated that people are motivated to act for many 
reasons. (Trial Tr. 2269). He stated: 
Motive. [The Federal inmates] all told you about the risks that they've taken 
coming out here. They've told you that they-none of them, not a single one has 
gotten anything, or has a guarantee of anything. A couple of them talked about 
the possibility of maybe getting something out this; but again, who can blame 
them? These are men who are spending decades in prison for having a handful of 
crack and a gun; and if doing the right thing can also lead to a benefit for them, 
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who would hold that against them? That doesn't mean that they're lying. That 
doesn't mean that they're making up-making anything up. (Trial Tr. 2268). 
Evidence Discovered After Trial 
50. The jmy convicted MacNeill of murder and obstruction of justice. 
51. Before trial, defense counsel served a Freedom of Information Act request on the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons. The request sought disclosure of Inmate l's August 2013 telephone 
and email conversations. These were disclosed to defense counsel during trial on 
October 28 and November 1, just five days before Inmate 1 testified. 
52. Defense counsel used these emails and telephone conversations extensively during cross-
examination of Inmate 1. 
53. After trial, defense counsel submitted another Freedom of Information Act request 
seeking disclosure of Inmate I's September and October emails and telephone 
conversations. These were disclosed December l, 2013. 
54. The new emails included the following: 
a. A September l, 2013 email from Inmate 1 to Robinson in which Inmate 1 states 
that his 18: 1 ratio motion was "dead in the water" and would not result in his 
being released. 
b. An October I, 2013 email from Inmate I to his mother in which Inmate 1 states 
he got a letter from his lawyer who "talked to Utah and things look good." 
c. Several statements by Inmate I that he planned to be home by Christmas. 
55. The new telephone conversations included the following: 









b. A September 16, 2013 conversation between Inmate 1 and his federal defense 
investigator. The investigator explains to Inmate 1 that his federal public 
defender is ''talking with the people out there in Utah and talking with the 
prosecutor here, to try to get some time off, and her suggestion to you would be to 
cooperate." 
C. A September 28, 2013 conversation between Inmate 1 and his sister in which 
Inmate 1 states that his lawyer thinks he will be home in December . 
d. A September 30, 2013 conversation between Inmate 1 and his federal defense 
investigator. The investigator tells Inmate 1 that his public defender has ''talked 
with the investigator out there, that Jeff Robinson will be providing us and the 
U.S. Attorney's Office with information after the trial about what all you did, you 
know testimony and assistance." 
e. An October 1, 2013 conversation in which Inmate 1 tells his girlfriend that he got 
~ letter from his lawyer who talked to "Utah" and "everything looks good." 
f. An October 13, 2013 conversation in which Inmate 1 tells his mother that he 
"likes Nancy Grace" and that he never watched HLN news before being locked 
up, but now it's "kind of my favorite." 
g. Conversations from October 17-22, 2013 clearly indicating that Inmate 1 had 
been watching television coverage of the trial. 
The Post-Trial Benefits Received b)1 Inmates 1 and 3 
56. One week after MacNeill' s trial concluded, Robinson wrote recommendation letters for 
Inmates 1 and 3. 
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57. Inmate l's letters were directed to the U.S. Attorney's Office and Inmate's 1 's federal 
public defender. In the letters, Robinson describes the evidentiary difficulties the 
MacNeill case presented. He states that Inmate 1 was a "very important witness" and that 
he "highly recommend[s] and encourage[s] [that] leniency be shown to [Inmate I] for his 
truthful and courageous testimony." (Exhibits A and_B, State Opp. Memo). 
58. Inmate 3's letter was directed to the U.S. Attorney's Office. In the letter, Robinson 
describes the same evidentiary difficulties. He states that Inmate 3 was a ''very important 
witness" and that he "highly recommend[s] and encourage[s] [that] leniency be shown to 
[Inmate 3] for his truthful and courageous testimony." (Exhibit D, State Opp. Memo). 
59. In December 2013, a United States District Judge granted Inmate l's Rule 35 motion 
reducing Inmate 1 's sentence to 84 months. Inmate 1 was released from federal prison. 
The same federal judge dismissed Inmate 1 's 18: 1 ration motion because it was moot. 
60. Inmate 3's federal sentence was reduced by 5 years. 
Conclusions of Law 
The Duties of The Prosecutor Relating To Jail.house Informants 
The relationship between the prosecutor and the jailhouse informant is a co-dependent 
one. In some cases, prosecutors need information only a jailhouse informant can give to convict. 
Desperate to secure a promise of early r~lease or some other benefit denied them, informants line 
up to fill the need. Because this relationship is one of mutual benefit, jailhouse informants can 
tell the story prosecutors want to hear, and prosecutors not look too closely at the reliability of 
the storyteller. 
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As one commentator wrote: 
[P]olice and prosecutors are heavily invested in using informants to conduct 
investigations and to make their cases. As a result, they often lack the objectivity 
and the information that would permit them to discern when informants are lying. 
This gives rise to a disturbing marriage of convenience: both snitches and the 
government benefit from inculpatozy information while neither has a strong 
incentive to challenge it. 
Natapoff, Alexandra, Comment: Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful 
Convictions, 31 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 107, 108 (2006). 
In a 2007 policy review, The Justice Project described the problem of the jailhouse 
informant in this way: 
[T]he motive to fabricate testimony is inherent in a system in which [jailhouse] 
snitches are often rewarded for their testimony. J ailhouse snitches, who often 
testify at pivotal moments in criminal prosecutions, have been shown to go to 
great lengths to deceive and misinform in the hopes of improving their current 
situations. With little or nothing to lose, and everything to gain, cunning and 
unscrupulous jailhouse snitches invent narratives and crime details that mislead 
law enforcement officers and contribute to appalling miscarriages of justice. 
Though the legal system is designed to weed out perjured testimony through 
adversarial procedures such as cross examination, the protections currently in 
place have proven starkly inadequate to safeguard□ against unreliable testimony 
by witnesses with powerful incentives to lie. 
Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, A Policy Review, The Justice Project, pp. 1-2 (2007). 
In this arena-where there is a high risk of pivotal, but perjured testimony-the 
prosecutor's professional responsibilities are a critical safeguard to preventing wrongful 
convictions. The prosecutor's ''role transcends that of an adversary: [ a prosecutor] is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty ... whose interest 
... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Doyle, 
2010 UT App 351, ~ 12, quoting, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,675, n. 6 (1985). "The 
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primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice, which can only be achieved by the 
representation and presentation of the truth." NDAA-National Prosecution Standards§ 1-
1.1, 3d Ed. (2009). [Emphasis added]. 
Like jurors, prosecutors should "examine [iailhouse informant testimony] with caution 
and weigh it with great care." (Jury Instruction 29). In doing so, the prosecutor should bear in 
mind that "a witness who believes that he may be able to obtain his freedom ... by giving 
testimony favorable to the prosecution, has motive to testify falsely." Id Meaningful efforts 
should be undertaken to corroborate the information provided. If a prosecutor reasonably 
believes that a jailhouse informant's testimony is false, the prosecutor should refuse to offer the 
testimony at trial. U. R. Prof. Cond. 3.3(a)(3) ("A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence ... that 
the lawyer reasonably believes is false''). 
Once the prosecutor has determined that a jailhouse informant will be called as a material 
witness, the prosecutor must fully disclose anything the informant has received or will receive in 
exchange for that testimony. Bagley, 473 U.S., at 676 (evidence favorable to the accused 
includes impeachment evidence); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). On the 
importance of mandatory pre-1rial disclosures, The Justice Project concluded: 
Mandatory disclosures create a more transparent process, allowing for meaningful 
oversight and adversarial challenge. In fact, the effectiveness of the legal 
system's built-in safeguard of cross-examination is almost entirely dependent 
upon the level of pretrial disclosures. 
Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, The Justice Project, p. 3. 
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The Jallhouse Informant Problems In This Case 
Here, it is unclear what effort prosecutors took to arrive at a reasonable belief that 
Inmates 1 and 3 were providing truthful infonnation. When asked by the defense to disclose 
Inmate 1 's prison emails and telephone conversations, prosecutors declined. They claimed no 
duty to disclose information or records not found in the Utah County Attorney's Office. (State's 
Response to Defendant's Seventh Request for Discovery, p. 2, 8/12/13). 
Apparently, prosecutors made no effort themselves to obtain and examine Inmate l's 
prison communications. Prosecutors do not have a duty to "make an investigation on behalf of 
the defendant" or to "search[] for exculpatory and mitigating evidence." State v. Pliego, 974 
P.2d 279,281 (Utah 1999). But as ministers of justice prosecutors must not call ajailhouse 
informant to the stand when there exists a reasonable belief that the testimony is false. U. R. 
Prof. Cond. 3.3(a)(3). 
Given the powerful incentive informants have to fabricate evidence favorable to the 
government and the prosecutor's primary duty to do justice, prosecutors should undertake 
meaningful efforts to corroborate information provided by jailhouse informants, and to 
investigate informant reliability. Certainly, Inmate 1 's prison communications would have been 
valuable to prosecutors in assessing Inmate 1 's truthfulness. The devastati~g cross-examination 
of Inmate 1 is the best evidence of that. Turning a blind eye to known impeachment materials 
illustrates the "marriage of convenience" discussed above. Both the informant and the 
government benefit from the inculpatory information and neither has "a strong incentive to 
challenge it." Natapoff, Alexandra, Comment: Beyond Unreliable, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 
107, 108 (2006). 
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Investigator Robinson stated that he believed both Inmates I and 3 were telling the truth 
because "certain infonnation [they provided] was not yet public,, and the information could only 
have been known from MacNeill. (State's Opposition Memo, Recommendation Letters, Exhibits 
B and D). Robinson does not say what non-public information was known to Inmates 1 and 3. 
Given the national media coverage of the trial over a period of years and Inmate 1 's admitted 
exposure to the coverage, it is hard to imagine what information could only have been acquired 
from MacNeill.3 
Before filing the Notice, prosecutors made diligent inquiry. In good faith, they asked 
Robinson what promises had been made to the federal inmates in exchange for their cooperation. 
What Robinson told them was not true. Under Utah law, there is no distinction between the 
prosecutor and police officers working the case. "Information known to police officers ... is 
charged to the prosecution since the officers are part of the prosecution team. Neither the 
prosecutor nor officers working on a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or evidence 
valuable to a defendant. The good or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant." State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 923, n. 5. 
In his affidavit, Robinson states that he "did not think to tell [prosecutors]" that Inmate 
l's attorney had asked for consideration and that Robinson had promised to give it. Robinson 
gives no explanation for his failure to disclose that Inmate 3 had personally asked for 
consideration. That this critical infonnation would lapse from Robinson's memory in the face of 
direct questioning tests the bounds of credulity. 
3 Assuming corroboration efforts were undertaken, the problem is that this process and ''the processes by which 
jailhouse snitches are compensated and their testimony is developed are largely hidden from view." Jailhouse 
Snitch Testimony, The Justice Project, p. 3. A robust pre-trial disclosure requirement shines light on this otherwise 
hidden undertaking, and ensures that cross-examination is an effective tool for testing credibility. 
26 
The best explanation seems to be that Robinson lacked experience.4 He failed to perceive 
the gravity of his interactions withjailhouse infonnants and was careless in responding to 
inquiring prosecutors. In his affidavit, Robinson concedes that the MacNeill case was "the first 
and only case [he] had where federal or state inmate witnesses testified." (State's Sur-Response, 
Exhibit B, Robinson Affid., 1 6). 
The State's attempt to down-play the importance of Inmate 1 's trial testimony rings 
hollow. This was a circumstantial evidence case. The evidence collected from the body of 
Michelle MacNeill was inconclusive. Post-mortem redistribution made toxicology evidence 
subject to serious question. There was strong evidence of motive, but-as the defense argued-
being guilty of an extramarital affair does not equate with being guilty of murder. 
MacNeill' s daughters testified against him, but this testimony did not go unchallenged. 
As daughters of Michelle MacNeill they were angered by MacNeill's infidelity to their mother 
and the hasty introduction of his paramour into the family circle. This bias against MacNeill was 
an undercurrent that could not be ignored by the trier of fact 
Evidence that MacNeill had pressed his reluctant wife into cosmetic surgery and then 
secured too much medication from her surgeon was telling. So was MacNeill's destruction of 
those medications within hours of Michelle MacNeill's death. But the most probative and 
damaging evidence admitted against MacNeill was his own confession as rehearsed by his fellow 
prisoner, Inmate 1. State v. Rodriguez, 2012 UT App 81, 16 (defendants confession is "probably 
the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him"), quoting Skilling v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2916 (2010). 
4 It is also plausible that Robinson-a veteran police officer of28 years-did not want to disclose promised benefits 
because this information would be used to impeach Inmate l, a pivotal witness in a high-profile case. 
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Inmate 1 told the jury that MacNeill had confessed to murdering his wife. Out of 
MacNeill's own mouth came the admission that he drugged Michelle MacNeill, got her into the 
bath, and held her under water. Like any good trial attorney, the lead prosecutor saved the 
damning testimony of Inmate 1 for last. 
Finally, the State's non-disclosure was exacerbated by Robinson's silence during trial. 
Robinson knew that Inmates 1 and 3 had asked for recommendation letters in exchange for their 
testimony. Robinson knew that he had agreed to write the letter for Inmate 1. Yet, he sat silent 
during trial, allowing prosecutors to elicit false testimony :from both Inmates 1 and 3. Robinson 
sat silent during closing argument. Prosecutors argued that both Inmates 1 and 3 testified only 
out of a desire to do right, receiving nothing for their testimony but increased risk of harm in 
pnson. 
If MacNeill had only to show that the State committed serious errors in the case, his 
motion for new trial would be granted. But the law requires more. 
Legal Standard and Grounds-Motion For New Trial. 
On motion of a party filed not later than 10 days after entry of sentence, the Court may 
"grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or ,impropriety which had a · 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." URCrP 24(a), (c). If a motion for new trial 
is granted, the moving party "shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held." URCrP 
24(d). 
MacNeill moves for new trial on the following grounds: (1) the prosecutor failed to 
disclose exculpatory impeachment evidence; (2) the prosecutor violated a Rule 16 order 




correct testimony the prosecutor knew or reasonably should have known was false; ( 4) the 
discovery of new evidence after trial; and (5) the prosecutor failed to inform the federal inmate 
witnesses of the Court's order excluding them from the proceedings, including television 
coverage of the trial. 
Legal Standard and Grounds-Motion to A"est Judgment 
A defendant may move to arrest judgment any time prior to the imposition of sentence. 
URCrP 23. The Court shall "arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a 
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment." Id. 
Here, MacNeill contends his stated grounds for new trial constitute "other good cause" 
for arresting judgment. MacNeill does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 
The Alleged Due Process Violations 
1. The Bradv V"wlations 
In Brady v. Maryland the United States Supreme Court held that due process of law is 
violated when the prosecutor withholds material evidence favorable to the accused, irrespective 
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor. Brady, 313 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Giglio v. 
United-States the Supreme Court extended this general rule to include impeachment evidence. 
The Court held that ''when the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt 
or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the] general rule [set 
forth in Brady]. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 154, quoting Napue v. Rlinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959). 
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The Court emphasized that non-disclosure is not enough to establish a due process 
violation. Rather, "a finding of materiality of the evidence is required under Brady." Id The 
Court must determine whether the non-disclosed evidence "could ... in any reasonable 
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." Id, quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271. 
Thus, a due process or Brady violation "occurs only where the state suppresses 
information that (I) remains unknown to the defense both before and throughout trial, and (2) is 
material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a 'reasonable probability' 
that 'the results of the proceeding would have been different."' State v. Doyle, 2010 UT App 
351, 15, quoting State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,133. 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,920 (Utah 1987), citingStricklandv. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Rules of criminal procedure are "meant to 
ensure that a trial is a search for the truth and that the verdict merits confidence . . . . [W]hen 
error has eroded a reviewing court's confidence in the outcome of a particular trial, we should 
start over and conduct a new trial." Id 
The salient question-is where on ''the spectrum of outcome probabilities" a ''reasonable 
likelihoodn might appear. Speaking to this issue, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. This is certainly above 
the "mere possibility" point on the spectrum. If it is "more probable than not" 
that the outcome of trial would have been different, then a court cannot possibly 
place confidence in the verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful reflection suggests that 
confidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short 
of the "more probable than not" portion of the spectrum. It may not be possible to 
define "reasonable likelihood" much more explicitly than this, but the foregoing' 
should be of some assistance in deciding whether an error requires reversal. 
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Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. 
Finally, in connection with the alleged Brady violation, MacNeill contends that the State 
also violated the Court's Rule 16 order to disclose promises made to the federal inmates. The 
State has an obligation to disclose evidence "when required by court order ... pursuant to Rule 
16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 4, quoting State v. 
Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This obligation is independent of the 
State's duties under Brady. 
The Court should grant a new trial only when the discovery violation affected the 
substantial rights of the defendant. Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 9, quoting Knight, 734 P.2d 
913,919 (Utah 1987). Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) ("any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded"). A rule 16 discovery 
violation affects substantial rights when, absent the violation, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result Knight, 734 P.2d at 919, quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 
(Utah 1984). Thus, the legal standard for both Brady and Rule 16 discovery violations is the 
same. 
In this case, the State suppressed exculpatory evidence related to both Inmates 1 and 3. 
Robinson knew that both men had asked for recommendation letters, and (in the case of hunate 
l) Robinson had agreed to provide a letter. This information remained unknown to defense 
counsel before and throughout trial. 5 The issue is whether the information was material-
5 In its memorandum opposing MacNeill's pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of the jailhouse informants, the 
State wrote that none of the informants were offered anything "other than a promise to put in a •good word' about 
their help to federal authorities." (Memo. Opp. Motion to Exclude Jailhouse Informant Testimony, p. 7). However, 
more than two weeks later, the State filed the Notice disclaiming any promises made to Inmates I or 3 in exchange 
for testimony. The State filed the Notice in response to the Court's order and MacNeill was entitled to take the State 
at its word. 
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whether there is a reasonable likelihood that disclosure to the trier of fact would have affected 
the outcome. 
Disclosure of Inmate 3's request for a recommendation letter was not reasonably likely to 
affect the outcome of the trial. On the most important issue, Inmate 3 's testimony was favorable 
to MacNeill. Inmate 3 testified that when confronted about murdering his wife, MacNeill denied 
wrongdoing twice. In light of this favorable testimony, defense counsel wisely chose to limit 
impeachment efforts on cross-examination. 
Inmate l's testimony is a harder call. However, after careful review of the record, the 
Court concludes that disclosure of Inmate 1 's request for a recommendation letter, and 
Robinson's promise to provide it would not have been reasonably likely to affect the outcome of 
the trial. This is so-not because of the State's pre-trial disclosures, examination, and closing 
arguments on the question, which were misleading-but because of defense counsel's withering 
cross examination. 
By use of Inmate 1 's prison emails and telephone conversations, defense counsel painted 
Inmate 1 for what he was-a calculating and sophisticated convict, ready to say or do anything 
necessary to get out of prison early. This was the sole objective of what Inmate 1 called 
"Operation Utah." 
On cross examination, Inmate 1 conceded that if he did not get a deal from Robinson, he 
would not testify. He admitted: (1) calling his federal public defender in relation to Operation 
Utah; (2) directing both his federal defense investigator and federal public defender to contact 
Robinson to determine the real deal; (3) that any reduction in his federal sentence would depend 
on how important a witness he was for the prosecution; ( 4) being told by his federal investigator 
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that if Inmate 1 ''put the nail in MacNeill's coffin" he might get the whole two-and-a-half years 
knocked off his federal sentence. 
Knowing that Inmate l had asked for a recommendation letter and Robinson had agreed 
to provide it would not have changed the verdict because it was clear Inmate I had every 
intention of asking for this benefit. The jury knew Inmate I would not testify in Utah without 
consideration. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 60-61). The key components of"Operation Utah" 
were presented at trial in detail-Inmate l's federal defense team would (I) wait to see if Inmate 
1 testified, (2) contact the prosecutor in Utah, (3) contact the AUSA and tell him what assistance 
Inmate 1 provided to the Utah people, and (4) file a Rule 35 motion to reduce Inmate l's federal 
sentence. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 72-74). 
This is not a case in which the State acknowledged the truth of the undisclosed promise 
or benefit in closing argument See, Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 3. Here-notwithstanding 
Robinson's knowledge to the contrary-prosecutors argued that the jailhouse informants 
received nothing in exchange for their testimony. Raising facts in closing argument that 
undisclosed Brady material could refute is troubling. But closing arguments must be considered 
in their entirety. During closing, prosecutors were compelled by the evidence to concede that 
Inmate 1 was "looking to get something for his testimony." They also acknowledged that 
jailhouse informants appeared in court with mixed motives-to do the right thing, but also to 
serve their own interests. 
The State also failed to disclose an email from Inmate 1 to Robinson in which Inmate 1 
states that his 18:1 Ratio Motion is "dead in the water." This belief was important because it 
contradicted Inmate l's trial testimony. Confronted with the clear objective of Operation Utah, 
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Inmate 1 testified that his hopes for early release were really tied to the pending 18: 1 Ratio 
Motion. 
After careful review of the record, the Court holds that a jury possessed of this additional 
information would not have rendered a different verdict. Cross-examination demonstrated 
Inmate 1 was ready to procure and accept early release by whatever means it could be 
obtained-whether by "Operation Utah" or the 18:1 Ratio Motion. His communications from 
prison demonstrated a strongly held belief that he would be home by December and that 
testifying for the prosecution in Utah was the catalyst for his early release. Inmate l's belated 
attempt to pin these hopes on the 18: 1 Ratio Motion was so inconsistent with his prior statements 
that jurors surely saw the attempt for what it was--a recent fabrication to evade impeachment. 
Additionally, the Court told the jury what factors might be considered in judging the 
credibility of witnesses, including what the witness had to gain or lose from the case. (Jury 
Instruction 27). If a witness testified falsely-which Inmate 1 clearly did-the jury was free to 
disregard his testimony entirely. Id. The Court also instructed the jury to weigh the testimony of 
jailhouse informants with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. (Jury 
Instruction 29). Jurors understood that the interests of Inmates 1 and 3 in the case were different 
than any ordinary witness, and that both had motive to testify falsely. Id. Armed with this 
instruction, the jury surely looked on the jailhouse informant testimony with a cautious and 
critical eye. 
Viewing the record as a whole, this is a case in which "the effective advocacy of [ defense 
counsel] rendered [the Brady violation] harmless." See, Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, 'i[ 3 
( considering the effectiveness of cross-examination in assessing whether non-disclosure of 
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exculpatory evidence undermined confidence in the outcome of trial). For these reasons, the 
Court concludes that the State's failure to disclose Brady material related to Inmates 1 and 3 was 
not reasonably likely to affect the outcome of the trial. 
2. Eliciting and Failing to Correct False Testimony 
Due process has long prohibited the prosecutor from obtaining a conviction through the 
''presentation of known false evidence." Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935);6 Pyle v. 
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942). The Mooney Court explained: 
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and 
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which 
in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a 
deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to 
be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and 
imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of 
justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation. 
Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112; State v. Hewitt, 689 P .2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984) ( criminal conviction 
obtained by use of false testimony violates due process under both State and Federal 
Constitutions). 
The usame result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it 
to go uncorrected when it appears." Napue, 360 U.S. 264,269. See also, State v. Gordon, 886 
P .2d 112, 1 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ( due process oflaw requires that when a prosecutor is aware 
that tes~ony is false, he or she has a duty to correct the false impression). 
As with Brady violations, it is not enough to show that the testimony offered was false. 
There must also be a finding of materiality. "A conviction obtained by the knowing use of false 
6 Brady was an extension of the prior case law related to the knowing use of false testimony. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
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testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could 
have affected the jurfs verdict." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, citing Napue, 360 
U.S. at 271; State v. Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 3 (declining to set aside conviction obtained in 
part by the use of false testimony because there was not a reasonable likelihood that the 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury); Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 
1981) (conviction obtained by knowing use of false evidence violates both State and Federal due 
process if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury) . 
Defendant argues that the harm.less error standard is more exacting and should apply 
here. This standard requires the State to prove that admission of the false testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80 (knowing use of false testimony "is considered 
material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt''). 
The language used to articulate these two standards of review-''reasonable probability 
of a different result" and "hannless beyond a reasonable doubt''-has introduced some confusion 
about what the State must prove to prevail. However, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that "there is little if any difference" between these two standards. See, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 
23-24; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680, FN. 9. (Blackmun, J. opinion,joined by O'Conner, J.). The 
Doyle court seems to acknowledge this, referencing both standards in the same breath. Doyle, 
2010 UT App. 351, ,r 3. 
At trial, the State elicited false testimony from both Inmates 1 and 3. On direct 
examination, Inmate I testified that (1) he had not asked for anything in exchange for his 
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testimony; and (2) that he had not struck a deal with Robinson for his testimony. Inmate 3 
testified that he would not ask for anything in exchange for his testimony. 
This testimony was false and Robinson knew it. Because Robinson is a member of the 
prosecution team, his knowledge is charged to the prosecutors. Knight, 734 P.2d at 923, n. 5. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that prosecutors knew or should have known that the foregoing 
testimony of Inmates 1 and 3 was false. Robinson-and prosecutors to whom his knowledge is 
imputed-did nothing to correct the false testimony either during trial or closing argument. 
The question is whether there is a rea~onable likelihood that the false testimony affected 
the outcome of the trial. The Court holds no. As explained, defense counsel made a strategic 
decision to limit impeachment of Inmate 3 on cross-examination. He did so because Inmate 3 's 
testimony on the key question was favorable. Inmate 3 testified that MacNeill denied killing his 
wife. Cross-examination of Inmate 1 was long, pointed, and devastating. Inmate 1 's true 
motives for testifying in Utah were revealed. It was clear that he had every intention of asking 
for and accepting anything he could get from to secure his early release. 
3. Violating the Order Excluding Witnesses 
At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear 
other witnesses' testimony, or the court may do so on its own. URE 615. Violation of an 
exclusionary order can be grounds for a mistrial, but "the burden is on the accused to 
demonstrate that he has been prejudiced to the extent that a mistrial should be granted.'' State v. 
Curtis, 2013 UT App. 287, citing State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, 112. The violation must be so 
likely to have influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial. State 
v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5,144. Thu~, to prevail on his motion for mistrial, MacNeill must prove 
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nonspeculative facts showing that a witness changed his testimony after hearing court 
proceedings, thereby prejudicing MacNeill to the extent that he cannot be said to have had a fair 
trial. Curtis, at 'if 22. 
MacNeill has failed to prove prejudice. The lion's share or Inmate 1 's testimony was 
consistent with what he had told Robinson prior to trial. The only meaningful difference was 
Inmate 1 's retreat from his first report that MacNeill used "Oxycontin" to drug his wife. At trial, 
Inmate 1 identified the drug only as "Oxy." When asked ifby "Oxy" he meant "Oxycontin," 
Inmate 1 stated: "Oxycontin and Oxycodone are the same thing. Basically one of them has 
Tylenol or Acetaminophen, the other one doesn't. I've had both of them, so I might have said 
Oxycontin or Oxycodone, either one." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 32). 
There is nothing in the record demonstrating what it was Inmate 1 purportedly watched 
about the trial on television, or that his change from "Oxycontin" to "Oxy" was motivated by 
what he saw. Moreover, defense counsel impeached Inmate I with this inconsistency on cross-
examination. Clearly, the State should have informed the federal inmates sooner about the 
exclusion order, especially because the source of jailhouse informant knowledge is so important 
to reliability. However, the Court is not persuaded that the State's delay prejudiced MacNeill. 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
Newly discovered evidence must meet three criteria in order to constitute grounds for a 
new trial: (1) it must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at the trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be such as to render a 
different result probable on the retrial of the case. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 5, ,r 66, quoting State 
v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 'if 11. 
38 
Evidence is not "newly discovered" if it is known to some degree to the defense before 
trial, or if the infonnation is obtainable, or can be made obtainable, prior to the conclusion of 
trial through reasonable diligence. Pinder, at 'tl'tl 73, 75-76. Evidence is cumulative if it is of the 
same character as existing evidence and supports a fact established by the existing evidence. 
State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App. 264, citing Black's Law Dictionary 458 (abr. 7th ed. 2000). 
Moreover, "newly discovered evidence does not warrant a new trial where its oajy use is 
impeachment" Pinder, at 'if 66. 
Finally, a new trial should not be granted unless the newly discovered evidence is 
material. The Defendant must show that the new evidence is admissible, credible, and would 
have such a substantial impact or weight on the jurors that it probably would change the verdict 
in a new trial. Id. at Ttf 60-99; Montoya, at ffll 12-27; State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 'tI 29. Trial 
judg~ are afforded a wide range of discretion in determining whether newly discovered 
evidence warrants the grant of a new trial. Montoya, at 1 10. 
During trial, MacNeill's Freedom of Information Act request was answered. MacNeill 
was provided with the August prison emails and telephone conversations of Inmate I. Defense 
counsel could have asked for a continuance so that Inmate 1 's September and October 
conversations could be obtained, but did not do so. 
Moreover, the September and October material is cumulative. Like the August 2013 
emails and telephone conversations, the September and October communications detail Inmate 
I's continued efforts to advance Operation Utah-testify in Utah, get a letter from Utah, move 
for early release, and be home by Christmas. Cumulative impeachment material would not be 
reasonably likely to affect the outcome of the trial. 
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Double Jeopardy 
Having denied MacNeill's motion for new trial and motion to arrest judgment, the Court 
need not reach the question of whether double jeopardy bars retrial. 
Other Arti.culated Grounds 
The Court concludes that any and all other grounds articulated by MacNeill for new trial 
and to arrest judgment are without merit 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court enters the following ORDER: 
• MacNeill's motion for new trial is denied; and 
• MacNeill's motion to arrest judgment is denied. 
As to these two motions, this is a final order. No further action of the court is required. 
The parties shall appear before the Court on Tuesday, September 2, 2014 at 1:00 p.m. 
to schedule a sentencing date. 
Fourth District Court 
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Defendant, MARTIN MACNEILL, through his attorneys of record, RANDALL K. 
SPENCER and SUSANNE GUSTIN, submit the following memorandum in support of Martin 
MacNeill's motion to arrest judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 
STATE1\1ENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about June 26, 2013, the Utah County Attorney's Office notified MacNeill that it 
intended to call Michael Buchanan, a federal inmate as a witness. 
2. On or about July 25, 2013, MacNeill filed his Seventh Request for Discovery and 
requested information regarding Buchanan and other inmate witnesses. 
3. On or about August 2, 2013, the UCAO responded to MacNeill's Seventh Request for 
Discovery and claimed that it did not "possess" the information about the inmates that 
MacNeill's counsel believed would be exculpatory. 
4. In August, 2013, MacNeill's counsel made numerous contacts with the federal prison 
system to determine how to attempt to obtain the exculpatory information he was seeking, and on 
September 2, 2013, delivered a subpoena/Freedom of Information Act Request to the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons. 
5. On September 12, 2013, MacNeill filed a motion to exclude testimony of the federal 
inmates which the Court subsequently denied, but ordered the UCAO to provide a written 
pleading setting forth any benefits given to the inmates for testifying. 
6. On October 15, 2013, one day before the trial, the UCAO filed a pleading titled, 
"Plaintiffs Notice of Benefits Offered or Provided to Jailhouse Informants." 
7. In the October 15, 2013 pleading, the UCAO stated in relation to Michael Buchanan who 
was designated as Inmate # 1: 
Inmate # 1 was incarcerated in a federal prison in Louisiana when he volunteered 
information about Defendant's case to law enforcement. Investigator Jeff Robinson 





reported by Investigator Robinson. Inmate # 1 's professed motivation for disclosing 
Defendant's statements to police was, "I just, to me I don't want it to happen to his 
girlfriend, because ifhe did it once, he'll do it again." 
The State of Utah has no authority over federal inmates and had nothing to offer 
Inmate # 1 in exchange for his cooperation in the investigation and his testimony at trial. 
There is no agreement to exchange Inmate # 1 's testimony for consideration from the 
State of Utah. Nothing has been given him, and there are no promises outstanding. (If 
Inmate # 1 were to request a recommendation from Investigator Robinson or the 
prosecution, that request would be honored. To date, however, he has not made any 
requests for any consideration.) 
On October 28, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received email correspondence between 
Michael Buchanan and his family for the month of August of 2013. 
9. On the evening of November 1, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received recordings of inmate 




On November 6 & 7, 2013, Buchanan testified during the trial of Martin MacNeill. 
During Buchanan's testimony, he affirmatively stated the following material facts: 
A. (Direct Examination) He expects to be incarcerated until January 2016. 
B. He hasn't talked to anyone about MacNeill's case (other than investigator Robinson) 
C. (Cross Examination) He hasn't asked for any deal in exchange for his testimony. 
D. In August of2013 (the month from which MacNeill's counsel had recorded telephone 
calls and emails) Buchanan believed there was a possibility that he could receive 
some benefit for testifying against MacN eill, but that he had not asked to receive any 
benefit. 
E. He was testifying against MacNeill because it was part of his rehabilitation-'Just 
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trying to do the right thing." 
F. As of the date of testifying, nothing has been given him, and no promises have been 
made in exchange for his testimony, and he has not requested any consideration in 
relation to his testimony. 
G. He hasn't seen Nancy Grace. One time, his family emailed him about it, but he didn't 
watch it because he didn't want it to "cloud his memory." 
H. He isn't planning on any benefit to him, and "besides thinking about it," he didn't do 
anything to pursue any benefit. 
I. The various emails he wrote in August, wherein he was talking about getting 
released, were in relation to a motion he filed regarding a federal case addressing an 
"18:1" ratio for crack cocaine that could cut time offhis sentence, and not about 
receiving consideration in exchange for testifying against MacN eill. 
j. When confronted on cross-examination about an August conversation with Steve 
Speelman, an investigator for his federal attorney, Elizabeth Ford, Buchanan testified 
that he did not ask for a deal, but asked Jeff Robinson to talk to his lawyers about a 
possible deal. 
K. Buchanan testified that his subsequent contacts with Robinson were not about getting 
a reduction in his federal sentence, but were only about his concern about the trial 
being televised. 
L. In August of 2013, he believed that Robinson's statement of Buchanan being his # 1 




of trial], he was just counting on his pending 18: 1 motion to get him out by 
Christmas. 
M. He reaffirmed that he did not lmow he would get anything by coming to Utah to 
testify. 
N. Robinson said he would do what he could, but really couldn't do anything because 
this was a State case, and he's a federal inmate. Robinson said he "possibly'' could do 
something, but probably not. 
0. He thought, in August 2013, that coming to Utah would help him, but recently 
learned in a letter from his lawyer that he probably would not get any benefit from 
testifying in Utah. 
P. (Redirect Examination by Prosecution) At first, he came forward because he thought 
he could possibly get out, but the bigger motivation is "it's wrong-something like 
murder is wrong, not acceptable." In the back of his mind, he thought "maybe he 
could benefit." 
Q. The federal prosecutors won't do a deal unless the state case happens in his area, and 
he's from Tennessee, not Utah. 
R. 
S. 
He is still expecting to get home because of his 18: 1 motion, "still waiting on that 
motion." 
Q: (by Prosecutor Grunander) Have you struck any deals for your testimony with Jeff 
Robinson? 
A: No Sir. 
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Q: Have you struck any deals for your testimony with the UCAO? 
A:No 
Q: Have you struck any deals for your testimony with the federal prosecutor? 
A:No 
T. Buchanan's lawyer told him to only plan on the pending motion (18:1 ratio motion), 
and didn't know if his testimony in Macneill' s case would help at all. 
U. Right now, his expected release is still January of 2016. 
12. After the trial concluded, MacNeill's counsel submitted another subpoena/FOIA request 
to the United States Attorney to get more information. 
13. On or about December 4, 2013, a federal Judge in Tennessee signed an order pursuant to 
a stipulated sealed motion filed by Elizabeth Ford on behalf of Michael Buchanan ordering his 
release from prison. 
14. On or about December 4, 2013, the same federal judge dismissed Buchanan's motion 
pursuant to the 18: 1 ratio because it is moot in light of the motion to dismiss being granted 
because of Buchanan's substantial assistance in the MacNeill case. 
15. On or about December 6, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received additional information from 
the United States Attorney's Office which included some emails and telephone calls made by 
Buchanan in September and October of 2013. MacNeill's counsel did not immediately review 
the new information due to other pressing matters. 
16. On December 20, 2013, MacNeill's counsel checked Buchanan's inmate status out of 
curiosity, and learned that Buchanan had been released from federal custody as of December 13, 
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2013. MacNeill's counsel then reviewed the emails and phone calls in earnest, and discovered 
the following: 
(Newly Discovered Emails) 
17. On Sepember 1, 2013, Buchanan emailed Jeff Robinson at the UCAO and said: 
18. 
19. 
looks like the release thing is dead in the water. the courts reversed the decision that I was 
going to get my action on. So it looks like you will have to have to come and get me. 
:( ..... .i am still ready and willing and I am happy to lmow that you will be able to keep 
us off of court tv. Please continue to try and contact my lawyer, Beth Ford, or her 
investigator Steve. Thank you very much and I am glad that you figured this system out 
because so many people have a hard time doing it. I look forward to keeping in touch. 
Michael 
On September 2, 2013, Robinson emailed the following back to Buchanan: 
I am sorry to hear about your court issues! I was also hopeful you would be released. I 
really appreciate your continued willingness to assist in this c~e. I will do my best to 
contact Steve and your attorney tomorrow. I'll be back in contact soon. Take Care, Jeff. 
To MacNeill's counsel's lmowledge, these September 1 & 2 emails between Robinson 
and Buchanan were not disclosed by the UCAO in discovery even though they are exculpatory 
because they show that, at least as of September 1, 2013, Buchanan knew that his 18: 1 ratio 
motion was not going to lead to his release. 
20. The September emails contain numerous communications with women named Jamie, 
Alisha, and Daphne. Buchanan describes numerous explicit sex acts he wants to do with each of 
them and discusses marrying at least two of them. He repeatedly tells them that he will be home 
by Christmas of this year, and asks them to "just hold on till then," "I hope you have not dumped 
me yet," "I have not promised you anything till now, but ill be home in December!!" etc. 
21. On September 12, 2013, Buchanan emails Jamie that he will "call his lawyer tomorrow." 
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22. On September 16, Buchanan emails his mother that he "had to do lawyer calls." 
23. On September 17, Buchanan emails his mother, "I want to come home bad!!!!!" 
24. On September 18, and multiple other days, Buchanan emails his mother and says, "I'm 
coming home!!!" 
25. On September 30, 2013, Buchanan's mother emails him and says, "plan to watch Jane 
Valez-Mitchell and Nancy Grace this week ... SHOULD BE WORTH WATCHING ... " 
26. On September 30, Buchanan emailed Daphne, and said, "talked with my lawyer this 
morning, things are looking good as planned." 
27. On October 1, 2013, Buchanan emailed his mother, "got a letter from my lawyer today. 
She said she talked to Utah and things look good!!!!!!" 
28. Buchanan continued to email Jamie, Daphne and Alisha about his homecoming plans, 
and that "the closer I get to home the slower this time rolls," "im not doing nothing but counting 
down the days!!!," "!just got finished cleaning out my locker and getting things slimmed down 
to only the things I need to survive 2 more months!!!!!!!," and "I'll be home in late December." 
(Recently Received Telephone Calls) 
29. On September 13, 2013, in a telephone call with his mother and father, Buchanan states: 
I'm trying to do all this shit, trying to come home .... I was trying to call my 
lawyer today, because they supposed to be telling me what's really going to, you 
know, yea, or nay, before I go up there, but they wasn't in, so it was kind of a big 
let down .... Hopefully, I'll be home around Christmas, that's what I'm hoping. 
30. On September 13, 2013, in a telephone call with his niece Raven, Buchan states, "Just 
hold on 'til December chick, I'm trying to be out of here in December .... Once I fmd out that, it 
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be a green light chick, hopefully December, I'll be home and we'll be getting us apartment in 
Montgomery, having a bangfest up in there, naked chicks everywhere, poppin the mollies." 
[Molly is a party drug similar to Ecstasy]. 
31. On September 13, 2013, Buchanan speaks to another woman named "Rhonelle" and told 
her that he would be getting out "hopefully, before Christmas ... .It's pretty much definite .... This 
shit's going down .. .It's going down this time. This is it." 
32. On September 14, 2013, Buchanan speaks with an unknown male and says, "Better clear 
your calendar for December, cause it be poppin"' 
33. On September 16, 2013 Buchanan speaks to investigator Steve Speelman with the federal 
defender services: 
MB: So what do you think I should do, do you think I should go ahead and do it? 
S: Well that's going to be up to you, uh, hold on. Let me see if Beth is in, and see what 
she might suggest for you [Steve puts down the phone] .... Hey Mike, she was in, and she 
said she was working on it, in terms of talking with the people out there in Utah and 
talking with the prosecutor here, to try to get you some time off, and her suggestion to 
you would be to go ahead and cooperate. 
MB: Okay, so she thinks it's going to be okay then. 
S: I guess so, with that. 
34. On September 17, 2013, Buchanan calls Raven back and says, "Jeff's talking right 
still .... He's going to see all of us. There's more than me .... I'm the ringleader though." 
Regarding coming home, Buchanan and Raven discuss the following: 
R: So after that, what's going to happen? 
MB: Probably around December? 
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R: So, like regardless of the decision, that's what they're going to go with? 
M: Yeah, regardless, win or lose, December. 
35. On September 22, 2013, Buchanan calls one of his girlfriends, who is also the mother of 
his daughter. Buchanan not only tells his girlfriend that he is coming home in December, but 
speaks to his daughter and also tells her that he is coming home. Buchanan then tells his 
girlfriend, after she gets back on the phone, that "she must know it is true" [that he will be 
released] because Buchanan told his daughter. 
36. On September 28, 2013, Buchanan calls his sister and tells his sister that his lawyer 
thinks he will be home in December. 
37. On September 29, 2013, Buchanan calls another one of his girlfriends, and she asks if"he 
got one"-referring to a deal, and Buchanan replied excitedly, "You know I did!" 
38. On September 30, 2013, Buchanan calls his attorney and speaks with Steve Speelman 
again. Speehnan tells Buchanan: 
Steve: Beth has talked with the investigator out there, that Jeff Robinson will be 
providing us and the U.S. Attorney's Office with information after the trial about what all 
you did, you know testimony and assistance ... and she'll send that to Dave Jennings, one 
of the supervisors, at the U.S. Attorney's Office and when he gets that, he'll act 
accordingly. When you testify and you get back, let us know that for sure too because 
you told us that it would be the first of November. You might get in there early. We'll 
get in touch with that investigator and go from there. 
MB: Sounds good. 
S: Yes it does sound good. (Both Buchanan and Steve chuckle). 
S: Hang in there. 
39. On October 1, 2013, Buchanan speaks to one of his girlfriends and tells her that he got a 
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letter from his lawyer, in which the lawyer says that she talked to "Utah" and "everything looks 
good." His girlfriend then expresses her sexual excitement. Buchanan then says something that 
was not completely decipherable about Bruce Richardson still being in the hole. 
40. On October 2, 2013, Buchanan speaks to his mother and expresses his happiness about 
getting a letter from his lawyer. 
41. On October 5, 2013, Buchanan calls his mother, and they speak about watching the Dr. 
Drew special about the MacNeill case. 
42. On October 9, 2013, Buchanan calls one of his girlfriends and says, "Did I tell you what 
Jeff said, Utah? Going in a couple weeks ... " "Shouldn't be long at all when I get back." "I'll be 
banging up in that [explicit sexual act]." 
43. On October 11, 2013 Buchanan speaks to another girlfriend and discusses his excitement 
about coming home and seeing his daughter. 
44. On October 13, 2013, Buchanan calls his mother. She discusses her concern that 
MacNeill may commit suicide, and they are concerned that Buchanan would not be able to do 
what he is going to do. They discuss that MacNeill "aint guilty yet," and Buchanan said, "he will 
lose." Mom asks: "What if Nancy Grace calls and offers big bucks to say something?" Buchanan 
answers excitedly, "Take it!...When I come home, I'll give you a phone# to call Nancy Grace.'' 
Buchanan again says that Robinson told him that he is ''# 1." 
45. On October 13, 2013, Buchanan called his mother again and says that "no one is by the 
phone, so he can talk now." Buchanan says, "I aint worried about any repurcussions." "He's just 
an old shriveled up doctor." "He aint mafia." Buchanan says that he likes Nancy Grace-she 
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tells the truth. His mom says, "I hope they pay me" because she needs the money. Buchanan then 
instructs his mother to tell Raven to only talk if they pay her. Buchanan then explains that he 
never watched HLN news until he got locked up. Now, "its kind ofmy favorite." 
46. On October 13, 2013, Buchanan spoke with his sister Stephanie and explained that he has 
talked to the prosecutor, and his face is going to be blanked out, and that it is supposed to start 
next week, and ''whatever it talces to get home .... Hopefully, we'll all be together for Christmas." 
Buchanan says that he "Needs [Martin's] ass alive and well," and that "he can hang himself' 
after he testifies against him. 
47. On October 13, 2013, Buchanan spoke with Raven and told her to "tell the press 
everything they want to know if the money is right, and that hopefully, he'll be home in 
December, and that his lawyer said everything looks good, so it just talces a couple weeks after 
they do it to put the motion in and they grant it .... After I get out, I don't give a fl'*k .... I'm a 
little nervous and a little excited. I ain't scared, just excited." 
48. On October 14, 2013, Buchanan called his Dad and said that he turned on the TV and 
saw somebody that he knew [MacNeill] and that he had lost a lot of weight and was looking 
stressed, and Buchanan laughed. 
49. On October 16, 2013, Buchanan called a girlfriend and told her that he was about to come 
home, and asked her if she was going to come and pick him up because he is getting released. 
50. On October 17, 2013, Buchanan called his parents and his mother mentions that the news 
"is loaded," and Buchanan says, "I kn.ow, I've been watching them .... Prosecution called their 
first witness .. .I saw some of it." His mom said the defense lawyer is smiling at the witnesses and 
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asking ''tricky questions." 
51. On October 18, 2013, Buchanan called his parents. Buchanan said that he got up at 6:00 
a.m. and walked into the TV room, and the trial was on two TV's. Buchanan further said, every 
time he walks by, and every time he turns on the channel, it's on. His mother said that he had to 
be very consistent in his testimony, and "stick to what you know" and what you say. Buchanan 
then said that Martin told him that he gave the bitch some oxycodone, some promethazine, and 
some sleeping pills. "That promethazine stuff ... that kills .... " Buchanan's mother then said that 
the sleeping pill was Ambien. 
52. Buchanan did not refer to promethazine in his interview in May of 2013 nor in his trial 
testimony. His reference to promethazine is clear evidence that Buchanan is getting information 
from the media. 
53. On October 20, 2013, Buchanan called his mother, and reports that he "saw a little bit of 
the trial this morning." "They had the bath tub." "Tall skinny man is asking the questions." "I 
saw the neighbors testify." 
54. On October 20, 2013, Buchanan spoke to his niece Raven, and she tells him to ''be 
careful, the dude is going to eat you alive .... You have got to stick to your story." Buchanan says 
that he "saw a little bit this morning." 
55. On October 21, 2013, Buchanan called his mother, and discussed that he was leaving 
soon. His mother said ''that guy is going to try and shake you and rattle you" and that it is going 
to "ruin your chances" if you get rattled. 
56. On October 21, 2013, Buchanan called his girlfriend, Daphne, and said, "If you put [TV] 
13 
on Nancy Grace at 8:00 o'clock. There is an update on it every morning on HLN." "Every time 
you cruise the channels, cruise by there and you '11 see it." Later in the call, Daphne says that she 
is hoping that this is it for ''us"-no more separations. Buchanan responds and says "I'm hoping 
for that too." Daphne asks, "are you going to marry me? Buchanan responds "of course, why 
not." (Buchanan has at least three women expecting him to marry them when he gets out). 
57. On October 22, 2013, Buchanan calls Raven. He told her he saw [MacNeill's trial] that 
morning. Raven asks if it will take more than two weeks for the paperwork after he is done, and 
Buchanan responds that it just depends on how fast they get in touch with Jeff, and how fast Jeff 
tells them what went on. 
58. On October 22, 2013, Buchanan called Daphne and said that hopefully, it wouldn't be 
long until he gets home. Daphne said that she watched the trial ''today,"and Buchanan asked 
what they were talking about. 
(Post-trial Disclosure From UCAO) 
59. On December 23, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received a letter (which wasn't actually seen 
until December 24, 2013) from Chad Grunander which was dated December 18, 2013, and 
postmarked on December 20, 2013. Included in the letter was a suicide note written by MacN eill 
on or about December 5, 2013 professing his innocence in his wife's death. The suicide note was 
apparently written shortly before MacNeill lacerated his femoral artery with a razor blade 
expecting to die. Also included in the letter from Mr. Grunander was a letter from Jeff Robinson 
to: 
W. Brownlow March, Esq. 
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60. 
U.S. Attorney Office 
800 Market Street, Suite 211 
Knoxville, TN 3 7902 
Robinson's November 15, 2013 letter was written just a week after the conclusion of 
MacN eill' s trial. 
61. In Robinson's letter, he informs the U.S. Attorney that "Mr. Buchanan was a very 
important witness in the case. While I understand this is a state case and may have little impact 
in the federal system, I highly recommend and encourage leniency be shown to Mr. Buchanan 
for his truthful and courageous testimony in our case ... .I appreciate any consideration you can 
show Mr. Buchanan as a result of him assisting in our case." 
62. Also enclosed in the UCAO's letter and disclosure received by MacNeill's counsel on 
December 23, 2013, was a letter from Buchanan's attorney, Elizabeth Ford, to Jeff Robinson, 
dated December 10, 2013. Ms. Ford writes to Jeff regarding Buchanan as follows: 
Dear Jeff: 
I thought that you would like to see what happened as a result of the very complete letter 
you sent to the United States Attorney's Office. Michael's time was reduced to time 
served. He should be released on Sunday. Thank you so much .... Elizabeth B. Ford. 
63. Consistent with the Robinson's representations in his November 15, 2013 letter, the 
UCAO relied extensively on Buchanan's testimony during MacNeill's trial. Buchanan's 
testimony was a significant part of both the prosecution's opening statement and closing 
argument. The prosecution also questioned Dr. Grey about the possibility of Michele MacNeill 
dying pursuant to a hypothetical consistent with Buchanan's testimony. 
64. The little impeachment evidence (August 2013 emails and phone calls of Buchanan) that 
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MacNeill's counsel was able to obtain prior to trial was not enough for the UCAO, and likely, 
the jury to seriously question Buchanan's credibility. 
65. The newly discovered evidence referenced above shows that Buchanan testified falsely 
about a number of material facts; it also demonstrates UCAO investigator Robinson was actively 
involved in planning a deal for Buchanan that MacN eill suspected, but could not prove at trial 
based on the information that had been disclosed or obtained by his counsel. 
66. The circumstances surrounding consideration given or promised to Buchanan is similar to 
the UCAO's handling of another inmate witness, Jason Poirier. As set forth in MacNeill's 
motion to exclude Poirier (filed on or about September 14, 2013), in January of 2013, based on 
recorded jail conversations subpoenaed by MacNeill, Poirier understood the deal he was going to 
receive in exchange for his testimony. In June of 2013, Poirier was treated consistent with his 
understanding of "the deal" even though the UCAO claimed it did not formally give Poirier a 
deal that could be used to impeach him. Similar to the Poirier deal, the UCAO apparently 
established a framework for Buchanan's deal before trial, but did not consummate it, and 
therefore, did not disclose it before trial. The new evidence confirms that prior to MacNeill's 
trial, Buchanan understood that Robinson was actively speaking with Buchanan's attorney about 
the manner in which Buchanan would receive consideration for his testimony. 
67. Apparently due to the perception that Buchanan's deal had not been completed, the 
UCAO presented Buchanan as a witness testifying against MacNeill as a result of his supposed 
moral obligation to society and in furtherance of his own "rehabilitation." Buchanan presented 




of his testimony. 
68. In reality, Buchanan, like Poirier, had a plan to benefit--to get out of jail--as a result of 
testifying against MacNeill. Contrary to his trial testimony, Buchanan firmly believed that, win 
or lose, his cooperation was going to lead to his release from prison before Christmas. 
Consistent with those beliefs, the UCAO fulfilled its bargain and wrote the post-trial letter 
consummating the deal. 
69. Robinson was present in the courtroom throughout the trial as the State's designated case 
officer exempt from the exclusionary rule. If the prosecutors did not know of Buchanan's 
perjured testimony, as a member of the UCAO, Robinson had a duty to inform the prosecutors 
during the trial. 
70. On or about July 11, 2012, Robinson submitted a sworn affidavit to Judge Howard in 
support of a wiretap of MacNeill 's electronic communications. In his affidavit, which was read 
and approved by at least three members of the UCAO, Robinson described in great detail all of 
the evidence he had collected against MacNeill, and proclaimed that it did not amount to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he could not proceed with the case against MacNeill without 
the evidence he hoped to obtain from the wiretap. Pursuant to Robinson's affidavit, Judge 
Howard signed an order authorizing the wiretap and stated that the UCAO had stated the case 
against MacNeill could not proceed from an evidentiary standpoint without the information it 
hoped to obtain from the wiretap. 
71. The wiretap took place, and no incriminating evidence against MacN eill was obtained. 
The UCAO filed charges against MacN eill anyway based on the fact that it only needed probable 
17 
cause to ethically file charges against MacN eill rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
72. Through the course of pre-trial motions, much of the purported evidence which Robinson 
included in his July 11, 2012 affidavit was excluded from being presented to the jury-further 
weakening the case which he admitted did not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(Additionally, significant portions of Robinson's July 11, 2012 affidavit contained inaccurate 
statements of evidence). 
73. The only significant new evidence that was presented at trial that was not known to the 
UCAO in July of 2012, was the inmate testimony. 
74. Five inmates testified at trial. Neither Christifa Knowles, Johnny Vaughn nor Gilbert 
Barrera testified that MacNeill admitted to harming Michele. Jason Poirier testified that 
MacN eill told him three days after meeting MacN eill, that "he had gotten away with killing his 
wife," and that he was "glad the bitch was dead" After subpoenaing records from the Utah 
County Jail, MacNeill was able to effectively impeach Poirier and demonstrate that Poirier was a 
liar and fraudster. On cross-examination, the defense played a recorded phone call for the jury 
where Poirier discusses setting up a friend of his to be falsely accused of committing a crime. 
75. Michael Buchanan was the only person who provided any evidence to the jury about 
what allegedly occurred between 9:30 and 11 :00 a.m. on April 11, 2007-the time frame in 
which the UCAO argued during its closing argument--that MacNeill must have killed Michele. 
The materiality and importance of Buchanan's testimony cannot be overstated. 
ARGUMENT 
MacNeill has repeatedly brought to the court's attention (Judge Mc Vey) the UCAO's 
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discovery violations throughout the litigation in this case. In each instance the UCAO has relied 
upon the notion that a discovery violation discovered prior to trial is not actionable under Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The current discovery violation was not discovered until after 
MacN eill' s trial, therefore an analysis under Brady and its progeny is appropriate. 
I. THE UCAO FAILED TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
Evidence which might be used to impeach a government witness, particularly if 
the witness is important to the government's case, falls within the definition of 
exculpatory evidence. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Suppression of exculpatory evidence violates Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16 as well as state and federal law. Rule 16 provides, in part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: .... 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment[.] 
The "prosecution" referred to in Rule 16 includes the police and all members of the 
prosecution team. State v. Knight, 734 P .2d 913, 918 n.5 (Utah 1987). The prosecution's 
duty is a continuing one. See Id. at 917. The right to discovery is an essential element of 
the due process oflaw in criminal cases. E.g., State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 784 (Utah 
1980), and State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983). As the United States 
Supreme Court held some 45 years ago in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
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(1963),"[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. 
Under the Brady doctrine, reversal is required if exculpatory evidence is unknown 
to the defense prior to or during the trial, if the evidence is material, such that there is a 
reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been disclosed. See State v. 
Eisner, 2001 UT 99, ,r 33, 37 P.3d 1073. The good or bad faith of the prosecution is not 
determinative. E.g., Tillman v. State, 2012 UT App 289, ,r 13, 288 P.3d 318; State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106. 
"The Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained 
by the knowing use of false evidence." Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). Lawyers owe 
a professional duty of candor to the courts, (see Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.3), and when 
they lmowingly present or fail to correct false evidence, this is accurately viewed as a 
"fraud" on the courts, E.g., Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 n.6 (Utah 1989). When a 
prosecutor obtains a criminal conviction through the knowing presentation of or failure to 
correct false evidence, this violates both article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 and 
nn. 1 and 2 (Utah 1984). In Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981), the court 
explained the relevant law in this specific context, stating: 
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It is an accepted premise in American jurisprudence that any conviction obtained 
by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and totally 
incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." The proposition is firmly 
established that a conviction obtained through the use of false evidence known to 
be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, Section 7, of the Utah State Constitution, 
if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury. The same result applies when the State, although not 
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. This 
standard derives from both the prosecutorial misconduct and, more importantly, 
the fact that the use of false evidence involves a corruption of the truth seeking 
function of the trial process. 
Id. at 690-91 (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) 
(the Court must determine if there is any reasonable likelihood that the evidence that was 
tainted could have affected the jury's verdict). 
In the present case, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Buchanan 
lied about having not seen media stories about the trial; he lied about not asking for and 
seeking a deal in exchange for his testimony; he lied about his plans to come home in 
December being related to his "other motion" about the 18: 1 ratio; he lied about not 
talking to other people about his testimony in the MacN eill case; and he lied about not 
learning about relevant information about MacNeill from the media (i.e., promethazine 
statements to his mother, etc.). 
The newly discovered evidence also demonstrates that the UCAO failed to 
disclose the existence of a deal given to Buchanan and its own involvement in that deal 
by contacting Buchanan's federal criminal defense attorney and possibly the assistant 
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United States Attorney handling Buchanan's case. The UCAO also failed to disclose that 
it planned to submit a request to modify Buchanan's federal sentence after the conclusion 
of the MacNeill trial-win or lose. 
The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150 (1972) where the prosecution failed to disclose information helpful to the 
defense in cross-examining a government witness. MacNeill, through his counsel's 
efforts, not by way of disclosure by the State, gathered some evidence to cross-examine 
Buchanan. Despite MacNeill's attempts to attack Buchanan's credibility, he did not 
possess definitive proof of Buchanan's deal or other lies which is demonstrated in the 
newly discovered evidence. The case against MacNeill is a circumstantial one, such that 
even the UCAO, just over a month prior to filing charges, submitted an affidavit to the 
Fourth District Court declaring that it did not have proof beyond a reasonable doubt and 
could not proceed with prosecuting MacNeill from an evidentiary standpoint. The most 
significant addition to the evidence since the UCAO's declaration in July of 2012 is the 
testimony of Michael Buchanan. Indeed, the UCAO referred to him as its #1 witness. 
IfMacNeill had the newly discovered information available to him during the 
trial, he could have definitively demonstrated that not only was Buchanan untruthful, but 
also that the UCAO concealed the truth about consideration given to Buchanan. The 
UCAO's concealment of information about Buchanan's anticipated consideration for his 
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testimony is a violation of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Crim. Proc.; Brady v. Maryland; 
and this Court's order requiring the UCAO to provide written disclosure of benefits to 
inmates for their testimony. The UCAO filed the statement of benefits as ordered by the 
Court, but did not disclose the deal in the works for Buchanan which was known at least 
to Jeff Robinson, the chief investigator for and employee of the UCAO. IfMacNeill had 
lmowledge of the newly discovered evidence in this case, the probability of a different 
result is very high, and according to the UCAO July 2012 affidavit, is nearly certain. 
II. MACNEILL'S DISCOVERY OF MICHAEL BUCHANAN'S PERJURY IS 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
Assuming arguendo that the prosecution did not fail to disclose exculpatory evidence 
related to Michael Buchanan as argued in section I above, MacNeill's due process rights to a fair 
trial were still violated based upon perjury committed by Michael Buchanan. In State v. James, 
819 P .2d 781 (Utah 1991 ), the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying James's motion for a new trial based on similar facts as the present case. 
James learned after trial, that a material witness for the prosecution was overheard telling another 
inmate that he fabricated his testimony in an attempt to get better treatment from the prosecutor. 
Id. at 793. The Utah Supreme Court applied a three part test and granted James a new trial: 
Id. 
(1) It must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at the trial; 
(2) It must not be merely cumulative; [ and] 
(3) It must be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case. 
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In the present case, MacN eill could not have discovered the information demonstrating 
Buchanan's perjury with the exercise of reasonable diligence. MacN eill' s counsel acted 
reasonably within their power to obtain exculpatory information. MacNeill requested the UCAO 
to obtain Buchanan's phone calls and emails from prison. The UCAO refused to do so. When 
MacN eill was forced to obtain the information, his counsel learned that he could not simply 
subpoena the federal government. The United States Supreme Court held in Touhy v. Ragen, 340 
U.S. 462 (1951), that a subpoena served on the federal government must be treated as a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request. One of the many restrictions ofFOIA is that a party cannot 
request records that will be created in the future. Accordingly, when MacNeill first prepared his 
FOIA request to the federal government about Michael Buchanan at the end of August of 2013, 
he was limited to requesting only information that had been created up to that point in time. 
MacNeill did not know what, if any, information he may receive about Buchanan. Due to 
the United States government shut down, the processing of MacN eill' s request was delayed. He 
did not receive Buchanan's August emails until October 28, 2013 and his August phone calls 
until the evening of November 1, 2013. MacNeill requested information from December 2012 to 
August 31, 2013, but only received emails and phone calls for one month--August of 2013. 
Because MacNeill's trial was coming to a close, MacNeill's counsel and those assisting, 
worked "around the clock" before Buchanan took the stand on November 6, 2013 to digest the 
information received. Under the circumstances, counsel for MacNeill did the best job he could 
to cross-examine Buchanan. The trial ended on November 8, 2013, and MacNeill's counsel did 
not have a reasonable opportunity to submit another FOIA request before the trial ended. 
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After the trial concluded, MacNeill submitted another FOIA request and obtained the 
additional exculpatory information that is the subject of this motion. 
Second, the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative. MacNeill's counsel 
suspected that Buchanan was not telling the truth during trial, but lacked the information to prove 
it. When MacNeill confronted Buchanan with his email from May of2013 (which was provided 
by the UCAO) and emails from August of 2013 suggesting that Buchanan was contemplating 
consideration in exchange for his testimony, Buchanan admitted that it was only in the "back of 
his mind" in August. Later, on redirect, Buchanan testified that after August, he learned that it 
wasn't really possible for him to benefit because MacNeill's case was a Utah State case, and 
Buchanan's charges were Tennessee federal charges. Buchanan went so far as to testify that his 
lawyer had sent him a letter stating that it was very unlikely that he would get any benefit from 
testifying against MacNeill. MacNeill had no ability to prove otherwise at trial. 
The newly discovered evidence indicates that the letter from Buchanan's lawyer was 
exactly the opposite of Buchanan's trial testimony. The new evidence shows that Buchanan's 
lawyers and UCAO investigator Jeff Robinson had a plan in place at least as early as September 
2013 wherein Buchanan would testify, and when the trial was over, Robinson would write a 
letter to the federal prosecutor seeking consideration for Buchanan. Accordingly, Buchanan's 
lawyer recommended that Buchanan testify. The plan materialized exactly as discussed in 
September, and an order was signed releasing Buchanan from prison on December 4, 2013. 
Similarly, during the trial, MacNeill was not able to substantially impeach Buchanan 
regarding his claim to have never watched media coverage about MacN eill' s case. With the 
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newly discovered emails and phone calls, it is clear that Buchanan perjured himself. 
Like James, the newly discovered evidence identified in the facts above is not simply 
impeachment evidence. Rather, it is independent evidence demonstrating a deliberate 
commission of perjury with the intent to subvert the trial process to Buchanan's own ends. 
Third, the newly discovered evidence renders a different result probable in the retrial of 
MacNeill' s case. Buchanan's testimony was the only' direct evidence presented at trial regarding 
what MacNeill allegedly did on the morning of April 11, 2007 to cause Michele MacNeill's 
death. The UCAO relied on his testimony in opening statement, in examination of expert 
witnesses, in closing arguments, and acknowledged to the federal judge in Buchanan's case that 
his testimony was "very important." Independent of the Brady arguments set forth in section I, 
MacNeill is entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of Buchanan's perjury 
at trial and his clear plan to commit fraud on the court in order to benefit himself. 
ID. MICHAEL BUCHANAN VIOLATED THE COURTS ORDER APPL YING 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO ALL FACT WITNESSES 
In addition to the discovery rules addressed above, either the UCAO or Michael 
Buchanan violated this Court's order that the exclusionary rule applied in this case. The Court 
instructed counsel for both sides to instruct all of its non-expert witnesses to refrain from 
watching television coverage of the trial. The application of the exclusionary rule in this case 
was especially important because MacNeill's case was the first case in Utah where cameras were 
allowed inside the court with the proceedings being streamed nationwide. 
This newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Michael Buchanan violated the 
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• 
Court's order in relation to the exclusionary rule. As was discussed at trial, there are a number of 
ways that the UCAO could have communicated with Buchanan that would not have been 
recorded by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The newly discovered evidence does not contain any 
communication from the UCAO advising Buchanan of the Court's order relative to the 
exclusionary rule. Either the UCAO failed to advise Buchanan in violation of the Court's order, 
or Buchanan knowingly violated the Court's order. Either way, Buchanan admitted in his 
communications with his family and girlfriends that he was watching parts of the trial up until he 
was transported from Texas to Utah on or about October 22, 2013. 
IV. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ARRESTED AND THE CASE DISMISSED; 
ALTERNATIVELY, MACNEILL IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
The Court should arrest the judgment and dismiss this case. The standard for determining 
whether to arrest judgment is the same as an appellate court considering an appeal for 
insufficient evidence. State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872 (Utah 1998) (trial court may arrest a jury 
verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or 
so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element). 
In MacNeill's case, the UCAO presented testimony from three medical examiners. Dr. 
Frikke found that Michele MacNeill died of natural causes. Dr. Grey, after initially agreeing with 
Dr. Frikke, amended the manner of death to be undetermined. Dr. Perper, the State's hired 
expert, found the manner of death to be undetermined. The testimony of Jason Poirier and 
Michael Buchanan was the only significant evidence obtained after the UCAO 's affidavit 
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admitting that it lacked proof beyond a reasonable doubt to proceed with prosecuting MacN eill. 
Without the testimony of Jason Poirier and Michael Buchanan, even when the evidence 
presented at trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the State failed to 
prove a critical element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt-that Michele MacN eill died 
due to the actions of ano~er. The testimony of Jason Poirier and Michael Buchanan is the only 
evidence presented during the trial that Michele MacN eill died as a result of the hands of 
another. Jason Poirier's testimony was so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained doubt regarding the truthfulness of his testimony. In light of the newly discovered 
evidence, it is clear that Michael Buchanan's testimony, like Jason Poirier's, is so inherently 
improbable, that reasonable minds must entertain doubt regarding its truthfulness. MacN eill 
respectfully requests the Court to arrest judgment and to dismiss the charges against MacNeill. 
In the alternative, the Court should grant MacN eill a new trial. The authority cited in 
section I & II above supports MacNeill's request for a new trial due to the lack of fundamental 
fairness of the original trial. Under the Brady doctrine, MacN eill is entitled to a new trial 
when exculpatory evidence was unknown to the defense prior to or during the trial, and 
the evidence is material, such that there is a reasonable probability of a different result 
had the evidence been disclosed. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,133, 37 P.3d 1073. In 
addition to the UCAO's Brady violations, its violations of the exclusionary rule further 
support MacNeill' s request for a new trial even though, standing alone, exclusionary rule 
violations may not be sufficient to obtain a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The UCAO failed to disclose material evidence known to it prior to and during 
trial. The UCAO filed a pleading with the court stating that Michael Buchanan had not 
asked for or been promised consideration in relation to his testimony; the UCAO 
pleading was false. Michael Buchanan committed perjury during MacNeill's trial 
pursuant to a plan to benefit himself by testifying against MacNeill. Michael Buchanan 
violated the Court's exclusionary rule, and watched parts ofMacNeill's trial on multiple 
days as well as news coverage of the trial prior to taking the witness stand himself. 
Without the testimony of Michael Buchanan, the evidence presented by the UCAO 
at Martin MacNeill's trial is so inherently inconclusive, that the Court should arrest the 
judgment in this case. Alternatively, pursuant to the Brady violations committed by the 
UCAO, and Michael Buchanan's perjury, the Court should grant MacNeill a new trial. 
Dated this the 27th day of December, 2013. 
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